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Economies 2015, 3(1), 2-36; doi:10.3390/economies3010002

Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems

School of Management, Kochi University of Technology, 185 Miyanokuchi, Tosayamada-cho, Kami-city, Kochi 782-8502, Japan
Academic Editor: William Ferguson
Received: 27 December 2013 / Revised: 27 October 2014 / Accepted: 19 January 2015 / Published: 28 January 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [395 KB, uploaded 28 January 2015]   |  

Abstract

In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferred candidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR. View Full-Text
Keywords: open list; closed list; proportional representation; single nontransferable vote; voting equilibria open list; closed list; proportional representation; single nontransferable vote; voting equilibria
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Hizen, Y. Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems. Economies 2015, 3, 2-36.

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