From a Medical to a Social Model: The Evolution of Disability Rights in the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence (2004–2024)

Abstract

The evolution of disability rights jurisprudence in Peru’s Constitutional Court (2004–2024) demonstrates a paradigm shift from medical to social models of disability. This research analyzes key Constitutional Court decisions through documentary analysis, identifying three distinct periods: early medical model jurisprudence (2004–2009), transitional incorporation of international standards (2010–2015), and consolidation of the social model (2016–2024). Findings reveal how the Court’s reasoning evolved from focusing on individual impairments and rehabilitation to recognizing disability as arising from societal barriers. The Court progressively developed sophisticated legal standards for disability discrimination, reasonable accommodation, and recognition of communication rights. Despite significant jurisprudential advancement, implementation challenges persist across institutional contexts, evidencing gaps between progressive legal frameworks and practical application. This study contributes to understanding how constitutional courts can drive paradigmatic shifts in human rights protection while highlighting the limitations of judicial interpretation alone in achieving disability rights implementation.

1. Introduction

The paradigm shifts from a medical to a social model of disability represents one of the most significant transformations in how society understands and responds to disability. The social model of disability emerged as a theoretical framework that fundamentally challenges traditional medical perspectives by relocating disability from individual “impairments” to societal barriers and systemic exclusion (Piccolo 2024; Ramírez and Bruno 2023). This theoretical repositioning has profound implications for how disability rights are conceptualized, protected, and implemented within legal systems worldwide.

Building upon this foundation, the social model of disability, initially developed by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, represents a paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing disability by relocating the focus from individual limitations to social and structural barriers. As Oliver (1996, 2012) articulates, this model radically redefines disability as a condition that society imposes beyond mere impairments through unnecessary isolation and exclusion from societal participation (UPIAS 1976). Theoretical debates surrounding this model have evolved significantly over recent decades, as evidenced by the seminal contributions of Finkelstein (1980, 2007), who characterizes disability as resulting from oppressive societal relationships with impaired individuals, and the critical reflections of Shakespeare and Watson (2001), who conceptualize disability as inherently postmodern in its complexity, variability, contingency, and situational nature.

Over the past several decades, the social model has undergone significant conceptual evolution through substantive critiques and theoretical expansions that deepen our understanding of disability. Central to these developments is the recognition that disability exists at the intersection of multiple theoretical frameworks. Burchardt (2004) illuminates how the capabilities approach complements the social model by providing a normative framework that conceptualizes disability as constraints on substantive freedoms and opportunities, rather than merely as socially imposed barriers. This conceptual bridge allows for a more nuanced understanding of how personal characteristics interact with environmental factors to create or diminish capabilities. Similarly, Gabel and Peters (2004) propose resistance theory as a unifying conceptual framework that transcends paradigmatic boundaries by acknowledging how disabled people actively resist oppressive structures through various forms of agency. This theoretical advancement moves beyond simple dichotomies of medical versus social approaches by positioning resistance as a fundamental analytical concept present across all paradigms. Meanwhile, Dewsbury et al. (2004) and Berghs et al. (2019) further extend the social model’s conceptual boundaries by exploring its sociological underpinnings and human rights implications, respectively, suggesting that contemporary disability theory requires stronger foundations that can address increasingly complex social, economic, and political challenges.

At its conceptual core, the social model of disability posits that disability emerges from the interaction between persons with disabilities and environmental barriers, including physical, attitudinal, and institutional obstacles that hinder their full participation in society (Introna 2023). This understanding marks a decisive break from medical models that located disability primarily within individual bodies and minds, focusing instead on how social structures and institutional arrangements create and perpetuate disability through exclusionary practices and systemic barriers (Piccolo 2024). The shift towards a social model perspective has been particularly influential in reshaping legal frameworks and judicial interpretation of disability rights.

In the realm of employment and economic participation, the social model has highlighted how traditional labor markets and workplace environments often create unnecessary barriers for persons with disabilities. Recent research demonstrates that these barriers are not inherent to disability itself but rather emerge from inflexible workplace structures and discriminatory practices (Rachatanantikul et al. 2024). This understanding has led to the development of legal obligations for reasonable accommodation and workplace modifications, recognizing that the primary difficulty lies not in individual limitations but in the failure of social institutions to adapt to human diversity.

The implementation of the social model through legal frameworks has particularly gained momentum following the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This international instrument embodies the social model’s principles and has catalyzed significant legal reforms across jurisdictions (Cho et al. 2024). Constitutional courts, as ultimate interpreters of fundamental rights, have played a crucial role in translating these principles into enforceable legal standards and in reshaping traditional legal doctrines to align with the social model’s understanding of disability.

Within this context, the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence on disability rights offers a unique lens through which to examine how legal systems adapt to and implement paradigmatic shifts in understanding disability. Constitutional courts have had to grapple with transforming abstract principles of the social model into specific legal standards while balancing competing rights and practical implementation issues (Introna 2023). This process has often involved reinterpreting existing constitutional provisions through the lens of the social model, developing new legal tests for discrimination, and establishing standards for reasonable accommodation.

In Latin America, the implementation of the social model has followed a distinctive path, particularly in the realm of legal capacity and criminal justice. Recent research shows that several Latin American countries have made significant legislative modifications to civil law, replacing substitute decision-making regimes with support systems based on the rights, will, and preferences of persons with disabilities (Mercurio and Sheinbaum Lerner 2024). However, this transformation has been uneven across different areas of law, with criminal law showing particular resistance to fully incorporating social model principles in both substantive and procedural aspects (Mercurio 2023).

Peru presents a particularly interesting case study in this regional context, with a comprehensive legal framework that has evolved significantly to incorporate the social model of disability. At the constitutional level, protection for persons with disabilities is anchored in several key provisions, with Article 2.2 establishing equality before the law and non-discrimination, Article 7 guaranteeing the right to protection, care, rehabilitation and security, Article 23 providing special protection for workers with disabilities, and Article 26 ensuring equal opportunities without discrimination (Flor and Perales 2024).

To fully understand the evolution of disability rights in Peru’s constitutional jurisprudence, it is essential to contextualize how international law is incorporated into Peru’s domestic legal system and the unique position of the Constitutional Court within Peru’s judicial structure. The Peruvian Constitution establishes a monist system of international law incorporation through Article 55, which provides that treaties form part of domestic law upon ratification. Moreover, the Fourth Final and Transitional Provision mandates that constitutional rights must be interpreted in accordance with international human rights treaties ratified by Peru. This constitutional design explains why the ratification of the CRPD in 2008 had such a profound impact on disability rights interpretation, creating a direct pathway for international standards to influence domestic jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court itself occupies a distinctive position in Peru’s judicial hierarchy, functioning as an autonomous constitutional organ separate from the ordinary judiciary, with its organization and functions regulated by Articles 201–205 of the Constitution and its Organic Law (Law 28301). The Court is composed of seven magistrates elected by the Congress with a qualified majority for five-year terms, and its jurisdictional independence is constitutionally guaranteed. According to Article 202 of the Constitution, the Court exercises jurisdiction over (1) unconstitutional actions against laws and norms with legal rank in sole instance; (2) final review of judicial decisions denying habeas corpus, amparo, habeas data, and compliance actions; and (3) conflicts of competence or constitutional attributions between state organs and levels of government. This comprehensive constitutional jurisdiction has enabled the Court to function as a powerful catalyst for paradigmatic shifts in human rights interpretation, with its decisions carrying significant normative weight across other state institutions and the broader legal system.

