Durable Protection in the European Union: The Case of Persons Fleeing Armed Conflicts

Abstract

Using the case of persons fleeing armed conflicts, the present article examines the required pre-condition for local integration in the European Union (EU), namely the grant of durable protection. We define durable protection as a form of long-lasting and secure legal status, which entitles its holders to relevant rights and entitlements capable of leading to local integration. The article uses three case studies, namely Ukraine, Sudan and Syria, to evaluate the durability of the EU and its Member States’ responses to international displacement caused by armed conflicts. The article demonstrates how state practice works to shorten deadlines, thereby reducing attachment to the host country. The article criticises the temporal limitation of temporary protection in the absence of long-term durable solutions and the complex legal regime of international protection that may arise as a result. The article concludes that the last decade of refugee protection in the EU, which has been characterised by large influxes of persons fleeing from conflicts in countries such as Syria, Ukraine and Sudan, indicates a tendency for the EU and EU Member States to provide only short-term solutions to displacement. Reduced durability contributes to the weakening of refugee protection in the EU.

1. Introduction

Violence in the context of armed conflicts is one of the principal contributors of forced migration in the world. The nexus between displacement and conflict is illustrated by the fact most displaced persons flee countries experiencing protracted or renewed conflicts such as Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan and Ukraine (UNHCR 2025a). UNHCR has identified three durable solutions to displacement, namely voluntary return to the country of origin (repatriation), resettlement to a third country, or local integration in the host country. Using the case of persons fleeing armed conflicts, the present article contributes to the literature on the third of these, local integration (Fitzpatrick 1994; Durieux 2014; Hovil and Maple 2022), by examining the required pre-condition for local integration in the European Union (EU), namely the grant of durable protection. We define durable protection as a form of long-lasting and secure legal status, which entitles its holders to relevant rights and entitlements capable of leading to local integration. Drawing on Hathaway’s scholarship, we also conceive of the rights attached to refugee protection as enabling refugees to make their own decisions about how to respond to their displacement, and, if they wish, to pursue a durable solution (Hathaway 2005).

Whereas most persons fleeing armed conflicts become internally displaced, many cross international borders in search of protection (UNHCR 2025a). The main international legal instrument for the protection of persons fleeing persecution and serious harm is the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. It defines a refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Refugee Convention 1951, art. 1A(2)). As Hathaway noted, the protection of refugees is best secured by invoking widely ratified treaty law, like the Refugee Convention itself (Hathaway 2005). Under the Refugee Convention, the rights of refugees accrue on the basis of the nature and duration of the attachment to the host country (Hathaway 2005). Khan and Ziegler argue that naturalisation, as encouraged by the Refugee Convention, is the durable solution on par with resettlement and repatriation, rather than local integration (Khan and Ziegler 2021, p. 1047). Hence, whilst the Refugee Convention does not mandate permanent residence or naturalisation, the recognition of refugee legal status is an essential first step to guarantee the set of rights that will enable refugees to integrate into the host country thereby enabling the choice of a durable solution.

Although there is nothing in the Refugee Convention which explicitly excludes from its scope persons fleeing armed conflicts, its restrictive interpretation by States, particularly in Europe, has led to the exclusion of many refugees in practice (Querton 2023). Instead, the EU and its Member States have developed and codified several alternative legal protection statuses, often described as complementary or subsidiary to refugee protection. The rights and entitlements associated with these alternative forms of protection are all more temporary in nature than refugee status under the Refugee Convention. Thus, although it is generally accepted that the context of armed conflict is not determinative of how an asylum claim is assessed, the EU is the only region in the world to have created a distinct subsidiary protection status for persons fleeing “indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict” (European Union 2011, art. 15(c)). In contrast, refugee legal frameworks in Latin America, the Caribbean and Africa provide for the grant of refugee protection irrespective of whether a person is fleeing a situation of armed conflict and widespread violence where large number of persons are at risk (Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1969; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees 1984). The range of international protection statuses available in the EU that differentiate the type and length of protection granted, based on whether or not the person is fleeing an armed conflict, further increased when EU Member States decided to activate the Temporary Protection Directive. An instrument designed in 2001 for EU Member States to act swiftly in case of large arrivals of persons displaced due to armed conflicts, it was first activated when the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine in February 2022. There are thus two distinct legal statuses and one ‘procedural tool’ (Durieux 2014) in the EU offering protection and rights available to persons in need of international protection following flight from violence in armed conflict.

The complexity caused by overlapping statuses in EU asylum law and continued divergences amongst EU Member States calls for greater analysis of how state practice in the EU contributes to the dilution of durable protection in the EU. This article adopts Durieux’s “clash of times” conceptualisation of the Refugee Convention as working progressively towards integration and naturalisation as a long-term solution whilst nonetheless providing for a refugee ‘deadline’ (Durieux 2014). The article uses three case studies, namely Ukraine, Sudan and Syria, to evaluate the durability of the EU and its Member States’ responses to international displacement caused by armed conflicts. Although the three case studies are not characterised by identical circumstances, most notably Ukrainian displacement being caused by an external act of aggression by the Russian Federation in February 2022, Sudanese displacement being caused by the revival of an internal armed conflict in April 2023, and the ‘end’ of the civil war in Syria following the overthrow of Bashir al-Assad in December 2024, these events offer recent examples of conflict-related international protection needs.

The article demonstrates how state practice in the case of persons fleeing armed conflicts works to shorten deadlines, thereby reducing attachment to the host country. This analysis is situated in the context of the “return turn” in EU asylum law, operationalised through restrictive policies that reinforce the temporary nature of protection (Guild and Groenendijk 2023; Schultz 2021). The article critiques the temporal limitation of temporary protection in the absence of long-term durable solutions and the complex legal regime of international protection that may arise as a result. The analysis also brings to the fore the disparities in treatment of asylum claimants who share the same circumstances of flight, namely violence in armed conflicts, but who originate from different countries. The article concludes that the last decade of refugee protection in the EU, which has been characterised by large influxes of persons fleeing from armed conflicts in countries such as Syria, Ukraine and Sudan, indicates a tendency for the EU and EU Member States to provide only short-term solutions to displacement. The complexity caused by the EU legal framework and its application further contributes to the dilution of refugee protection in the EU. Overall, reduced durability contributes to the weakening of refugee protection in the EU.

Following this introduction, Section 2 sets out the international protection framework for persons fleeing armed conflict in the EU and explains how the different and often overlapping protection statuses provide different levels of durability. Section 3 reviews the implications of granting temporary protection to Ukrainians whilst the war continues and the interplay between the different protection mechanisms by using recent examples of Ukrainians who have sought asylum irrespective of the temporary protection they were given. Section 4 then evaluates recent asylum decisions concerning Sudanese nationals who were granted subsidiary protection and makes the case for the application of the Refugee Convention definition to the circumstances of their flight. Finally, Section 5 discusses the application of cessation provisions to Syrian nationals, which demonstrates another means by which states shorten the duration of international protection in the EU. Section 6 draws together the findings from the case studies and makes recommendations for improved durable protection.

