Economies 2013, 1(2), 14; doi:10.3390/economies1020014
Editorial

Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy

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Received: 15 September 2013; Accepted: 15 September 2013 / Published: 17 September 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Note: In lieu of an abstract, this is an excerpt from the first page.

Excerpt: Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations) to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms) and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations); available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated); agents’ motivations (material and/or social); and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition) or bounded (limited cognition). Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems) that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy. [...]
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MDPI and ACS Style

Ferguson, W.D. Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy. Economies 2013, 1, 14.

AMA Style

Ferguson WD. Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy. Economies. 2013; 1(2):14.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ferguson, William D. 2013. "Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy." Economies 1, no. 2: 14.

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