This constitutional framework has been developed through a robust set of legislative measures. The General Law on Persons with Disabilities (Law 29973) represents a cornerstone of this framework, establishing comprehensive rights protection and introducing specific obligations such as employment quotas (5% for the public sector) and reasonable accommodation requirements. The Mental Health Law (Law 30947) has institutionalized the community-based model of care, marking a decisive shift away from the institutionalization paradigm characteristic of the medical model. Additionally, Law 29535 officially recognizes Peruvian Sign Language and establishes obligations regarding interpretation services, acknowledging the linguistic rights of persons with hearing disabilities.

A particularly significant reform came with Legislative Decree No. 1384, which revolutionized the legal capacity framework by incorporating the social model paradigm and aligning domestic law with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Flor and Perales 2024). This decree eliminated the traditional guardianship system based on substitute decision-making and established a system of support and safeguards that recognizes the legal capacity of persons with disabilities. This reform was complemented by modifications to the Civil Code, Civil Procedure Code, and Notarial Law, creating a comprehensive framework for implementing the new paradigm (Mercurio and Sheinbaum Lerner 2024).

The scholarly literature on the social model of disability in Peruvian law demonstrates a significant evolution, particularly in constitutional jurisprudence and its impact on the legal framework. Varsi-Rospigliosi and Torres-Maldonado (2019) document how legal capacity reforms through Legislative Decree 1384 marked a turning point in the transition from a medical–rehabilitative approach toward a social model, although they identify resistance in judicial practice. Caycho (2020) analyzes how Peru’s reform of legal capacity for persons with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities revolutionized the regulatory framework but notes that the current regulations are only partially compatible with Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Complementarily, Bregaglio and Constantino (2020a, 2020b) document how, despite support system reforms, courts continue to apply guardianship approaches and identify persistent barriers in healthcare decision-making.

In the institutional domain, Seminario-Hurtado and Avellaneda-Vásquez (2024) demonstrate significant gaps in implementing the social model within the Peruvian penitentiary system, while Flor and Perales (2024) explore the legal implications of the social model in criminal accountability, proposing a reformulation of fundamental categories such as culpability and responsibility. Bardales-Noriega (2025) confirms the persistence of structural barriers to labor inclusion, noting that employment quotas have not been respected due to structural conditions and the growth of informal employment. Finally, complementary works by Seminario-Hurtado (2022a, 2022b) and Bermudez-Tapia and Seminario-Hurtado (2020, 2021) demonstrate accessibility gaps in justice systems and limited implementation of communication rights, evidencing the disconnect between the jurisprudential evolution of the Constitutional Court and everyday institutional practices.

Within this context, the present study offers an original contribution by systematically analyzing the complete evolution of the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the rights of persons with disabilities over a twenty-year period (2004–2024), identifying three distinctive stages in the transition from the medical to the social model. Unlike previous studies that have focused on specific aspects such as legal capacity (Caycho 2020; Varsi-Rospigliosi and Torres-Maldonado 2019), particular sectors such as employment (Bardales-Noriega 2025), or the penitentiary system (Seminario-Hurtado and Avellaneda-Vásquez 2024), this research provides a comprehensive analysis of how the highest constitutional interpreter has progressively transformed its understanding of disability and developed sophisticated legal standards for discrimination, reasonable accommodations, and communication rights. This study not only documents this jurisprudential evolution but also examines the interaction between interpretative advances and institutional implementation challenges, contributing to understanding how constitutional courts can drive paradigmatic shifts in human rights protection while highlighting the limitations of judicial interpretation alone in achieving effective implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities.

2. Methods

This research employs a qualitative documentary analysis of the Peruvian Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on disability rights from 2004 to 2024. Our corpus comprises Constitutional Court decisions (sentencias) that have developed significant interpretations regarding disability rights during this period. The selected decisions span across three temporal periods that reflect the evolution in disability rights interpretation: early jurisprudence (2004–2009), transitional jurisprudence (2010–2015), and social model jurisprudence (2016–2024).

The early jurisprudence period is represented by fundamental decisions such as Case No. 00324-1999-AA/TC, Case No. 01624-2002-AA/TC, Case No. 03081-2007-PA/TC, and Case No. 02480-2008-PA/TC. The transitional period includes key developments found in Case No. 02317-2010-PA/TC, Case No. 02362-2012-PA/TC, Case No. 01153-2013-PA/TC, Case No. 02437-2013-PA/TC, and Case No. 04104-2013-PC/TC. The social model period is evidenced in more recent decisions, particularly Case No. 00194-2014-PHC/TC, Case No. 05048-2016-PA/TC, Case No. 03835-2017-AA/TC, and culminating in Case No. 01106-2022-PA/TC.

Our analytical framework employs a three-stage process beginning with doctrinal analysis. This stage involves the careful identification of key legal reasoning in each decision, examination of interpretative criteria employed by the Court, analysis of how international standards are incorporated, and identification of evolving legal standards for disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation. This detailed textual analysis allows us to trace the development of legal doctrine through key constitutional decisions, focusing primarily on jurisprudential reasoning and the evolution of legal standards.

The second stage comprises evolutionary analysis, where we examine the progressive development of key concepts through time. This includes tracking the conceptual evolution in disability understanding (from medical to social model), the development of specific legal tests for disability discrimination, the integration of international human rights frameworks such as the CRPD, and the conceptual evolution in the Court’s understanding of disability discrimination and reasonable accommodation. This diachronic analysis helps identify patterns of change and continuity in the Court’s jurisprudence. To conduct this evolutionary analysis, we carefully examined the language used by the Court in each decision, noting shifts in terminology and reasoning across the three periods. We particularly focused on how the Court’s references to disability changed from terms like “impeded” and “declared incompetent” in earlier decisions to “persons with disabilities” in later ones, and how its reasoning evolved from focusing on individual limitations to recognizing societal barriers. We also identified key transitional cases, such as Case No. 02317-2010-PA/TC, where the Court began incorporating international standards while still retaining elements of the medical model approach.