2. The International Protection Framework for Persons Fleeing Armed Conflict in the European Union

The Refugee Convention is an international treaty that was adopted as a response to the Second World War, yet its definition of a refugee does not make any differentiation between whether persons are fleeing situations of armed conflict or times of relative peace (Refugee Convention 1951). Nevertheless, the perception by many States, particularly those that operate highly individualised refugee status determination processes, is that the Refugee Convention does not apply to persons fleeing wars and armed conflicts and that they should be granted complementary forms of protection instead (Wouters 2021). Significantly, many states require asylum applicants who flee widespread violence to demonstrate a risk over and above the rest of the population (Hathaway and Foster 2014, p. 174). Chimni referred to the “myth of difference” in his argument that European States constructed a myth of difference in the 1970s, whereby refugees fleeing post-WWII Eastern Europe fled persecution whilst those fleeing countries in the Global South did not flee circumstances that could be described as persecution (Chimni 1998, p. 350).

Around the same time, the concept of temporary protection emerged worldwide. Although the approach was regularly adopted for persons fleeing in large numbers from situations of armed conflict, its scope was considered temporary only because it was a short-term solution in a nearby country followed by resettlement in Western States (Durieux 2014). Thus, the causes of flight were never considered to be of short duration but rather of indefinite duration (Fitzpatrick 1994). Yet, Western States considered repatriation as the favoured solution to refugee protection, thereby emphasising the temporary nature of refugee protection (Durieux 2014). Meanwhile, European States have continued to require individuals fleeing armed conflicts to be singled out for persecution, thereby resulting in the denial of refugee protection in most instances (Querton 2023). Research shows that the conventional perspectives of warfare adopted by appellate authorities in the EU means violence continues to be perceived as indiscriminate rather than a strategic choice by non-State armed groups (Querton 2023). Despite the adoption of UNHCR’s International Guidelines on Armed Conflict and Violence, which state that the Refugee Convention is directly applicable to civilians displaced by situations of armed conflict and violence (UNHCR 2016), state practice in the EU continues to deny refugee protection for persons in flight from armed conflicts in favour of more temporary forms of legal status. In addition to granting complementary forms of legal status, host states have, at times, applied pressure through restrictive policies, reduced access to rights, or cessation procedures that undermine the stability and legal certainty of refugees (Schultz 2021; Schwartz 2019). Although the question of whether persons fleeing armed conflicts are recognised as refugees varies greatly across host States (Türk et al. 2017), the result has been a dilution of durability of protection.

The type of protection status awarded to persons fleeing armed conflicts will depend on how asylum decision-makers interpret the relevant legal provisions. A refugee is defined in the Refugee Convention as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (art. 1A(2)). The Refugee Convention definition of a refugee was first incorporated into the Qualification Directive in 2004 (art. 2(c)). Although the Directive was merely aimed at harmonising minimum standards related to the identification of persons genuinely in need of international protection and the content of international protection in order to limit the secondary movement of asylum applicants between EU Member States (European Union 2004, rec. 6–8), it was also hailed as a breakthrough for providing detailed interpretive guidance on key elements of the refugee definition and codifying complementary protection in EU law (McAdam 2005; Lambert 2006; Storey 2008). Article 15 harmonised EU Member States’ non-refoulement obligations under international human rights law and provided for the grant of subsidiary protection status where there are substantial grounds to believe a person faces a real risk of suffering serious harm, defined as “a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict”, amongst others (European Union 2004, art. 15(c)).1 The Directive was recast in 2011 and will be replaced by a Regulation in 2026 (European Union 2024) but Article 15(c) has not been amended since the original version was adopted.

Whether a person fleeing an armed conflict is granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status in the EU impacts on the content of international protection they will receive. Beneficiaries of refugee protection, as opposed to subsidiary protection, are generally guaranteed a wider set of rights and entitlements, including longer residence permits (European Union 2011, art. 24), travel documents (art. 25), and more favourable social assistance (art. 29) and family reunification rules (Nicholson 2018). Since the early years of the Qualification Directive, McAdam criticised the distinction for the absence of any international legal basis justifying it (McAdam 2005, p. 461). While the European Commission sought greater harmonisation in the rights afforded under refugee and subsidiary protection statuses in the Qualification Regulation, Member States expressed divergent views, some favouring increased flexibility in areas such as social welfare and healthcare, while others saw scope for further alignment, particularly with regard to family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (European Commission 2016, p. 10). UNHCR considers that the differences, in particular the length of residence permits, are ‘neither necessary nor objectively justified in terms of flight experience and protection needs’ (UNHCR 2018, p. 33). Longer residence permits and being joined by their family members are essential factors in facilitating the local integration of persons in need of international protection in the host country. Nonetheless scholars have previously demonstrated the tendency within the EU to grant subsidiary protection to persons fleeing armed conflicts rather than refugee status (Querton 2023), and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) has recently explicitly acknowledged the trend (EUAA 2025a). Limiting access or delaying access to those rights contributes to maintaining persons fleeing armed conflicts in a state of temporariness. Legal status in the EU is thus closely associated with durability of protection.

In addition to the variable long-term integration prospects based on the different international protection statuses, the durable and effective protection of persons fleeing armed conflicts is further complicated and watered down by the Temporary Protection Directive adopted in 2001. The purpose of the Temporary Protection Directive is to “establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are unable to return to their country of origin” and sharing the burden stemming from large number of persons in need of international protection (European Union 2001, art. 1). The Directive provides for the immediate protection of such persons to avoid the breakdown of EU Member States’ asylum system that could result from a large number of claims (European Union 2001, art. 2(a)). Beneficiaries of temporary protection are those who have had to leave their country or region of origin and who are “unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the situation prevailing in that country” including “persons who have fled areas of armed conflict or endemic violence” and “persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, systematic or generalised violations of their human rights” (European Union 2001, art. 2(c)). Initially part of the first package of measures designed under the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Temporary Protection Directive was not recast at the same time as the other instruments, such as the Qualification Directive, possibly due to the fact that it was perceived as an emergency measure which had not yet been tested (Mazur 2022). By 2020, as the Temporary Protection Directive had never been activated, the intention of the European Commission was to repeal it and replace it with a Regulation in the context of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (European Commission 2020).

Although some scholars have argued that temporary protection is a “procedure of exceptional character” and therefore not an additional international protection status in EU law per se (Durieux 2021, p. 690; Mazur 2022), the CJEU has recently noted it “confers on its beneficiaries more limited rights than those conferred by the granting of international protection” indicating that it does create a distinct category of protection with rights and obligations (CJEU 2024, para. 82). Further, temporary protection will only be awarded following a Council Decision adopted by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, which extends temporary protection to all designated individuals in the EU (European Union 2001, art. 5). Whereas this avoids individual applicants having to be processed through individual refugee status determination procedures, the duration of temporary protection is strictly limited. Temporary protection is granted initially for one year, which can be extended for another year in six-month increments (European Union 2001, art. 4 (1)), followed by a final extension of one year (European Union 2001, art. 4 (2)). The short-term temporary nature of residence characterises the Directive as a “return oriented protection mechanism”, which aims to return beneficiaries as the most appropriate solution (Durieux 2014, p. 232). Implementing Decision 2022/382 grants all individuals eligible for temporary protection the right to enter EU territory and select their country of destination (European Union 2001, art. 8 (3)). Beneficiaries of temporary protection must be given a document evidencing their status, and have the right to work, be self-employed, education, vocational training, work experience (European Union 2001, art. 12), suitable accommodation, social welfare, subsistence, and medical care (European Union 2001, art. 13). Nonetheless apart from immediate access to the relevant rights, the set is less generous than those granted to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Gluns and Wessels 2017).

