Special Issue "Contract Theory"
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 July 2013)
Dr. Tim Worrall
School of Economics, The University of Edinbergh, 31 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, UK
Phone: +44 131 651 5128
Interests: game theory and bargaining theory; market structure and pricing; information and uncertainty; intertemporal choice and growth; consumption, saving, production, employment and investment; financial markets; corporate finance and governance; regulation and industrial policy
Contract Theory may be regarded as a subset of Game Theory where one agent can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other parties in the game. Contract theory therefore, could be viewed as a refinement that characterises one, or a set of, constrained efficient equilibria. Contract Theory is useful in understanding relationships between trading partners, institutions and organisations when agents have conflicting objectives. It has become an essential component of understanding any exchange where trade is not simultaneous, for example, insurance or credit. Important topics for future research in contract theory include: financial contracting and its role in the credit crisis; the implications of enforcement constraints on contractual dynamics; the inclusion of behavioural elements in contracting and the interaction of formal and informal contracts; understanding the general equilibrium effects of contractual design. This special issue is intended to reflect the richness and variety of contract theory. Among the general topics of research to be considered are:
1) Relational contracts
2) Incomplete contracts
3) Limited enforcement
4) Financial and credit contracts
Dr. Tim Worrall
Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited.
Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed Open Access quarterly journal published by MDPI.
Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 500 CHF (Swiss Francs). English correction and/or formatting fees of 250 CHF (Swiss Francs) will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections.
- incomplete contracts
- moral hazard
- adverse selection
- limited commitment
- reference points
- relational contracts
Games 2013, 4(3), 347-366; doi:10.3390/g4030347
Received: 7 April 2013; in revised form: 9 June 2013 / Accepted: 9 July 2013 / Published: 25 July 2013| PDF Full-text (494 KB)
Games 2013, 4(3), 437-456; doi:10.3390/g4030437
Received: 25 April 2013; in revised form: 27 June 2013 / Accepted: 2 August 2013 / Published: 14 August 2013| PDF Full-text (462 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Games 2013, 4(3), 457-496; doi:10.3390/g4030457
Received: 7 April 2013; in revised form: 11 July 2013 / Accepted: 6 August 2013 / Published: 21 August 2013| Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (839 KB)
Games 2013, 4(3), 508-531; doi:10.3390/g4030508
Received: 14 February 2013; in revised form: 12 August 2013 / Accepted: 19 August 2013 / Published: 30 August 2013| PDF Full-text (302 KB)
Article: Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building
Games 2013, 4(3), 532-560; doi:10.3390/g4030532
Received: 14 August 2013; in revised form: 10 September 2013 / Accepted: 11 September 2013 / Published: 16 September 2013| PDF Full-text (352 KB)
Article: The Optimality of Team Contracts
Games 2013, 4(4), 670-689; doi:10.3390/g4040670
Received: 11 April 2013; in revised form: 31 October 2013 / Accepted: 11 November 2013 / Published: 18 November 2013| Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (484 KB)
Last update: 6 June 2013