The final stage involves contextual analysis, where each decision is examined within its historical and legislative framework, such as the enactment of Law 29973 and Legislative Decree 1384. We also analyze how jurisprudence interacts with institutional practices in key sectors including employment, healthcare, and education, examining both jurisprudential progress and implementation problems. This contextual approach ensures that our analysis captures not only legal developments but also their relationship with broader social and institutional changes in disability rights protection. In conducting this contextual analysis, we mapped each significant Constitutional Court decision against major legislative developments and institutional responses. For example, we examined how the Court’s decisions on reasonable accommodation in education were implemented by universities following Case No. 02362-2012-PA/TC, and how mental health institutions responded to the Court’s community-based care mandates after Case No. 05048-2016-PA/TC. We also consulted existing empirical research on implementation outcomes, particularly drawing on studies documenting institutional practices in various sectors to identify gaps between jurisprudential standards and practical application.

This methodological approach enables us to trace how the Constitutional Court’s reasoning has evolved from medical to social model interpretations of disability rights, while identifying both doctrinal developments and practical issues in implementing the social model through constitutional interpretation. Through this comprehensive analysis, we aim to contribute to understanding how constitutional courts can effectively drive paradigmatic shifts in human rights protection.

3. Findings

3.1. The Medical Model Era in Constitutional Interpretation (2004–2009)

The early jurisprudence of Peru’s Constitutional Court reflects a clear adherence to the medical model of disability, characterized by an emphasis on individual “impairment” and rehabilitation. This approach is evidently manifested in Case No. 00324-1999-AA/TC, where the Court employed terms like impeded and interpreted Article 23 of the Constitution from a protective rather than rights-based perspective. The Court’s reasoning centered on the individual’s limitations rather than societal barriers, emphasizing the need for special protection rather than structural changes.

This medical model perspective was further reinforced in Case No. 01624-2002-AA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) where the petitioner sought constitutional protection to continue caring for his aunt who had a disability and was unable to care for herself. The petitioner, who was her legal representative, claimed that the respondent was attempting to prevent him from fulfilling his duty to protect her health, physical integrity, and rights by filing a criminal complaint against him for alleged false imprisonment. The case reached the Constitutional Court after conflicting rulings in the lower courts. In this judgment, the Court interpreted Article 7 of the Constitution primarily through the lens of “impairment” and incapacity. The Court’s reasoning focused on the need to “protect the disabled” (legal basis [fundament] 5), reflecting a paternalistic approach characteristic of the medical model. The Court upheld the constitutional claim and ordered the respondent to refrain from preventing the plaintiff from exercising his right to protect his represented person. Notably, the Court emphasized:

5. There exists a duty to protect persons incapable of providing for themselves, especially regarding the enjoyment of rights that Title 1 of the Constitution grants to all citizens; consequently, the respect and dignity of the person with disability, as well as their autonomy and equal opportunities must be guaranteed, in the present case, by allowing the plaintiff to care for and protect the person with disability, and the free exercise of the powers of representation granted, since every person with physical disability should enjoy, to the maximum degree feasible, the same rights that other people enjoy.

[author’s translation]

A significant demonstration of the medical model’s influence can be found in Case No. 03081-2007-PA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) where an elderly woman petitioned on her own behalf and as the legal guardian of her 46-year-old daughter who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The petitioner challenged EsSalud’s (Social Health Insurance) decision to discharge her daughter from a mental health rehabilitation center despite her ongoing condition. The petitioner argued that she was unable to provide the specialized care her daughter required, as she was elderly, lived alone, and lacked basic services such as electricity and running water. She also expressed concern that her daughter could potentially react violently and pose a risk to herself or others. EsSalud contended that the discharge was based on medical criteria and that the patient was fit to continue treatment outside the hospital. The Court upheld the constitutional claim, invalidating the discharge report and ordering EsSalud to provide permanent and indefinite medical care and hospitalization to the patient. While this decision represented an important step in recognizing mental health rights, its approach remained firmly anchored in medical model concepts. The Court’s analysis (legal bases [fundaments] 25–26) focused primarily on treatment and rehabilitation, with limited consideration of social barriers or community integration:

25. The right to health and particularly the human right to mental health includes, on one hand, the prohibition of state interference in the individual sphere, and on the other, a range of guarantees for the benefit of human dignity, which implies a huge variable of socio-economic factors essential for the healthy development of human beings. In other words, the right to mental health has as essential content those elements inherent to the right to health, but with the particularity that its holders constitute a highly vulnerable sector of the population that requires a vision of their fundamental rights from a perspective that not only involves legal categories, but also medical, anthropological, sociological, among other aspects […] 26. Hence, state obligations are not constrained, as already stated, to a guarantee of respect in the sense of a negative freedom of non-interference, but rather import, by virtue of Article 9 of the Constitution, a set of positive actions so that the right to health is not an ideal, a Platonic entity, nor a formula emptied of content due to its programmatic nature […].

[author’s translation]

The decision’s emphasis on institutional care and medical intervention, rather than community-based support and social inclusion, exemplifies the medical model’s dominance in this period.

The Court’s approach to reasonable accommodation during this period, as evidenced in Case No. 02480-2008-PA/TC, also reflected medical model thinking. This case involved a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Matilde Villafuerte Vda. de Medina as the legal guardian of her son, Ramón Medina Villafuerte, against the Social Health Insurance (EsSalud). The petitioner challenged a psychiatric discharge report recommending her son’s release from the Rehabilitation Center for Chronic Patients, where he had been hospitalized for 12 years due to paranoid schizophrenia with family dysfunction. She requested continued permanent hospitalization, arguing that her son was a psychotic patient with violent tendencies who required lifelong institutional care. She contended that at 69 years old, living in precarious conditions with her daughters and grandchildren, and suffering from health issues herself, she could not provide the specialized multidisciplinary psychiatric treatment her son needed. EsSalud defended the discharge decision, stating that after 12 years of treatment, the patient’s psychotic symptoms had significantly improved, and while his health would never be completely normal, he did not require lifelong institutionalization. The Court upheld the constitutional claim, invalidating the discharge report and ordering permanent hospitalization and constant provision of medication for the patient. Rather than conceptualizing accommodations as removing societal barriers, the Court approached them primarily as compensatory measures for individual limitations. The decision (legal bases [fundamentos] 14–16) framed the right to health of persons with disabilities primarily in terms of medical care and rehabilitation:

14. In this order of ideas, this Court considers that the right to mental health is a fundamental right whose support is found in the principle-right of human dignity and in the rights to health and psychological integrity. This is because the preservation of human life is not only limited to protecting the biological survival of the human person but also extends to the specific possibility of recovery and improvement of health conditions […] 15. Well, bearing in mind that the right to mental health aims to protect the rights to health, personal integrity, and a life in dignified conditions, it is appropriate to indicate in an enunciative manner the manifestations that integrate its content and that can be exercised and demanded. Thus, the right to mental health includes: a. The right to access adequate and suitable treatments, whether preventive, curative, or palliative, when people have problems enjoying the highest possible level of mental health […] 16. Now, mental health, like all fundamental rights, entails the performance of abstention and/or provision obligations by the State or individuals providing mental health benefits. Therefore, it is also appropriate to indicate in an enunciative manner what these obligations are. Thus: a. The State must create conditions that ensure medical assistance and medical services for everyone in case of mental illness, which includes equal and timely access to preventive, curative, and rehabilitation mental health services.

