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This study proposes the concept of Co-exploration as a diversification strategy that enables oil and gas (O&G) companies to leverage their geoscientific capabilities to jointly assess multiple resources, such as geothermal energy, natural hydrogen, lithium in brines, geological storage, and deep-sea mining. Those resources share a reliance on traditional upstream capabilities, including geological mapping, geophysical data acquisition and interpretation, reservoir characterization, modeling techniques, risk analysis, drilling, operations in remote environments, and the management of complex projects. A compatibility matrix was developed to summarize how well these alternatives fit a Co-exploration strategy. Alternatives such as CCS and CO₂-EOR stand out for their technical and operational synergies with O&G upstream operations; however, they rely on tax incentives and an immature carbon market. Conversely, geothermal energy (EGS) and lithium production from brines represent more balanced alternatives for a Co-exploration strategy, combining geoscientific synergies, environmental and climate compatibility. Natural hydrogen offers strong strategic alignment but faces low technological maturity and market uncertainties. Finally, deep-sea mining emerges as the least viable alternative, despite its strategic appeal regarding the supply of critical elements. However, applying legacy O&G methods and tools to these alternative resources is not straightforward. Alternative projects can differ from O&G projects in investment scale, time horizons, and risk–return profiles. There are also challenges associated with permitting, resource ownership, environmental and monitoring requirements, long-term liabilities, and social acceptance.

Crop-residue burning in mainland Southeast Asia wastes a bioresource and coincides with the region’s worst air quality. We asked how projected crop-calendar shifts change the overlap between residue burning and stagnant weather by mid-century (2041–2060). Burning windows from harvest to the next planting, validated against satellite cropland fire detections, were projected with 15 bias-corrected CMIP6 models under SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5 and combined with two stagnation indices: calm days and poorly ventilated afternoons. Rice harvests advance by 6–9 days, but the calendar shift changes the share of residue burning on stagnant days by less than 0.5 percentage points in the ensemble mean, whether burning follows the harvest or the next planting, because burning peaks in late February and March, when the frequency of stagnant days changes little from week to week. The shift instead removes one to two dry days from the first month after the rice harvest, when straw is collected. The change in the ventilation climate is larger but uncertain, because models disagree on near-surface wind, and it differs between and within countries. Crop-calendar shifts are therefore unlikely to increase the exposure of residue burning to stagnant conditions.

Achieving climate neutrality in Europe is a critical goal, yet there is no model-based assessment detailing the key factors and assumptions of each Member State’s National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). To fill that gap, the plans of 35 European countries (33 NECPs and the equivalent national plans of Norway and Switzerland) were reviewed, and each was simulated in a common energy emissions modeling framework, creating a consolidated European National Commitments (NC) scenario that assumes full implementation of the plans. The LEAP (Low Emissions Analysis Platform) model developed for this purpose covers energy consumption and production in the residential, industrial, agricultural, transport (terrestrial, maritime, aviation), and services sectors. Greenhouse gas emissions are calculated in CO₂ equivalents for each fuel type and end use. Under the NC scenario, energy-related GHG emissions fall by about 65% between 2025 and 2050, with reductions in all sectors, driven by energy efficiency gains and cleaner fuel mixes. Yet the plans are not mutually consistent: summed over all countries, they imply net imports of 115 TWh of electricity and 79 TWh of green hydrogen in 2050 that no European plan foresees supplying. However, achieving these reductions depends on fully implementing 35 plans, which vary substantially in their timelines, ambition levels, data granularity, and fuel trade assumptions. The paper discusses these inconsistencies and proposes policy recommendations tailored by sector, country, and policy framework to support a holistic and equitable transition.