Accordingly, whilst there may be different levels of social assistance rights awarded to refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, status holders are also entitled to “an adequate standard of living […] which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical and mental health” (Reception Conditions Directive, art. 17(2)). From June 2026, when the Recast Reception Conditions Directive will apply, Member States must additionally provide health care and “a standard of living for all applicants in accordance with Union law, including the Charter, and international obligations” (Recast Reception Conditions Directive 2024, art. 19(2), 21, 23(4)). Commentators have noted that CJEU case law on the concept of human dignity will be important in this respect (Slingenberg 2024). The Temporary Protection Directive, on the other hand, ensures only “necessary assistance in terms of social welfare and means of subsistence” which may be offered in kind (Gluns and Wessels 2017, p. 75). Whilst beneficiaries of international protection must be provided with “access to healthcare under the same eligibility conditions as nationals of the Member State” (European Union 2011, art. 30), temporary protection holders are guaranteed only “emergency care and essential treatment of illness” (European Union 2001, art. 13 (2)). Although research suggests that integration in the labour market is much better for beneficiaries of temporary protection compared to those granted leave under the Qualification Directive (Doomernik and van Heelsum 2024), applicants for international protection must now be given access to the labour market within six months of registering a claim rather than within nine months of filing a claim and treated on the same terms as nationals in respect of certain employment conditions (Recast Reception Conditions Directive 2024, art. 17). Member States are now also required to guarantee and facilitate access to language and civic education courses for beneficiaries of internation protection (Recast Reception Conditions Directive 2024, art. 18). Thus, whilst temporary protection enables some to integrate the working force of the host country immediately, this remains dependent on having relevant qualifications and language skills. The welfare assistance provisions are less generous making it more difficult for those with temporary protection to set themselves up in the longer-term, reflecting the short-term nature of the instrument, which is principally a mechanism for dealing with large influxes rather than routing its beneficiaries onto a path where local integration will eventually become a durable solution option.

The EU asylum legal regime contains provisions defining the relationship between these legal statuses. Firstly, subsidiary protection is a status available only to those who do not qualify for refugee status (European Union 2011, art. 2(f)) and EU Member States must first determine whether someone is a refugee before considering their eligibility for subsidiary protection. Secondly, beneficiaries of temporary protection must be able to claim asylum at any time (European Union 2001, art. 17(1)). Indeed, the codification of temporary protection in EU law does not absolve EU Member States of their obligations under the Refugee Convention and international human rights law. Nonetheless, the Temporary Protection Directive states that EU Member States may provide that temporary protection may not be enjoyed concurrently with the status of asylum seeker while applications are under consideration (European Union 2001, art. 19(1)).

As the main cause of flight in the world today is violence in armed conflicts, it is unsurprising that mass arrivals of forcibly displaced persons from countries such as Syria, Ukraine and Sudan are frequent in the EU. Whilst the period 2015 to 2016 saw a peak in asylum applications due to the armed conflict in Syria, there has been a 20% increase in applications between 2022 and 2023, partly due to the war in Ukraine. However, the response of the EU and its Member States varies greatly according to asylum claimants’ origin. In 2015 for example, thousands of Syrians fleeing the armed conflict between the Al-Assad government and various rebel factions were either granted refugee protection or various forms of complementary protection such as subsidiary or humanitarian protection with fewer rights, whilst a minority were refused protection entirely. Since 2022 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, over 6.5 million Ukrainians have been granted temporary protection in the EU under the Temporary Protection Directive yet asylum applications by Ukrainians had increased by 90% in 2024 compared to the previous year (EUAA 2025a). More recently, Sudanese nationals have sought protection from the revived armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces yet tend to be granted mostly subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The type of protection granted is also shaped by structural features of EU asylum law that that can undermine the objective of harmonisation.

Central here are the “safe country” concepts, including safe country of origin, first country of asylum, and safe third country, legal constructions of EU rather than international law that allow Member States to accelerate procedures or shift responsibility elsewhere (ECRE 2025a). While often justified on grounds of efficiency, burden sharing, and avoiding “forum shopping” (Fullerton 2011; Byrne and Shacknove 1996), they have been criticised for reducing individualised assessments to procedural presumptions. The 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum further codifies these mechanisms, while applicants from designated regions continue to face lower recognition rates (Peers 2024; Hatton 2022). Political framing also shapes their application: securitised narratives, as during the Belarus crisis, justified restrictive measures against people arriving at the Polish border, whereas humanitarian framings, as with Ukrainian arrivals, enabled more generous protection (Kienast 2022). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has placed only partial limits on the application of the safe third country concept, most notably through the annulment of provisions on a common safe country list in Parliament v. Council case (CJEU 2008) and the 2025 Grand Chamber ruling mandating full judicial review and transparency of supporting evidence (CJEU 2025a). Collectively, these factors contribute to what is described as an “asylum lottery,” in which outcomes depend as much on origin and political framing as on legal criteria (Zaun 2017).

The overview of the main differences between the different international protection statuses in the EU set out above demonstrates how short-term benefits such as immediate access to the labour market for example, are watered down by the limited durability of protection in the longer term. Yet as will be seen below, the relationship between the various international protection statuses is currently the subject of disagreements.

3. Temporary Protection for Persons Fleeing Armed Conflicts: The Russian/Ukrainian War

3.1. Stretching Temporality

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 led Ukrainians to enter the EU in large numbers. Subsequently, the European Council unanimously decided to activate the Temporary Protection Directive for the first time. Referred to as a “pragmatic, if somewhat limited mechanism to respond to acute migration spikes”, the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) is seen as a stopgap rather than a comprehensive solution and has raised apprehensions about the potential erosion of the 1951 Refugee Convention (Dalkiran and Lipman 2025, pp. 2–3). A contentious issue is the Directive’s selective activation, which has led to accusations that the EU is reinforcing a “two-tier system” that privileges certain nationalities, namely Ukrainians while marginalising others (Mazur 2022, p. 298). As Mazur notes, this selectivity has drawn criticism for institutionalising racism against non-Ukrainian asylum seekers and reveals that the decision to apply temporary protection over international protection is “essentially a political choice” (Mazur 2022, p. 298). Moreover, it has been claimed that Ukrainians are perceived as ‘refugees’ because they are fleeing a war of aggression from another State rather than an internal armed conflict or civil war due to decision-makers’ conventional warfare perspective (Querton 2023). This Section explores the application of temporary protection to Ukrainians fleeing the armed conflict from the perspective of durable protection. It discusses the complex and sometimes yet to be determined relationship between this mechanism and international protection, highlighting the impact of the activation of the mechanism on the long-term protection of persons fleeing Ukraine.