[author’s translation]

This period’s jurisprudence consistently employed terminology characteristic of the medical model, such as “impeded”, “declared incompetent”, and “handicapped”. More significantly, the underlying logic of the Court’s decisions during this era located disability within the individual rather than in the interaction between persons with disabilities and environmental barriers. The remedies ordered by the Court similarly reflected this understanding, focusing primarily on individual medical care and rehabilitation rather than structural or societal changes.

The medical model era in the Court’s jurisprudence was also characterized by a limited engagement with international human rights standards. While the Court occasionally referenced international instruments, its interpretation remained anchored in a protective rather than rights-based framework. This approach would begin to shift only with the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Court’s subsequent jurisprudential evolution toward the social model.

3.2. The Transition Period: Incorporating International Standards (2010–2015)

The period between 2010 and 2015 marks a crucial transition in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on disability rights, characterized by the progressive incorporation of international standards and the emergence of social model elements. This transition began with Case No. 02317-2010-PA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Miguel Armando Cadillo Palomino against the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion. The petitioner challenged his exclusion from the National Registry of Irregularly Terminated Workers under Law No. 29059, alleging violations of his rights to work, equality, non-discrimination based on disability, and due process. The case reached the Constitutional Court after lower courts had dismissed the complaint, ruling that an administrative contentious procedure would be an equally satisfactory alternative channel for resolving the dispute. The Court upheld the constitutional claim in part, recognizing the violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights to equality in the application of the law, due process, and non-discrimination based on disability, and ordered his immediate registration in the National Registry of Irregularly Terminated Workers. In its judgment (legal bases [fundaments] 32–34), the Court introduced the concept of disability as a “suspect category” and developed standards for identifying indirect discrimination. The Court established that when discrimination is based on disability, the burden of proof shifts to the alleged perpetrator:

32. […] ‘suspicious categories’ or ‘especially odious’ are understood as those classification criteria that refer to certain social groups that have been historically discriminated against and that, therefore, deserve to receive special or differentiated protection from the legal system. […] any distinction based on these expressly prohibited criteria will be affected by a presumption of unconstitutionality, which can only be dispelled through strict, objective, and reasonable justification. […] 34. […] when discrimination affects the right not to be discriminated against for any of the reasons expressly prohibited by the Constitution, the constitutional judge must adhere to the following rules: (i) first, it will be the duty of the defendant, and not the plaintiff, to prove that such discrimination has not occurred; (ii) second, such demonstration must be judged through strict scrutiny […].

[author’s translation]

A significant advancement came with Case No. 02362-2012-PA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) brought by Gisela Elva Tejada Aguirre against the Graduate School of the Peruvian University of Applied Sciences. The petitioner, who suffered from amblyopia in both eyes due to congenital cataracts and had lost vision in her right eye and nearly all vision in her left eye, sought to have regulation 2.2.9 of the Studies Regulations inapplicable to her case and requested reinstatement in the Master’s Program in Regulation IV with permission to take an oral examination for the Law of Regulation and Competition course. She argued that her visual impairment made it nearly impossible to complete written evaluations, a condition she had disclosed to the university when she was invited to join the master’s program after completing her undergraduate law degree there in 2006. Despite initially being told her disability would not be an issue, the university denied her request for oral examination accommodations and dismissed her from the program after she failed two courses, citing academic regulations. The Court upheld the constitutional claim, finding an infringement of the petitioner’s rights to education and equality, and ordered the university to implement differentiated treatment for the evaluation of the petitioner that would allow her to demonstrate her knowledge in accordance with her visual disability. In this landmark decision (legal basis [fundament] 11), the Court directly applied the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) to interpret the right to education. The Court recognized that educational barriers were not inherent to the student’s disability but resulted from the institution’s failure to provide reasonable accommodation:

11. […] this obligation does not exempt educational institutions from implementing structural, academic, or other measures when an unequal situation between students is noticed that could generate harm to their academic development, since just like the State (and all its institutions), individuals are also obligated to respect fundamental rights (horizontal effectiveness), among which are the right to equality and education.

[author’s translation]

Case No. 02437-2013-PA/TC further developed the concept of reasonable accommodation, with the Court explicitly recognizing that the physical environment has historically been designed for persons without disabilities, creating a “hostile environment” for persons with disabilities. This case involved a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Margarita Cósar Camacho, Marcos Antonio Sura Lozano, and Juan Pérez Salas against Supermercados Peruanos S.A. Plaza Vea (a supermarket chain). The petitioners, all persons with visual disabilities certified by the National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS), sought permission to enter all the chain’s stores nationwide accompanied by their guide dogs. They alleged that on 9 September 2011, the supermarket had issued a statement on its website denying them entry with their guide dogs and that they had been repeatedly prohibited from entering despite explaining the necessity of guide dogs for persons with their type of disability. The respondent argued that their prohibition was based on the Sanitary Regulation for the Operation of Food and Beverage Self-Services (Ministerial Resolution No. 1653-2002-SA/DM), which restricted the entry of all types of animals for sanitary reasons. The Court upheld the constitutional claim and ordered Plaza Vea to allow the petitioners with visual disabilities to enter their facilities accompanied by their guide dogs, guaranteeing their unlimited and unhindered presence in such premises. In its judgment (legal bases [fundaments] 8–9), the Court articulated a groundbreaking understanding of environmental barriers:

8. The adoption of these measures is not justified by disability itself […] but in the fact that their exclusion from various social processes has originated in the conditions and characteristics of the environment or social setting in which they have been forced to interact. 9. […] all activities […] have been planned to take place in physical environments that conform to the requirements and needs of people who are not affected by disability. […] Historically, then, that environment has been hostile to people suffering from some disability. The lack of physical environments adequate to the needs of persons with disabilities has triggered, first, their marginalization and, then, their exclusion from all these social processes […].

