Games 2013, 4(4), 670-689; doi:10.3390/g4040670

The Optimality of Team Contracts

1email and 2,* email
Received: 11 April 2013; in revised form: 31 October 2013 / Accepted: 11 November 2013 / Published: 18 November 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Contract Theory)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns. Standard constraints, resulting in incentive contracts, fail to ensure implementability, and we examine centralized collusion-proof contracts and decentralized team contracts, as well. We prove that the principal may restrict attention to team contracts whenever returns from the project satisfy a mild monotonicity condition.
Keywords: principal-agent problems; linear contracts; collusion; team; decentralization
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MDPI and ACS Style

Barlo, M.; Özdoğan, A. The Optimality of Team Contracts. Games 2013, 4, 670-689.

AMA Style

Barlo M, Özdoğan A. The Optimality of Team Contracts. Games. 2013; 4(4):670-689.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Barlo, Mehmet; Özdoğan, Ayça. 2013. "The Optimality of Team Contracts." Games 4, no. 4: 670-689.

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