Although the European Commission, supported by UNHCR (European Commission 2000, para. 4.3), initially proposed a maximum temporary protection duration of three years, with a possible extension to five years, some Member States were reluctant to accept this period, and the Commission made a new proposal for a maximum two years (European Commission 2000, para. 5.4). Reflecting these concerns, the final text of the Directive set a maximum duration of three years, reducing the originally proposed five-year ceiling.2 Despite the TPD stating that temporary protection shall come to an end when the maximum duration has been reached (European Union 2001, art. 6(1)a), temporary protection for Ukrainians was extended into a fourth year until March 2026 (Council of the European Union 2024). This was made possible through the European Commission’s interpretation of the duration clause that when the reasons for temporary protection persist, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, may extend temporary protection for an additional year (European Union 2001, art. 4(2); European Commission 2024). This expansive interpretation of a fundamental aspect of the temporary mechanism illustrates the flawed assumption underlying the concept of temporary protection for persons fleeing armed conflicts, which are increasingly protracted with no prospect of resolution (von Einsiedel 2017). In terms of durability of protection, although the mechanism is intended to provide protection to individuals fleeing armed conflict, it fails to adequately account for the protracted nature of contemporary conflicts and the extended timelines required for post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, the future of the situation in Ukraine remains uncertain, as the war continues and the civilian population remains at risk due to ongoing attacks by the Russian Federation (UN General Assembly 2025). In this context, the durable solution of repatriation remains remote, and the prospect of further extensions raises fundamental questions about the underlying premise of temporariness in the temporary protection regime.

Stretching the concept of temporary protection beyond its intended scope raises concerns about undermining legal certainty and creating prolonged ambiguity for beneficiaries. The TPD failed to consider and include provisions for durable protection in cases of protracted armed conflicts. In practice, it delays those in need of protection from commencing the journey towards long-term residence and integration in the country of asylum. Whilst many may not want to settle permanently in the host country, artificially maintaining the temporary nature of protection reduces the availability of durable solutions later down the line. Guild and Groenendijk (2023, p. 106) point out that proposals to amend the TPD simply to allow for extended duration of protection do not address the underlying legal status of beneficiaries. Instead, such amendments risk perpetuating a category of protection in which individuals enjoy some rights (See: ECRE 2025b; Łysienia 2025) but without the legal certainty of formal refugee status under the CEAS. This situation has provoked substantial criticism within the international legal and human rights community (Guild and Groenendijk 2023; See also: Kienast et al. 2023). Extending temporary protection may ensure continuity of access to rights and support, but it also risks institutionalising a temporary status that fails to address the complex and long-term needs of Ukrainians displaced by war.

When temporary protection ends,3 the TPD mentions only two options, namely an application for asylum under the conventional international protection framework or return to the country of origin. Whilst the temporary protection mechanism includes extensive provisions governing return to the country of origin (European Union 2001, chap. 5), it contains no provisions for post-temporary protection status or any transitional solution. Although Durieux considers that temporary protection in EU law is a “prelude” to the normal operation of the Refugee Convention (Durieux 2014, p. 242–43), the only hint at the possibility of remaining in the host country post-temporary protection is that “the general laws on protection and on aliens in the Member States shall apply” (European Union 2001, art. 20). It is open to individual Member States to enable beneficiaries of temporary protection to transfer into different immigration categories, but the Directive does not consider this at all.

The emphasis on return in the Directive was already apparent during its drafting. The Economic and Social Committee explicitly stated that one of the aims of temporary protection was to prepare beneficiaries “for the return to their country of origin,” thereby reinforcing the inherently temporary nature of the status (Economic and Social Committee 2001; Mazur 2022, p. 292). As Ergin observes, “in general, the expectation, and often the preferred durable solution, is repatriation” (Ergin 2023, p. 353), a perspective also shared by Fitzpatrick, who highlights return as central to the underlying logic of temporary protection (Fitzpatrick 2000).

However, the feasibility of return depends on stringent conditions and return is contingent upon a “safe and durable” situation in the country of origin (European Union 2001, art. 6, art. 21). UNHCR has played an important advisory role in relation to return of persons from Ukraine. In its March 2022 non-return advisory, the agency called on States to “suspend the forcible return of nationals and former habitual residents of Ukraine, including those who have had their asylum claims rejected” (UNHCR 2022, para. 14). UNHCR further stated that this bar on forcible return constitutes a “minimum standard” that should remain in place “until such time as the security situation in Ukraine has significantly improved to permit a safe and dignified return of those determined not to be in need of international protection” (UNHCR 2022). The assessment of when such circumstances are met remains a highly political and, therefore, unpredictable process. As Ergin cautions, equating the termination of temporary protection with the end of protection needs is “quite a short-sighted view” (Ergin 2023, p. 356), one that ignores the legal and humanitarian realities many beneficiaries continue to face. The presumption that the end of temporary protection is followed by repatriation in the TPD fails to account for the protracted nature of armed conflicts today and delays beneficiaries from being routed into durable protection options with longer-term prospects of local integration. Indeed, Durieux warned that temporary protection hovers “at the edges of refugee law,” denying beneficiaries the legal certainty and social inclusion associated with more stable statuses (Durieux 2014, p. 221).

3.2. When Temporary Protection Ends Whilst War Continues

Temporary protection offers a rapid response to mass displacement but is inherently short-term, unlike refugee protection, which can lead to more stable status under EU law. Time spent under temporary protection does not currently count toward the five years of legal residence required for long-term resident status (Long-Term Residents Directive 2003). A 2022 proposal to recast the Directive would allow this time to be counted (European Commission 2022, art. 4(3)), but negotiations are on hold. However, to obtain a long-term residence permit, Ukrainians would still need to have had lawful residence in a different category prior to application (European Commission 2022, art. 3 and art. 4(3)). Hence, even if adopted, the recast Long-Term Residents Directive would not enable a direct transition from temporary protection to long-term residence status. This exclusion has significant implications for beneficiaries’ access to secure residence and associated rights under EU law, including enhanced mobility and local integration prospects.

The uncertainty caused by Ukrainians’ temporary protection permits coming to an end and the war in Ukraine continuing, however, has led many to seek alternative forms of international protection. Indeed, the number of Ukrainians claiming asylum in the EU in 2024 increased by 90% compared to 2023 (EUAA 2025a). The transition from one type of protection permit to another raises a series of legal questions, including how asylum applications by Ukrainians might be determined in international refugee law and in the context of the Common European Asylum System. There are several ways in which the grant of temporary protection residence permits to Ukrainians is impacting the determination of their asylum claims. These tensions highlight how the use of short-term solutions hinder the obtention of durable protection in the EU.

While the standard rule in the EU is that the country of first entry handles the asylum claim (European Union 2013b), those with temporary protection residence permits may have the flexibility to lodge asylum claims in other Member States (European Union 2013b, art. 17(1)). Whilst this provides Ukrainians who wish to claim asylum greater choice than other asylum seekers, the pressures on EU Member States’s asylum systems, which the activation of the TPD sought to avoid, may merely have been postponed. To ease those possible pressures, it is open to host countries to use prima facie refugee status determination, an expedited procedure applying to individuals from Ukraine within a defined timeframe (Ineli Ciğer 2023). This model would allow for group-based assessment using data collected during registration, offering a cost-effective and flexible approach (Ergin 2023, p. 359). Scholars have long argued that refugee status can be granted without the need for the applicant to be personally targeted, so long as the group they belong to faces serious harm (Grahl Madsen 1966; Hathaway 1996; Jackson 1999; Querton 2023). This is particularly relevant in situations of armed conflict, where the risk of violence is widespread.