[author’s translation]

The transition period culminated with Case No. 04104-2013-PC/TC (legal bases [fundaments] 18–20), where the Court elaborated on the concept of universal design and positive measures. This case involved a compliance action (proceso de cumplimiento) filed by Diómedes Luis Nieto Tinoco, in his capacity as President of the Regional Federation of Persons with Disabilities of Junín (FEREDIJ), against the Regional Government of Junín. The petitioner sought to compel the Regional Government to create and implement the Regional Office for the Attention of Persons with Disabilities (OREDIS), in accordance with Article 10 of Law No. 27050, General Law of Persons with Disabilities, and Article 2 of Law No. 28164. Additionally, he requested compliance with the hiring of persons with disabilities in the percentage established by Article 33 of Law 27050 (not less than 3% of the total staff). The petitioner had previously submitted formal requests on 13 September 2011 and 7 March 2012, but the authority had shown reluctance to comply with the legal mandate. Lower courts had dismissed the case, arguing that the mandate lacked unconditional quality as it required the Regional Government to demonstrate capacity to implement the office with adequate staff, infrastructure, and budget—matters that could not be determined in a compliance proceeding due to lack of an evidentiary stage. The appellate court further noted that the mandate required executing various administrative procedures, requirements, and formalities, including technical coordination with the National Council for Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS) and budgetary allocations. The Court partially upheld the claim, declaring the petition regarding compliance with Article 49 of Law No. 29973 inadmissible but ordering the Regional Government of Junín to create the Regional Office for Attention to Persons with Disabilities (OREDIS) within its organizational structure. In this decision, the Court established that reasonable accommodation must be viewed as part of a broader strategy to create inclusive environments, rather than as mere individual adaptations:

18. […] the principle of equality also requires that public facilities and services be conceived with a ‘universal design’, consequently being accessible to all […] 20. […] the design of products, environments, programs, and services should be thought out so that they can be used by all people, to the greatest extent possible. This should include the correct orientation of persons with physical, mental, or sensory disabilities. […] In short, the inclusion of persons with disabilities requires favoring the development of environments that allow them to orient themselves […].

[author’s translation]

Throughout this period, the Court’s terminology and conceptual framework evolved significantly. Terms such as “impeded”, “declared incompetent”, and “handicapped” were gradually replaced by person with disability, reflecting the influence of the CRPD’s human rights approach. More fundamentally, the Court began to analyze disability discrimination cases through the lens of structural barriers rather than individual limitations, though elements of the medical model persisted in some aspects of its reasoning.

This transition period was characterized by an increasing sophistication in the Court’s understanding of international standards and their domestic application. While not fully embracing the social model, these decisions laid the groundwork for the more comprehensive adoption of social model principles that would characterize the subsequent period.

3.3. Consolidation of the Social Model (2016–2024)

The period from 2016 to 2024 represents the full consolidation of the social model in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, marked by explicit adoption of this paradigm and the development of sophisticated legal standards. This consolidation began decisively with Case No. 00194-2014-PHC/TC, a habeas corpus petition (hábeas corpus) filed by José Antonio Guillén Tejada on behalf of his son, Juan José Guillén Domínguez, against Carolina Domínguez Ávila, the son’s mother and provisional guardian. The petitioner, who was separated from his wife but lived in the same house in separate spaces, alleged violations of his son’s rights to personal integrity, freedom of movement, and protection from humiliating treatment. Specifically, he sought the removal of metal bars and a sealed window that the respondent had installed in their son’s room. The case involved a young adult with chronic psychotic organic brain syndrome and profound mental retardation, who had been placed under his mother’s provisional guardianship by a Family Court order. The respondent argued that safety measures were necessary to prevent her son from escaping and harming himself or others, as he could occasionally become aggressive despite medication. She contended that her son had freedom of movement during the day under the supervision of a nursing technician, and the bars were only in his bedroom used for sleeping. A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation confirmed that the beneficiary required security measures to remove objects with which he could harm himself and needed constant supervision in his movements and during the nights. Lower courts had issued contradictory rulings, with the trial court partially granting the petition while ordering alternative safety arrangements and the appellate court revoking this decision, finding the mother’s safety measures reasonable given the circumstances. The Court upheld the petition, finding a violation of the right to individual liberty, and ordered the removal of the metal bars and the unsealing of the windows in the beneficiary’s room. The Court also ordered the Family Court to adapt the interdiction process to one of supports and safeguards in accordance with the social model of disability, demonstrating a specific application of the new paradigm in judicial practice. In this landmark judgment (legal bases [fundaments] 11–12), the Court expressly adopted the social model of disability:

11. […] one of the most relevant aspects embodied in the Convention is the establishment of the so-called social model, as an adequate perspective from which to approach the understanding of the rights and freedoms of persons with disabilities (Article 1). In this regard, the so-called social model understands disability as the result of the interaction or concurrence of a particular situation of the subject with the conditioners or obstacles that society, with or without intention, imposes on this group of people”. [author’s translation] 12. Thus, contrary to what was perceived from the previous medical or rehabilitative model, which understood disability as a purely personal attribute, the validity of this new paradigm brought by the Convention transfers disability, so to speak, to the design of society’s structures and behaviors. Thus, for example, while having visual difficulties is a condition of human diversity, not being able to take a written exam in an educational center because it does not adopt the necessary reasonable accommodations represents a situation of disability.

[author’s translation]

The transformation of mental health rights under the social model paradigm is evidenced in Case No. 05048-2016-PA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Odila Yolanda Cayatopa Vda. de Salgado, as guardian and mother of J.E.S.C., against the Social Health Insurance (EsSalud). The petitioner sought to nullify the discharge order issued on 12 June 2015, by the Almanzor Aguinaga Asenjo National Hospital and requested the immediate transfer of her daughter to the Rehabilitation Center for Chronic Patients (CRIPC) Hospital 1 Huariaca-EsSalud-Pasco or an equivalent facility. She argued that her daughter, who had suffered from chronic hebephrenic schizophrenia since she was 16 years old (38 years old at the time of filing), required specialized care until her full recovery, including not only pharmacological therapy but also psychotherapy, occupational therapy, and recreational therapy. The petitioner contended that over more than twenty years, EsSalud had only provided ambulatory pharmacological therapy and sporadic hospitalizations during crises, which had led her daughter’s condition to become chronic and severe without achieving recovery. She claimed she had requested her daughter’s transfer to a specialized rehabilitation center twice in September and October 2014 but received no response. EsSalud responded that they had never ceased providing treatment to the patient at the psychiatric service of Almanzor Aguinaga Asenjo National Hospital and had made efforts to transfer her to the Huariaca Hospital in Cerro de Pasco, but the Guillermo Almenara National Hospital in Lima had rejected the transfer three times. Lower courts issued contradictory rulings, with the trial court finding in favor of the petitioner based on inconsistencies in the patient’s diagnosis and evidence that the discharge was due to excessive hospital stay rather than recovery, while the appellate court reversed this decision, finding insufficient justification for transferring the patient to another facility. The Court partially upheld the claim, finding a violation of the right to mental health, and ordered that within 30 days, a Medical Board from the National Hospital Almanzor Aguinaga Asenjo issue a conclusive diagnosis on the patient’s medical situation, prognosis, and treatment alternatives that must include the social model of disability. The Court also ordered the adaptation of the interdiction process to one of supports and safeguards in accordance with Legislative Decree 1384, marking a significant departure from previous approaches that prioritized institutionalization. In this landmark judgment (legal bases [fundaments] 17–19), the Court rejected the institutional model of care in favor of a community-based approach:

