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Games 2013, 4(3), 437-456; doi:10.3390/g4030437

Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points

Received: 25 April 2013 / Revised: 27 June 2013 / Accepted: 2 August 2013 / Published: 14 August 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contract Theory)
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Abstract: We analyze noncontractible investments in a model with shading. A seller can make an investment that affects a buyer’s value. The parties have outside options that depend on asset ownership. When shading is not possible and there is no contract renegotiation, an optimum can be achieved by giving the seller the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. However, with shading, such a contract creates deadweight losses. We show that an optimal contract will limit the seller’s offers, and possibly create ex post inefficiency. Asset ownership can improve matters even if revelation mechanisms are allowed.
Keywords: incomplete contracts; noncontractible investments; reference points; asset ownership incomplete contracts; noncontractible investments; reference points; asset ownership
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Hart, O. Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points. Games 2013, 4, 437-456.

AMA Style

Hart O. Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points. Games. 2013; 4(3):437-456.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Hart, Oliver. 2013. "Noncontractible Investments and Reference Points." Games 4, no. 3: 437-456.

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