However, the grant of temporary protection permits has caused difficulties for its beneficiaries lodging asylum claims in the first place. This is illustrated by a preliminary ruling currently pending before the CJEU, referred by the Administrative Migration Court in Sweden (CJEU 2025b). The case involves a family who applied for international protection in Sweden while already benefiting from temporary protection. Whilst the refugee claims were refused on the merits, the Swedish Migration Agency argued that Chapter 21 of the Swedish Law on Foreign Nationals precludes examination of claims for subsidiary protection while temporary protection is in effect. Among the key questions submitted are whether individuals with temporary protection may apply for and be granted subsidiary protection status under EU law, and whether national rules, such as those in Sweden defining “protection claims” as relating to refugee status only, are consistent with EU obligations. The Swedish court asked whether Articles 17(1) and 19(2) of the TPD imply the right to apply not only for refugee status but also for subsidiary protection, and whether these rights, together with Article 10(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, are sufficiently clear to have direct effect.

Preventing beneficiaries of temporary protection from claiming subsidiary protection in Sweden may be contrary to EU law, in light of a recent CJEU judgement concerning the scope of temporary protection and its potential extension to groups beyond those initially designated in the Council Decision (Ineli Ciğer 2024). The CJEU emphasised that the TPD aims to “safeguard the effective possibility for third-country nationals and stateless persons benefiting from temporary protection of obtaining international protection following an appropriate examination of their individual situation, whilst guaranteeing them immediate protection of more limited scope” (CJEU 2024, para. 127). Therefore, national authorities are obliged to assess, in full compliance with the European Union (2013a), whether an applicant qualifies for either form of protection. As the Court emphasised, “those third-country nationals and stateless persons cannot be prevented from effectively exercising their right to make an application for international protection” after the expiration of temporary protection (CJEU 2024, para. 129). The reference to international protection in the context of the TPD suggests an obligation to assess, on an individual basis, eligibility for both refugee status and subsidiary protection. The awaited CJEU judgement on the preliminary reference from the Swedish court is expected to further clarify the interplay between the TPD, the Asylum Procedure Regulation, the Qualification Directive, and national laws implementing the CEAS. In the meantime, it is evident that whilst the activation of the TPD facilitated the arrival of large numbers of persons displaced from Ukraine, its obstruction of basic access to longer-term and durable protection alternatives is stark.

3.3. Applications for International Protection by Ukrainians

Whilst barriers to claiming international protection for beneficiaries of temporary protection in some EU Member States were outlined above, this sub-section discusses the substantive determination of their asylum claims in other EU Member States. It highlights how some of the rights associated with temporary protection and existing misconceptions about the application of the Refugee Convention to persons fleeing armed conflicts have hindered durable protection. Significantly, beneficiaries of temporary protection are entitled to return to their home country either temporarily or permanently. Thus, whilst some Ukrainians have returned to Ukraine for short visits for various reasons such as assisting family, coping with hardship abroad, or exploring the possibility of safe returns (ECRE 2023), this may have a detrimental effect on their subsequent asylum claims because a recent visit may undermine the claim that the person has a well-founded fear of being persecuted (EUAA 2024b, p. 32).

Further, as discussed above, Member States often default to subsidiary protection for those fleeing armed conflict. This trend continues with Ukrainian asylum claims, where authorities rely on Article 15(c) Qualification Directive while bypassing full consideration under the refugee definition (Storey 2023). In respect of judicial approaches to Article 15(c) Qualification Directive in the context of Ukraine, two interpretative trends have emerged across Member States. The first is a regional approach, in which courts assess the applicant’s area of origin within Ukraine and analyse the level of indiscriminate violence in that region. The second is a national approach, where the ongoing international armed conflict is considered to pose generalised risks across the entire Ukrainian territory.

An example of the regional approach can be seen in the French CNDA (Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile) jurisprudence. Referring to its general framework, in case M.M., the CNDA applied both quantitative and qualitative indicators, using data from sources like ACLED, IOM, and UNHCR to assess the situation as of the date of judgement (CNDA 2020). This approach has led to the finding that areas such as Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia are experiencing indiscriminate violence of “exceptional intensity”, thus warranting subsidiary protection for applicants originating from these oblasts. Conversely, regions like Odessa are not automatically deemed unsafe and personal vulnerabilities, such as age or illness, must also be present to qualify for protection (CNDA 2023d). Nonetheless, the CNDA has refused to invoke internal protection alternatives without explicitly stating whether this reflects a view on the extent of indiscriminate violence in Ukraine (Legifrance 2025, art. L. 513–15).

In contrast, the national approach is reflected in decisions such as those by the Tribunal of Perugia (Civil Court [Tribunale] 2022) and the Spanish National Court of Madrid (Audiencia Nacional 2022). These courts emphasise the ongoing nature of the armed conflict and its capacity to generate serious risk throughout Ukraine. In the Perugia case, the court denied refugee status due to the lack of individual persecution but granted subsidiary protection given the generalised danger, including indiscriminate violence (Civil Court [Tribunale] 2022).

The diversity in interpretation echoes concerns that despite the Diakité judgement (CJEU 2014) moving away from international humanitarian law benchmarks such as territorial control and sustained military operations, some jurisdictions may continue to utilise these international humanitarian law-derived criteria to assess indiscriminate violence (Querton 2025). This can result in assessments overly focused on the operational capacities of the armed conflict’s parties and the intensity of their military engagements, which is at odds with the CJEU’s jurisprudence and imposes a stricter, more exclusionary interpretation of Article 15(c) Qualification Directive.

Nonetheless, there are instances where national courts have aligned more closely with the CJEU’s approach. For example, in D.K. v. Republic of Cyprus, the (International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC) 2024) granted subsidiary protection to a Ukrainian national from Mariupol, finding that return would expose the applicant to a real risk of serious harm under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive. The court explicitly cited Elgafaji (CJEU 2009) and CF and DN v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (CJEU 2022) to support an interpretation that does not rely on rigid quantitative thresholds (International Protection Administrative Court (IPAC) 2024).

The jurisprudence that has emerged across the EU in relation to asylum claims from Ukrainians is concerning as it suggests that Member States may continue to prioritise subsidiary protection as the primary form of international protection when persons flee armed conflicts, potentially neglecting the need for assessments under the refugee definition. Given that much of the violence during armed conflicts happens outside the battlefield and that there is often an inverse relationship between the scale of conventional warfare and the intensity of civilian-targeted violence, asylum decision-makers should apply a clear conceptual separation between the occurrence of an armed conflict and the violence exercised during such conflict (Querton 2023). The case study of asylum claims following the reignition of the armed conflict in Sudan discussed below provides further evidence of how over-reliance on subsidiary forms of protection detrimentally impacts access to durable protection in the EU.

4. Refugee Protection for Persons Fleeing Armed Conflicts: The Conflict in Sudan

As noted above, widespread violence in situations of armed conflict has often led states to grant complementary forms of protection rather than refugee status due to misconceptions regarding the application of the Refugee Convention to the circumstances of persons fleeing ‘general conditions’ in the country of origin (Wouters 2021; Querton 2023). Granting subsidiary protection rather than refugee protection to persons fleeing widespread violence in armed conflicts is another device by which states artificially shorten the duration or ‘deadline’ of international protection, circumventing the ‘attachment’ mechanism of the Refugee Convention (Durieux 2014). As will be explained below this has important consequences for durable solutions in the EU because cessation provisions for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are less stringent than for those recognised as refugees under the Refugee Convention. This Section uses the renewal of violence and the armed conflict in Sudan as a case study to examine European states’ recent approaches to adjusting time in refugee law.