17. Gone are the ‘treatments’ dispensed to persons with disabilities under the models of prescindence and rehabilitation. According to the criteria of the first, society decides to do without them, either through eugenic policies or confining them to the space destined for the ‘abnormal’ and ‘poor’ (marginalization). The second is characterized by society trying to rehabilitate or ‘normalize’ them through scientific methods, as they will only be ‘useful’ or ‘necessary’ to the extent that they are rehabilitated […] 18. The social approach to persons with disabilities basically understands that the limitations to the exercise of their rights do not lie in the person themselves, nor in the impairments attributed to said persons, but that their origin lies in the interaction of said impairments with external barriers existing in society that prevent their full and effective participation as a member of it on equal terms […] 19. Disabling barriers can range from architectural to attitudinal. In the case of persons with mental disabilities due to a serious disorder, attitudinal barriers can start from devaluation (not considering their opinions) and fear, to neglect and rejection that, in some cases, reaches the extreme of confinement of the person (prescindence or intramural model), moving them away from the possibility of their social and labor reintegration. […].

[author’s translation]

The practical implications of the social model in the employment context were developed in Case No. 03835-2017-AA/TC, a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Felipe Vela Vargas against the Provincial Municipality of Coronel Portillo. The petitioner sought to nullify Mayoral Resolution 689-2014-MPCP, dated 2 May 2014, which terminated his administrative career due to permanent physical incapacity, and requested reinstatement to a position requiring less physical effort than his previous role but of a similar category or level. The petitioner, who was a tenured employee serving as Director of Sectoral Program I (remuneration level F-3), argued that his termination constituted discrimination based on his physical disability. He contended that the municipality had not complied with Article 186 of Supreme Decree 005-90-PCM, as it had failed to demonstrate how his physical disability prevented him from performing his assigned functions. He emphasized that his duties were administrative in nature and did not require physical effort that could impede effective performance. Furthermore, he noted that a medical certificate dated 19 January 2016 certified that he had partial permanent disability without occupational impairment and indicated that he could continue working. The municipality’s attorney responded that the termination was not discriminatory but based on the petitioner’s condition as evidenced by Medical Certificate DS 166-2005-EF dated 19 January 2013, which diagnosed him with end-stage renal disease, diabetes mellitus, and hypertension, with characteristics of permanent disability. The lower courts rejected the petition, with the trial court finding that the medical evaluation conducted by EsSalud’s disability assessment committee had determined the petitioner suffered from permanent disability, which constituted grounds for termination under Article 182 of Supreme Decree 005-90-PCM, while the appellate court held that an administrative contentious process would be the appropriate channel for challenging the administrative resolution. The Court upheld the constitutional claim, finding violations of the constitutional right to work and the prohibition of discrimination based on disability, and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner to his position as Director of Sectoral Program I or to another similar position requiring less physical effort than the one he had been performing. This remedy directly applied the social model by focusing on workplace adaptation rather than individual limitations. In this judgment (legal bases [fundaments] 18–20), the Court established that employers have an affirmative obligation to provide reasonable accommodations, shifting the focus from the worker’s limitations to the workplace’s barriers:

18. […] according to the provisions of Article 50 of the General Law on Persons with Disabilities, they have the right for their employers to make reasonable adjustments in the workplace, which in turn acts as a guarantee of the right to equal opportunities, since the absence of reasonable adjustments entails a discriminatory situation for the case of public servants who suffer from some legally proven impairment. 19. […] in the case of public servants who have some impairment, legally proven, the employing entity will have to make the corresponding reasonable adjustments to facilitate the work of the person with a disability, which must be compatible with their functions and the need for service. 20. […] this Court considers that the defendant has not observed the provisions of subsection c) of Article 35 of Legislative Decree 276, as amended by Law 29973, since it is not evident that it has previously made the necessary reasonable adjustments for him to continue working in his position, since only when, despite their implementation, job performance is not possible, could it have been considered that the impairments due to the plaintiff’s illness ‘prevent the performance of his tasks’ […].

[author’s translation]

The culmination of this consolidation period is represented by the recent Case No. 01106-2022-PA/TC, which establishes sophisticated evidentiary standards in disability discrimination cases and recognizes sign language rights as constitutional rights. This case involved a constitutional complaint (amparo) filed by Manuel Sullcapuma Tturuco against the National University of San Antonio Abad of Cusco. The petitioner, a deaf person since birth with a disability certificate from CONADIS (National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities), sought to invalidate Letter 243-2020-UTH/DIGA-UNSAAC dated 11 December 2020, which terminated his employment. He requested continuation of his employment through the renewal of his administrative service contract or placement in a similar position. The petitioner had worked uninterruptedly for the university from 15 September 2017 until 31 December 2020, as a nutrition assistant in the university dining area. He argued that as a person with disability, he was entitled to special protection under Article 23 of the Constitution and Law 29973 (General Law on Persons with Disabilities), which requires public entities to hire persons with disabilities in a proportion not less than 5% of their total staff. Critically, he alleged that the termination letter was served without the intervention of a support person (interpreter), violating Article 659-B of the Civil Code and Article 5.2 of Supreme Decree 075-2008-PCM. The university responded that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies, that an administrative contentious process would be the appropriate channel for such claims, and that the non-renewal was due to budget reductions for 2021 rather than discrimination. Lower courts rejected the petition, holding that the fixed-term employment contract had simply expired and that despite the petitioner’s disability, he had been signing contracts since 2017 without an interpreter and had been properly notified of the contract’s expiration. The Court upheld the constitutional claim, finding violations of the rights to equality, non-discrimination, and work, and ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner to his position or to another of similar level or category, along with the payment of unpaid wages from the day after he ceased working until his reinstatement. This decision represents a specific application of the social model principles in the employment context, particularly regarding communication rights for persons with hearing disabilities. In this landmark decision (legal bases [fundaments] 24–26), the Court recognized sign language rights as constitutional rights:

24. In accordance with the constitutional provision, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities provides the following: Article 30. 4. Persons with disabilities shall be entitled, on an equal basis with others, to recognition and support of their specific cultural and linguistic identity, including sign languages and deaf culture. 25. Thus, by virtue of the Fourth Final and Transitional Provision of the Constitution, this Constitutional Court interprets that one of the areas to which the aforementioned constitutional article refers also relates to persons with hearing disabilities. This is because, while in the field of social communication, hearing people can communicate through Spanish, Quechua, Aymara, etc., in the case of persons with hearing disabilities, sign language is their means of communication with their surroundings and society. 26. According to the above, the Constitutional Court considers that any person with a hearing disability has the right to use their own language, sign language, through an interpreter, before any authority. However, this should not be interpreted as referring only to a judicial authority, but as any authority belonging to the public administration, and even to providers of public services.

