Special Issue "Game Theory and Political Economy"


A special issue of Economies (ISSN 2227-7099).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (28 February 2014)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. William D. Ferguson
Economics Department, Grinnell College, 1210 Park Street, Grinnell, IA 50112, USA
Website: http://www.grinnell.edu/news/william-bill-ferguson-75-professor-economics
E-Mail: ferguso1@grinnell.edu
Phone: +1 641 269 3132
Fax: +1 641 269 4985
Interests: collective action and institutional political economy; particularly with a game-theoretic approach; network theory and labor economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This issue will focus on applied game theory, addressing broadly defined issues of political economy. Topics can range from micro-level interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to macro-level national, regional, population, or global interactions. We welcome models that advance the understanding of social dilemmas and collective-action problems, including studies that address the distribution of power and policy implications. We are particularly interested in models that illustrate how strategic behavior responds to three or more of the following factors: informal institutional context (e.g., social norms); formal institutions (rules and laws); organizational development; exercises of power; available information; motivation as reflected in incentives based on given or developing (perhaps context-sensitive) preference orientations; information processing; social learning; and agent's understandings (cognition). A variety of methodological approaches are welcome; for example, models may operate with given preference orientations, and/or institutional settings or may address associated developmental processes. Likewise, conceptions of strategic agents (individuals or organizations) may utilize material and/or social preferences, based on either substantive rationality (agents have sufficient cognition to estimate best responses) or bounded rationality (cognitive limits and costs to processing information). Accordingly, game-theoretic approaches may be classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic. Overall, we encourage focus on how strategic behavior affects prospects for fruitful exchange, cooperation, and/or development.

Prof. Dr. William D. Ferguson
Guest Editor


Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Economies is an international peer-reviewed Open Access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. For the first couple of issues the Article Processing Charge (APC) will be waived for well-prepared manuscripts. English correction and/or formatting fees of 250 CHF (Swiss Francs) will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections.


  • strategic interaction
  • social dilemmas
  • development
  • motivation
  • institutions
  • organizations
  • bargaining
  • collective action
  • evolutionary game theory
  • epistemic game theory
  • behavioral game theory
  • bounded rationality
  • firm behavior
  • social preference

Published Papers (5 papers)

by  and
Economies 2014, 2(3), 171-192; doi:10.3390/economies2030171
Received: 14 January 2014; in revised form: 8 July 2014 / Accepted: 12 August 2014 / Published: 25 August 2014
Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (576 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text

by  and
Economies 2014, 2(2), 95-108; doi:10.3390/economies2020095
Received: 6 January 2014; in revised form: 11 February 2014 / Accepted: 10 March 2014 / Published: 25 March 2014
Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (439 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text

Economies 2014, 2(1), 45-77; doi:10.3390/economies2010045
Received: 20 December 2013; in revised form: 6 February 2014 / Accepted: 20 February 2014 / Published: 6 March 2014
Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (373 KB)

Economies 2014, 2(1), 20-44; doi:10.3390/economies2010020
Received: 4 December 2013; in revised form: 4 January 2014 / Accepted: 14 January 2014 / Published: 22 January 2014
Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (487 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
abstract graphic

Economies 2013, 1(2), 14; doi:10.3390/economies1020014
Received: 15 September 2013; Accepted: 15 September 2013 / Published: 17 September 2013
Show/Hide Abstract | PDF Full-text (282 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text

Last update: 23 September 2013

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