Since April 2023, the armed conflict in Sudan has led more than 1.2 million people to flee Sudan whilst 4.8 million have been internally displaced (UNHCR 2023). This is due to a re-ignition of the armed conflict arising from a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by Sudan’s de facto leader and army chief, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo (Salih 2023). The resulting widespread violence brings to the fore (yet again) the question of how the Refugee Convention is applied to persons fleeing armed conflicts.

Statistics indicate that there is a trend towards EU Member States granting subsidiary protection to Sudanese nationals to a greater extent than refugee protection in 2024 (Eurostat 2025). The latest data for the third quarter of 2024 in particular shows almost double the number of positive decisions being subsidiary protection compared to refugee protection (Eurostat 2025).4 As a result of the situation of insecurity in Sudan, a number of asylum authorities in Europe have determined that the country is experiencing an internal armed conflict and that the level of indiscriminate violence in certain parts of the country justifies the grant of subsidiary protection, as provided for by Article 15(c) Qualification Directive and derived national legislation. For example, the French National Asylum Court has concluded that the states of South Darfur (CNDA 2023c), Western Darfur (CNDA 2023a), North Darfur (CNDA 2023b), Central Darfur (CNDA 2024a), South Kordofan (CNDA 2024c), and West Kordofan (CNDA 2024b) are experiencing such a high level of indiscriminate violence that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm to a civilian’s life or person solely by being present in these areas. The UK Home Office reached the same conclusion in respect of Khartoum and its hinterlands, Darfur, Kordofan, Al Jazira, Sennar and White Nile (UK Home Office 2025, para. 3.1.1). Although the findings are to be welcomed in that they provide some form of protection to many Sudanese nationals, it is important to reflect on whether refugee protection may be appropriate instead.

The violence exercised by the parties to the armed conflict in Sudan is severe and takes the form of many human rights violations, including torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and sexual and gender-based violence by both the SAF and the RSF (OHCHR 2024; Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2024). Human rights abuses are thus sufficiently serious to constitute persecution. In Sudan, the risk of being subjected to human rights violations often occurs for reasons related to ethnicity or perceived political opposition. For example, there is evidence that the SAF target civilians for allegedly supporting the RSF on the basis of their real or perceived ethnicity (OHCHR 2024; ADF 2024; Sudan Tribune 2024). Moreover, most of the violence in Darfur is exercised by the RSF and its allies and is ethnically motivated (Refugees International 2024; UNSC 2024). Violence in situations of armed conflict is rarely targeted against single individuals but rather it is directed against similarly situated individuals on the basis of identity politics (Querton 2023). Furthermore, the limited means of armed groups has resulted in the use of terror or forced displacement to control populations. Thus, control of territory is ensured by coercing the population through highly visible forms of violence and human rights violations. Kaldor argues that the objectives of fighting parties are increasingly expressed in terms of identity politics rather than political realism (Kaldor 2012). She defines identity politics as “the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity” (Kaldor 2012, p. 7). In this process, dominant identities are redefined based on exclusionary objectives along political, religious, national and gendered norms. As identities are also attributed to the ‘other’ and become fixed, changing sides to the conflict is no longer possible. As a result, armed conflicts become increasingly protracted and extreme, justifying ever more severe and public forms of violence. Accordingly, parties to the conflict exercise violence strategically by targeting entire groups of persons sharing actual or imputed characteristics in order to terrorise the population and thereby control large parts of the territory (Querton 2023).

Where host countries consider that a person is a refugee, they may nonetheless rely on the concept of internal relocation to refuse the refugee claim. An internal flight alternative is the notion that there is another part of the country where there is no risk of persecution and where the person may reasonably be expected to relocate (Ní Ghráinne 2021). Whereas not all countries in the EU currently apply this concept regularly, the Qualification Regulation will require all EU Member States to consider an internal flight alternative by 2026 (European Union 2024, art. 8). The safety of proposed relocation areas requires regular reviews however due to the instability caused by the armed conflict. Port Sudan for example, which the UK Home Office considers an internal flight alternative because it is “largely controlled by the SAF” and where there is not a general risk of indiscriminate violence (UK Home Office 2025, para. 4.1.1), was recently under attack by a series of drone strikes from the RSF (Akinwotu 2025).

When assessing the reasonableness of relocation, States should give due consideration to socio-economic conditions. In Sufi and Elmi, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) established that because the humanitarian conditions in Somalia were the result of the direct and indirect actions of parties to the armed conflict (ECtHR 2011b, para. 282), a decision-maker should “have regard to an applicant’s ability to cater for his most basic needs, such as food, hygiene and shelter, his vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of his situation improving within a reasonable time-frame” (ECtHR 2011b, para. 283; See also: ECtHR 2011a). Country of origin information on Sudan suggests that humanitarian conditions are dire (EUAA 2025b). Furthermore, the dire humanitarian conditions are predominantly caused by the direct and indirect actions of parties to the armed conflict. Deliberate action by the RSF in Sudan have made the famine worse, initially by blocking humanitarian aid delivered by UN agencies and since by attacking, detaining and stealing from volunteers at community kitchens on suspicion of collaborating with their opponents and being informers (Eltahir and Abdelaziz 2024; Nasir 2024). Both sides to the conflict are also using food as a weapon of war (Michael 2024). This would indicate that internal relocation may not be reasonable for many Sudanese nationals (See: Small Arms Survey 2024).

The Sudan case study suggests that many Sudanese have valid claims for refugee protection, yet jurisprudence in the EU continues to centre on the application of subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. It illustrates the sustained shift by EU Member States towards subsidiary forms of protection diluting refugee time in a manner that renders the durable solution of local integration more remote.

5. Cessation of International Protection: The Fall of Bashar al-Assad and the ‘End’ of the Conflict in Syria

Ten years ago, in his analysis of the relationship between temporary protection and international refugee law, Durieux (2014) considered that States are reluctant to repatriate refugees to their country of origin following a change in circumstances that might justify the cessation of refugee status due to administrative and logistical difficulties. More recent practice in the EU indicates a different trend, however. Indeed, the Syria case study illustrates how some host countries are quick to react when the conditions in the country of origin change, for example when non-state armed groups topple governments, by suspending the examination of asylum claims and invoking cessation provisions before obtaining evidence that those changes are durable. This section focuses on the EU’s approach to the protection of Syrian refugees, starting with an examination of the types of legal status afforded to them. While it does not explore the specific reasons behind the non-activation of the TPD in 2015 (Mazur 2022), it considers the potential implications of this decision for the long-term integration of Syrians in the EU. Additionally, the section assesses whether recent developments in Syria warrant the cessation of international protection for Syrian refugees currently residing in the EU. Cole has called for further clarification between cessation clauses and both complementary protection and temporary protection. She also warned against increasing interest in using cessation as mechanism to compel return of refugees to their country of origin (Cole 2021, p. 1045). Whilst O’Sullivan acknowledges that it is not unlawful for states to deport former refugees post-cessation, she nonetheless advocates for a rebuttable presumption against deportation after five years of residence due to the increasing rights refugees enjoyed over time and the negative effects of deportation, bar where it would be reasonable to deport them (O’Sullivan 2019). Cessation of international protection is an end to protection and effectively ‘stops the clock’ for purposes of local integration, requiring the person to return instead.

