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Peer-Review Record

Are There Moral Duties toward Refugees? Considerations in Legal Ethics

by Paul Tiedemann
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Submission received: 4 November 2020 / Revised: 16 December 2020 / Accepted: 30 December 2020 / Published: 19 January 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Refugees and International Law: The Challenge of Protection)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

One problem with this article hits the reader straight away, in the use of long, incomprehensible words, in the abstract. "A coherent refugee ethic cannot be developed on the basis of a utilitarian, egalitarian or eudemonistical moral theory. Only the deontological moral theory provides a suitable basis".  It is really important, I think, not to confuse the reader from the word go with these kinds of phrases. Instead, even in the abstract, explain these differences briefly, so the reader can follow.

I would not suggest the author's easy dismissal of no-border theory, which in fact, if he embraced at least some elements of its logic, would mean that the 'asylum paradox' referred to in passing, either would not need to be included as a paradox, or could be reduced. Once the assumption that the 'nation-state' has the right to exclude (as this author assumes) is made, I find this article very much in conformity - indeed in almost slavish obedience - to dominant state practices in the EU since at least 2000. Yet it is not the job, I believe, of academics to line up obediently behind the 'black box' of state discretion in border controls. Whilst appearing to take a ''logical" line on morality questions, the author is "seeing like a state". On issues of morality the state itself, and its executive, always look for individual "moral agents" to hold accountable when things go wrong. Reinforcing this impression of a slavish adherence to dominant right-wing norms, the author uses a hypothetical argument to undermine Ott's propositio that refugees' need for safety should override the more everyday utility of nationals.  Yet empirical research shows that 1000 refugees arriving generally shows that employment for everyone grows in high in-migration economies.  I find the "hypothetical" example in lines 104-111 disingenuous. There is therefore no "altruism" demanded, unless one goes along with the argument that "refugees [and migrants] steal jobs". The argument against Singer, another 'straw man' to knock down, does not convince me. Abstraction does not deny individual cases, and the author argues both for attention to the individual, and for not paying attention to Singer's example of an individual child drowning.  Confusing, to say the least. Obfuscatory perhaps? Reading through the various "approaches", picked it seemed more or less at random, I was surprised to see no references anywhere to Rawlsian principles, which can still help this author to distinguish between e.g. equality of treatment and equality of outcomes. And to show that there is a basis for non-arbitrariness of opportunities, assigned at birth or through other accidental circumstances. I disagreed that "But, if there are no absolute rights or values, then respect for the moral value of the person cannot be considered the content of a right that every human being possesses simply because he/she is a human being" followed almost immediately by this sentence, which is presumptuous: "Obviously, Egalitarianism is entangled here in a petitio principii"  Ah, obviously!  I am afraid my temptation at this point is to see this as a petty quarrel among German scholars (I did consult the bibliography) that is of little interest beyond that country!  In 2020 it may strike me that the sheer arrogance of line 214 is unjustifiable: "So, there are no good reasons for a utilitarian or an egalitarian foundation of refugee ethics". After just 3-4 short pages, I am not sure the author can justify a sweeping statement. A little modesty could improve this paper, but I am not sure that is possible here.  

I would propose that if the paper is to be published it should be changed to a discussion of the deontological approach. I see no added value in the early parts of the paper where the author 'dismisses' other arguments, and I see little point in discussing utilitarianism and egalatianism and so forth in order to justify the deonotological position.  It would be better to start from section 2.4 and simply remove the start of the paper. If the author could live with that, then the piece might be publishable. However, since i work mainly on refugees and not really on law and ethics I might have missed some of the profound points made in this article.  Frankly after section 4 I was already lost.  Therefore, I leave it to the editors and second reviewer also to advise on resubmission.

 

Thanks!

Author Response

The reviewer confesses in the last paragraph of his comment what one can already suspect when reading the text before it:  His/her criticism is therefore limited to attacking the author ad personam (arrogance, right-wing-arguments). The reviewer obviously prefers texts if they are "refugee-friendly". He/She thus demands an ideological justification for a result that has already been established before the argumentation has begun. This is the opposite of philosophical reflection. Philosophy starts with questions, not with answers.

Nevertheless, four remarks:

  1. Abstracts cannot replace the article itself. The article explains what is meant by Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Eudemonism and Deontology.
  2. The decision for a deontological approach in philosophical ethics must be justified. It is not a quasi-religious confession. One can only justify the decision by showing why other approaches are less appropriate in the context of refugee ethics.
  3. The reviewer obviously did not understand Konrad Ott's argumentation. However, this is not due to my text.
  4. The petitio principii of Egalitarianism lies in the fact that it establishes its own principle by already presupposing it.

 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

The paper is very good and I think that can be published in the present form.

 

However, the Author should comsider:

 

  • Are utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and eudemonism objectionable in general or only with regard the refugees? Sometimes it seems that these theories do not work in general. Some other times it seems that refugees rise issues that show that these theories are weak.
  • Line 310-317. The difference between utilitarianism and deontology (concerning 'harm') is not very clear. Please, clarify.
  • Line 653. It seems that Hegel has a lot in common with Bentham and utilitarianism. So, please, explain better why you consider Hegel's view after you have shown that utilitarianism is weak and it does not work.

Author Response

To § 1

I clarify this point by an insertion in line 50-57.

 

To § 2

I inserted some more sentences in line 322-329 in order to clarify the difference between Deontology and Utilitarianism.

 

To § 3

I accept that the reference to Bentham at this point requires more clarification. However, a closer discussion of Bentham seems not to be adequate here because it leads away from the actual point that I want to discuss, namely the doctrine of the double effect. This is why I deleted the reference to Bentham (line 660, former line 653). It is not relevant here.

Only for the reviewer: The difference of deontological and utilitarian ethics does not refer to the question what an action is (theory of action). Rather, it refers only to different standards concerning the qualification of actions as evil or good.

Reviewer 3 Report

I regret to inform that the manuscript presented in Laws is a version similar to other work already existing on the Internet. Which I attach, as it is free to download from the web.

Moral Duties toward Refugees. 39 Pages Posted: 4 Dec 2018

Paul Tiedemann.

Justus-Liebig-University Giessen

Date Written: November 1, 2018

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3281634

In addition, the same work already published on the internet says that it is a translation of a previous one. See foot note in page 1.

"This paper is the slightly modified translation of the essay ”Was schulden wir Flüchtlingen. Eine Ethik des Flüchtlingsschutzes“, published in JRE 26 (2018)."

As this is a blind review, and I do not know the name of the author who sent the work, it could be a case of plagiarism. And in any case it must be only the same author, for the work to be considered.

 

Finally, in case the publisher considers that it can be taken into account, I note that it is not an original work as it is already published on the Internet, and that it is also a translation of another previous work as they themselves claim.

With all this I regret to inform you that the manuscript must be rejected for ethical considerations and to safeguard the intellectual property of the already published manuscript.

 

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Author Response

Based on the email from Emma Luo dated November 23, 2020, this criticism can be regarded as settled. In addition, I would like to inform you that I will delete the working paper that I published on https://ssrn.com/abstract=3281634 (2018) as soon as LAWS has given final approval. I will only publish the abstract there and a link to the article in LAWS.

Round 2

Reviewer 3 Report

Once the  ethical concerns about this study were solved by authors and editorial office, I have no problem about the quality of the manuscript. It is an acceptable work for publishing.

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