[author’s translation]

Throughout this period, the Court’s jurisprudence has been characterized by three key developments that reflect the maturation of the social model approach: first, the consistent reference to and application of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as an interpretative framework, moving beyond mere citation to substantive incorporation of its principles; second, the development of specific legal tests and standards that operationalize social model principles in specific cases; third, the recognition of intersectional dimensions of disability discrimination and the need for comprehensive remedial approaches.

The consolidation of the social model is also evident in the Court’s remedial approach. Rather than focusing solely on individual compensation or accommodation, the Court’s orders increasingly address structural barriers and require systemic changes. This evolution reflects a deeper understanding that disability rights violations often stem from institutional and societal barriers rather than individual circumstances.

This period demonstrates the Court’s successful integration of international standards with domestic constitutional interpretation, creating a robust framework for protecting disability rights based on social model principles. The jurisprudence not only articulates theoretical principles but also provides practical guidance for implementing the social model across various contexts, from employment to education to healthcare.

4. Discussion

The evolution of disability rights protection in Peru represents a complex interplay between jurisprudential development and institutional transformation, particularly following the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the enactment of Law 29973, the General Law on Persons with Disabilities. This evolution has produced significant impacts while revealing persistent obstacles in implementation across various institutional contexts.

The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential development has established comprehensive frameworks for addressing disability discrimination within Peru’s specific institutional context. The Court’s recognition of disability as a “suspect category” in employment discrimination cases has been particularly impactful, as evidenced in cases involving state institutions like the National University of San Antonio Abad del Cusco (Case No. 01106-2022-PA/TC) and the National Bank (Case No. 02904-2011-PA/TC). This development has required public institutions to demonstrate that employment decisions affecting persons with disabilities are based on objective criteria rather than discriminatory practices (Malhotra 2024). This evolution directly reflects the theoretical shift from medical to social models articulated by Oliver (1996, 2012) and Finkelstein (1980, 2007), demonstrating how the conceptual frameworks established in the disability rights movement have been translated into specific legal doctrines within Peru’s constitutional jurisprudence.

A significant institutional impact has been observed in the healthcare sector, where the Court’s jurisprudence has pushed for transformation from a medical to a social model of disability. This is particularly evident in cases involving EsSalud and public hospitals like Hospital Víctor Larco Herrera and Hospital Hermilio Valdizán (Case No. 03081-2007-PA/TC, Case No. 02480-2008-PA/TC, Case No. 05048-2016-PA/TC, and Case No. 03835-2017-AA/TC). The Court has emphasized the need for community-based mental health services, aligning with the requirements of Law 29889, which modified the General Health Law to guarantee the rights of persons with mental health conditions. However, as noted by Shimoda et al. (2024), institutional resistance to moving away from traditional medical model practices remains strong, particularly in mental health facilities. Research by Bregaglio and Constantino (2020a) on medical consent practices in Peruvian healthcare institutions identifies specific implementation barriers, including persistent paternalistic attitudes among healthcare providers, insufficient protocols for supported decision-making, and limited understanding of capacity assessment alternatives. Their findings document how medical institutions often default to substituted decision-making despite legal reforms. This resistance reflects what Shakespeare and Watson (2001) identified as the complex, contingent, and situated nature of disability, where institutional structures often lag behind conceptual and legal advancements.

The implementation of reasonable accommodations in Peru’s public sector presents particular problems. While the Court has established strong protections through cases like Case No. 02437-2013-PA/TC, public institutions often struggle with practical implementation. This is evident in the education sector, where universities and other educational institutions face difficulties in implementing effective accommodation systems despite clear judicial mandates. The National Council for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS) has played a crucial role in monitoring compliance, but implementation gaps persist. Empirical research by Seminario-Hurtado and Avellaneda-Vásquez (2023) on Peruvian educational institutions documents that only 38.2% of universities have implemented comprehensive accessibility measures, with significant gaps in both physical infrastructure and procedural accommodations. Their study reveals that despite clear constitutional mandates, implementation is hindered by limited resources, insufficient technical guidance, and persistent attitudinal barriers among institutional leadership. These obstacles demonstrate what Burchardt (2004) highlighted regarding the limitations of legal frameworks alone in transforming capabilities and opportunities for persons with disabilities, underscoring the need for a more comprehensive approach that addresses both structural and attitudinal barriers.

A noteworthy development has been the Court’s recognition of sign language rights as constitutional rights, requiring public institutions to provide interpretation services. This has implications for various state entities, from universities to courts, though practical implementation faces resource constraints. The Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, through Supreme Decree 006-2017-MIMP, has established regulations for implementing these rights, but institutional capacity remains limited (Ramírez and Bruno 2023). Avellaneda-Vásquez et al. (2024) document specific problems in implementing sign language rights in Peru, noting that only 23 officially recognized sign language interpreters are registered nationwide, creating significant accessibility barriers in judicial, educational, and healthcare settings. Their research highlights the disconnect between progressive constitutional recognition and practical implementation due to insufficient training programs and limited institutional prioritization. This dimension of the Court’s jurisprudence represents a practical application of what Gabel and Peters (2004) conceptualized as resistance theory, wherein language rights become a site of resistance against dominant communicative norms and a means of asserting disability identity and agency.

The Court’s jurisprudence has also impacted employment quotas for persons with disabilities in public institutions. Law 29973 requires public entities to maintain a 5% quota for employees with disabilities, with oversight shared between the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion and the National Civil Service Authority (SERVIR). However, compliance remains inconsistent across institutions, reflecting broader obstacles in implementing affirmative action measures (Cho et al. 2024). These implementation difficulties illustrate the persistent tensions between progressive legal frameworks and institutional practices, a pattern consistent with what Dewsbury et al. (2004) described in their critique of social model applications in practical contexts.

Intersectional discrimination presents issues in the Peruvian context, especially in cases involving multiple vulnerabilities. The Public Ministry’s role in protecting persons with disabilities has expanded following recent Court decisions, particularly in cases involving mental health and employment rights (Case No. 00194-2014-PHC/TC). However, developing effective frameworks for addressing multiple discrimination grounds remains challenging within Peru’s legal system (Alford and Graham Holmes 2024). The Court’s evolving approach to intersectionality reflects a growing recognition of what Berghs et al. (2019) articulated as the need for a “social model of human rights” that can address increasingly complex dimensions of disability discrimination in contemporary societies.

The implementation of the social model of disability in Peru’s institutional framework has revealed significant gaps between jurisprudential standards and practical application. While Legislative Decree 1384 has reformed various aspects of Peru’s Civil Code to recognize the legal capacity of persons with disabilities, practical implementation of support systems and reasonable accommodations remains inconsistent across institutions (Meyer and Willems 2024). Research by Varsi-Rospigliosi and Torres-Maldonado (2019) and Bregaglio and Constantino (2020b) reveals that despite the landmark reform through Legislative Decree 1384, implementation of support systems faces significant problems in judicial practice, with empirical evidence showing inconsistent application of the social model principles in civil and family courts. Their study of judicial decisions reveals that many courts continue to apply guardianship-like reasoning even when formally adopting support mechanisms, particularly in cases involving persons with intellectual disabilities. These implementation problems highlight the tensions between legal doctrine and institutional practice that have characterized disability rights advancement in Peru and globally.