The Syrian armed conflict, which erupted in 2011, triggered one of the most significant displacement crises of the 21st century, with around 6.1 million Syrians (UNHCR 2025c) fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt, and later to Europe. In 2015, the arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees at the borders of the EU sparked debate over the type of protection EU Member States should offer, including the UNHCR recalling the Temporary Protection Directive as being “designed to ensure a uniform status and rights across the EU” (UNHCR 2015). Turkey, which has since become the world’s largest host of Syrian refugees (now over 3 million) (UNHCR 2025b) responded by granting temporary protection status. Within the EU, however, the TPD remained dormant, despite growing calls for its activation (Gluns and Wessels 2017; Ineli Ciğer 2015). Once described as the “largest protracted refugee situation of the decade,” (Lambert 2017, p. 735, fn. 97; High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges 2015, para. 3) the displacement of Syrians is now rivalled by the Ukrainian displacement described above. The EU’s swift activation of the TPD for Ukrainians fleeing the 2022 war provoked criticism and allegations of double standards (Ineli Ciğer 2022). Critics pointed to the EU’s failure to offer similar protection to Syrians in 2015, despite the scale and nature of their displacement (Storey 2023). The EU’s reaction to the displacement from Syria was described as “slow and idiosyncratic” as well as “raising serious concerns about the future of the Common European Asylum System” (Lambert 2017, p. 741).

Whilst Syrians were initially granted refugee protection to a greater extent at the beginning of the armed conflict in 2011, protection for Syrians gradually shifted from refugee status to subsidiary or humanitarian protection when the number of arrivals increased significantly. In 2015, 217,285 Syrians received refugee status in the EU-27, compared to 54,775 who were granted subsidiary protection (Eurostat). By 2016, the numbers nearly converged, with 258,060 receiving refugee status and 255,230 granted subsidiary protection (Eurostat). This trend continued into 2024, when 164,905 Syrians were granted refugee status and 155,480 received subsidiary protection (Eurostat). These figures reflect not only the consistently high acceptance rate of Syrian protection claims but also the varying policy preferences of Member States, many of which have increasingly refused refugee protection in favour of subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive. Garlick has criticised this trend, stating that the “predominant use of Article 15(c) for Syrian claims in some states is occurring despite the acknowledged primacy in law of refugee status […] and clear country of origin and interpretive guidance” (Garlick 2017, p. 249; Storey 2023, p. 104).

Moreover, EU Member States also further restricted the rights of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection from 2015/2016 onwards. In Germany, a significant policy shift occurred in 2016, when the automatic recognition of Syrians as refugees was revoked and substituted with subsidiary protection, affecting their eligibility for family reunification (Stevens 2017, p. 4). This policy led to a two-year suspension of family reunification rights for those under subsidiary protection. Around the same time, other EU Member States adopted similar restrictions on the right to family reunification for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection (Nicholson 2018).

Whilst there has been a general trend towards increased grants of subsidiary protection, jurisprudence from the highest courts in EU Member States also demonstrates a diverse application of international protection standards for Syrian nationals, particularly regarding the distinction between subsidiary protection and refugee status. While some jurisdictions maintain a narrow interpretation that reserves refugee status for applicants who can prove they have been individually targeted for persecution based on the 1951 Refugee Convention grounds5 others have acknowledged broader contextual and situational risks that justify refugee status, even in the absence of personalised threats.

For example, in Spain, the Supreme Court ruled that Syrian nationals who were resettled under a government programme coordinated with UNHCR must be recognised as refugees, not merely as beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. The Court held that participation in a resettlement programme inherently implies recognition of refugee status, and thus, denying such status would contradict the purpose and framework of resettlement protection (Supreme Court of Spain 2020). The Slovenian Supreme Court, in its judgement of 24 February 2021, upheld refugee status for a Syrian applicant initially granted subsidiary protection. The Court emphasised the relevance of the applicant’s origin from regions formerly controlled by opposition forces and the resulting perception by the Syrian regime. Citing European Asylum Support Office (now the EUAA) and UNHCR reports, the Court acknowledged that the applicant would likely be viewed as politically suspect upon return, not necessarily due to actual opposition activities, but due to the regime’s attribution of political beliefs based on geographical origin (Supreme Court of Slovenia 2021). This reflects a recognition that regional association can be sufficient grounds for refugee status especially in the context of countries experiencing armed conflicts (Querton 2023).

Conversely, the German Higher Administrative Courts have taken a different stance in comparable cases, emphasising the need for a personal link to the grounds for persecution. Applicants were denied refugee status and granted subsidiary protection instead, with the courts holding that risks arising from generalised violence, fear of conscription, or residence in former opposition-held areas did not automatically establish a link to the five grounds enumerated in the Refugee Convention (Germany Higher Administrative Court 2020b). The courts stressed that asylum claims must demonstrate a personalised risk of persecution, and that even refusal of military service does not automatically imply political persecution (Germany Higher Administrative Court 2020a), despite the CJEU’s decision in EZ (CJEU 2020).

More recently and since 2023, a growing number of decisions reflect a shift away from granting any form of international protection, including subsidiary protection, rejecting applications entirely instead. Some Member States, such as Germany, Denmark, Belgium, and Bulgaria, have begun to argue that certain parts of Syria no longer pose a real risk of indiscriminate violence based on updated country of origin information (EUAA 2024a) and security assessments (EUAA 2023). As a result, even subsidiary protection is increasingly denied, with asylum authorities and courts concluding that the general security situation has improved sufficiently to no longer meet the threshold of “serious harm” under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive.

For example, the Higher Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany) concluded in July 2024 that the current armed conflict in Syria, including in Hasaka province, no longer presents a serious general risk to civilians that would justify subsidiary protection, despite acknowledging ongoing violence and instability (Germany Higher Administrative Court 2024). Similarly, the Danish Refugee Appeals Board found that conditions in Homs did not warrant continued protection under Section 7(3) of the Immigration Act, citing insufficient levels of indiscriminate violence to trigger a need for protection (Refugee Appeals Board 2024).6 The Belgian Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL 2023) and the Bulgarian Administrative Court of Haskovo (Bulgarian Administrative Court of Haskovo 2024) also dismissed appeals for international protection, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate sufficient risk due to the current level of violence in their regions. In both cases, courts emphasised the lack of individual risk factors and interpreted the armed conflict as having de-escalated to a point where indiscriminate violence no longer posed a sufficient threat.

The evolution of protection standards for Syrians in the EU points to a broader trend within the EU, potentially leaving Syrian applicants without any form of legal safeguard despite the volatile and unpredictable nature of the Syrian context. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 following an unexpected offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters has brought into question the protection needs of Syrian refugees yet again. Several European governments (Austria, Germany, Denmark) announced their intention to suspend the processing of international protection claims from Syrian nationals and invoked cessation provisions for those already granted protection (Reuters 2024; Deutsche Welle 2024; Politico 2021).7 Although no deportations have occurred, these actions underscore the tension between state policies and international standards (Politico 2021). This response risks breaching not only the spirit but potentially the letter of Member States’ obligations under the Common European Asylum System (Vignon 2024).

Cessation of international protection is significant as it effectively puts an end to a person’s trajectory towards integration, and eventual naturalisation, in the host country. Indeed, if a person has acquired permanent residence or naturalised since they were granted international protection, they cannot be the subject of cessation proceedings. These developments reflect growing debates over when international protection needs end following a ‘win’ by one side to an armed conflict. Premature declarations of safety may lead to forced returns, repeated displacement, and violations of fundamental rights. Sudden returns of large numbers of displaced nationals may also pose a security risk of armed conflicts reigniting (Durieux 2014, p. 239).

Whether those fleeing armed conflicts were originally granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status in the EU has important implications when host countries decide to bring protection to an end. Whilst the cessation of both refugee status and subsidiary protection in EU law mandates that the change in circumstances “is of such a significant and non-temporary nature” that the risk of persecution has ceased to exist (European Union 2011, art. 11(e)–(f)) or that the person no longer faces a real risk of serious harm (European Union 2011, art. 16), the interpretation of cessation provisions in practice raises different considerations based on a person’s legal protection status. Thus, refugees are protected due to a risk of being persecuted linked to their actual or perceived personal characteristics whereas subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) Qualification Directive addresses a general risk of serious harm in situations of armed conflict. A change in circumstances relating to one side to the conflict taking over is more likely to lead to an assessment that levels of indiscriminate violence no longer meet the required threshold of severity, meaning it is more straightforward to cease subsidiary protection than refugee protection in the EU.

However, the standard for cessation is high. As emphasised in the UNHCR Guidelines on Cessation, it must be demonstrated that there has been a fundamental, stable, and durable change in the conditions of the country of origin, such that the individual no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. These changes must be both profound and enduring (UNHCR 2003). Therefore, partial or regional safety, such as designated “safe zones,” does not justify cessation if the risk of persecution persists elsewhere in the country. This principle was reaffirmed by the CJEU in Abdulla and Others (C-175/08), where it held that cessation under the Qualification Directive requires verification that the actor of protection, typically the state, has taken reasonable steps to prevent persecution and that such protection is effective and accessible (CJEU 2010, para. 70). The CJEU stressed that human rights considerations must inform the assessment of whether the change is “significant and non-temporary” (CJEU 2010, para. 76). The requirement is not merely the absence of persecution, but the presence of functioning institutions capable of guaranteeing fundamental rights (ECRE 2025b).

Although refugee status is linked to a well-founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds and the threshold for cessation of subsidiary protection may differ, the principles of durable change and effective protection still apply. ECRE emphasises that cessation for subsidiary protection holders must similarly be based on an individualised and up-to-date assessment of current country conditions, and that such assessments must not rely solely on general improvements but consider the applicant’s specific vulnerabilities (ECRE 2025b). Without strict adherence to the core principles outlined in the UNHCR Guidelines, namely that cessation should only be applied when conditions in the country of origin are both fundamentally changed and demonstrably safe and durable, there is a serious risk that cessation will be misused as a political instrument. Indeed, whilst legal standards promote an objective approach to determining whether the risk on return still exists, Cole has called for also taking into account the political pressures that govern the application of cessation (Cole 2023). This undermines the legal standards’ role as a legal safeguard designed to protect individuals until genuine and lasting solutions are available.

Furthermore, the UNHCR Guidelines emphasise that the application of cessation clauses should promote durable solutions and must not result in renewed displacement or prolonged uncertainty. They underscore that individuals should not be compelled to return to volatile or unstable environments (UNHCR 2003). This concern is not merely theoretical but grounded in empirical evidence, which reveals a legitimate risk of renewed displacement when returns are prematurely promoted. Repeated displacement occurred among Afghan refugees returning under the UNHCR/IOM Solution Strategy, where instability and poor reintegration support led many to flee again (Teke Lloyd et al. 2025). Comparable issues arose in Liberia (in 2012), Angola (in 2012), and Rwanda (in 2013), where UNHCR declared post-conflict stability sufficient for mass repatriation. In all cases, revoking refugee status prompted returns despite ongoing safety and reintegration challenges (Teke Lloyd et al. 2025; Omata 2013).

Some states have adopted return policies that blur the line between voluntary and coerced return (Beaman et al. 2022), weakening durable protection in the EU. After Assad’s fall, Germany promoted returns by offering financial incentives to Syrian nationals. In January 2025, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees added Syria to its Reintegration and Emigration Programme for Asylum-Seekers/Government Assisted Repatriation Programme (InfoMigrants 2025). This move, made before conditions in Syria could be deemed genuinely safe or stable, risks pressuring refugees to return despite ongoing insecurity.

The rapid response by some EU Member States to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 by suspending the examination of individual asylum claims and initiating cessation procedures without waiting for any geo-political changes to settle is undermining the durability of protection in the EU. Current approaches to cessation of international protection in the EU following the ‘end’ of the armed conflict in Syria demonstrate how host countries are adopting short-term perspectives of change in the country of origin to circumvent the ‘attachment’ logic of the Refugee Convention which envisages effective integration and naturalisation in the longer term.

6. Conclusions

The three case studies analysed in this article demonstrate how state practice in the EU serves to undermine the concept of refugee protection by creating an imbalance between the ‘deadline’ of protection and the gradual attachment of the refugee to the host state as provided for in the Refugee Convention. This serves to weaken durable protection in the EU for persons fleeing armed conflicts. As global forced displacement due to violence in armed conflicts is at the highest level ever recorded, the concerns identified in this article are likely to continue to negatively impact many asylum claimants in Europe.

The EU has not articulated a clear path from temporary protection to permanent residence or international protection, exacerbating the precariousness faced by displaced persons from Ukraine and perpetuating a sense of legal limbo. The Ukraine case study challenges the underlying premise of temporariness in the temporary protection regime. It would be detrimental to the durability of protection for the EU to continue to rely on a temporary instrument that may outlive its utility. Instead, the EU and its Member States should develop durable legal solutions that reflect both the changing nature of displacement, which is increasingly protracted, and the rights of those affected. This could be achieved by ensuring temporary protection has built-in pathways to regularisation or by transitioning beneficiaries to full refugee status under the asylum regime, for instance, on the basis of prima facie recognition or individual assessment of claims. This requires a recalibration of the EU’s approach to protection, one that goes beyond emergency response and toward long-term responsibility. Durable protection may be achieved by providing persons in need of protection with choices regarding their longer-term prospects, whether this entails local integration or return.

The evaluation of how EU Member States determine the asylum claims of Sudanese nationals highlights their continued focus on subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive in the case of persons fleeing armed conflicts. The discussion argued that many Sudanese may have valid claims for refugee protection, thereby demonstrating the continued practice of EU Member States to grant subsidiary forms of protection to persons fleeing armed conflicts. This dilutes ‘refugee time’ in a manner that renders the durable solution of local integration more remote. In this respect, it is essential that host countries give primacy to the Refugee Convention when responding to the international protection needs of persons fleeing armed conflicts.

The invocation of cessation clauses in contexts such as Syria, still affected by limited institutional capacity and fragmented territorial control, requires particular caution. Cessation should never be used to justify returns to unsafe or fragile and regularly changing conditions. Cessation of international protection hampers the durable solution of local integration. Furthermore, premature cessation decisions create a risk of repeated displacement after return, which would place an additional administrative burden on the States having to process new applications. Accordingly, cessation practices must adhere to high legal thresholds and be implemented with procedural fairness, including the right to a thorough re-examination of protection needs. Whilst the adoption of the new Qualification Regulation aims to advance the harmonisation of qualification criteria and achieve greater consistency in asylum decisions, it also ensures protection status is maintained only as long as the risk of persecution or serious harm persists. The evolving insecurity in Syria, Ukraine and Sudan will be a critical test of EU Member States’ adherence to the Refugee Convention, requiring cessation of protection only when conditions have changed in fundamental, durable, and stable ways.