The Court’s evolving jurisprudence has particularly impacted institutional practices regarding employment termination and contract non-renewal for persons with disabilities. Recent decisions have established that public institutions must demonstrate that such decisions are not based on disability discrimination, requiring specific documentation and justification (Case No. 01106-2022-PA/TC). This has implications for human resource practices across Peru’s public sector, though implementation remains challenging (Sofokleous and Stylianou 2023). The Court’s approach in these cases demonstrates a practical application of the capabilities framework articulated by Burchardt (2004), focusing on enhancing substantive opportunities for employment rather than merely formal protections against discrimination.

Looking forward, several key problems emerge in the Peruvian context. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, along with CONADIS and other relevant institutions, must develop more detailed frameworks for implementing reasonable accommodations across different public services. The Ministry of Economy and Finance’s role in allocating resources for accessibility modifications and reasonable accommodations remains crucial, though budget constraints often limit implementation (Tibyriçá and Mendes 2023). These institutional issues reflect the need for what Berghs et al. (2019) described as a stronger social model that can serve as a means to effectively enable and guarantee rights in practice, not merely in legal doctrine.

The analysis reveals that while Peru’s Constitutional Court has established strong protections for disability rights, practical implementation faces significant institutional and resource challenges. The gap between jurisprudential standards and institutional practices suggests the need for more coordinated efforts among various state entities, including the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labor, and CONADIS (Bardales-Noriega 2025). This coordination challenge exemplifies what resistance theorists like Gabel and Peters (2004) identified as the need for multi-level resistance strategies that operate across institutional boundaries and leverage different forms of agency.

Future developments in Peru’s disability rights framework will likely require strengthened coordination among these institutions, along with enhanced monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The role of the Public Ministry in ensuring compliance with disability rights protections may need to expand, particularly in cases involving institutional discrimination. Additionally, the development of more effective remedies for systemic discrimination will be crucial for advancing disability rights protection in Peru’s institutional context (Griffiths 2022). These developments will need to engage with the conceptual richness of contemporary disability theory, incorporating elements of the capabilities approach, resistance theory, and the social model of human rights to address increasingly complex forms of disability discrimination and exclusion.

These implementations reflect broader patterns identified in Peruvian disability rights scholarship. Varsi-Rospigliosi and Torres-Maldonado (2019) highlight how Peru’s civil law tradition has shaped the implementation of disability rights reforms, creating tensions between progressive frameworks and traditional legal concepts. Their analysis of judicial decisions following Legislative Decree 1384 reveals a gradual but inconsistent adoption of social model principles in civil courts. Similarly, Seminario-Hurtado (2022a, 2022b) documents how accessibility implementation varies significantly across different institutional contexts, with judicial and educational institutions showing greater progress than healthcare and transportation sectors. This uneven implementation suggests the need for more comprehensive monitoring mechanisms and institutional accountability frameworks, aligned with what Shakespeare and Watson (2001) described as the situated and contingent nature of disability that requires contextualized rather than one-size-fits-all approaches to implementation.

The evolution of disability rights protection in Peru thus presents both significant achievements and persistent barriers. While the Constitutional Court has established strong theoretical frameworks and rights protections, practical implementation requires continued attention to institutional capacity, resource allocation, and coordination among various state entities. The convergence of jurisprudential development and practical implementation remains a key challenge for the future of disability rights protection in Peru’s legal and institutional framework. This tension between legal doctrine and institutional practice reflects the broader problems in translating social model principles into substantive rights and opportunities in diverse institutional contexts.

5. Conclusions

The analysis of Peru’s Constitutional Court jurisprudence from 2004 to 2024 reveals a significant transformation in the legal understanding and protection of disability rights, marking a progressive shift from a medical to a social model approach. This evolution demonstrates both the potential and limitations of constitutional interpretation in advancing paradigmatic changes in human rights protection.

The Court’s jurisprudential development illustrates three key findings about the role of constitutional courts in promoting the social model of disability. First, the Court’s evolution shows that meaningful change requires more than simply citing international standards—it demands a fundamental reconceptualization of how disability is understood within constitutional reasoning. This is evidenced by the Court’s transition from treating disability as an individual medical condition to recognizing it as the product of social and environmental barriers, as demonstrated in landmark cases like Case No. 00194-2014-PHC/TC and Case No. 01106-2022-PA/TC. This transformation reflects the theoretical shift from medical to social understandings of disability that has been so influential in reshaping legal approaches worldwide.

Second, the Court’s experience demonstrates that effective implementation of the social model requires courts to develop specific, practical standards rather than merely stating general principles. The Court’s later jurisprudence, particularly in cases involving reasonable accommodation and employment rights, shows an increasing focus on developing detailed guidelines and shifting evidentiary burdens to make rights protection more effective. This practical approach has proven crucial for translating social model principles into specific institutional changes.

Third, the analysis reveals that constitutional courts can play a crucial role in promoting paradigm shifts in human rights protection, but their effectiveness depends heavily on their ability to engage with and influence other state institutions. The Court’s efforts to promote the social model have been most successful when accompanied by specific orders for institutional reform and clear standards for implementation, as seen in cases involving public universities, healthcare institutions, and employment practices.

However, this research also highlights persistent barriers in implementing the social model through constitutional interpretation. Despite strong jurisprudential frameworks, practical implementation often lags behind legal development, suggesting that court decisions alone are insufficient to achieve full disability rights protection. This gap between jurisprudential development and practical implementation points to the need for more comprehensive approaches that combine legal reform with institutional capacity building and resource allocation.

Looking forward, this analysis suggests several important directions for future research and practice. First, there is a need for more detailed study of how constitutional court decisions translate into institutional practices, particularly in resource-constrained contexts. Second, future research should examine how courts can more effectively address intersectional discrimination while maintaining the practical specificity needed for effective implementation. Finally, there is a need to better understand how constitutional courts can promote coordination among different state institutions to advance disability rights protection.

In conclusion, Peru’s Constitutional Court’s jurisprudential evolution offers valuable lessons about both the potential and limitations of constitutional interpretation in advancing disability rights. While the Court has successfully developed sophisticated frameworks for implementing the social model, the persistent obstacles in practical implementation suggest the need for continued attention to the relationship between legal doctrine and institutional practice. This experience contributes important insights to broader discussions about the role of constitutional courts in promoting human rights protection and the effectiveness of different legal strategies in advancing disability rights. The ultimate measure of progress lies not in the sophistication of legal doctrine but in the tangible improvements in the lives and opportunities of persons with disabilities.