Economies 2014, 2(1), 45-77; doi:10.3390/economies2010045

Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces

Received: 20 December 2013; in revised form: 6 February 2014 / Accepted: 20 February 2014 / Published: 6 March 2014
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
Download PDF [373 KB, uploaded 6 March 2014]
Abstract: Classical power index analysis considers the individual’s ability to influence the aggregated group decision by changing its own vote, where all decisions and votes are assumed to be binary. In many practical applications we have more options than either “yes” or “no”. Here we generalize three important power indices to continuous convex policy spaces. This allows the analysis of a collection of economic problems like, e.g., tax rates or spending that otherwise would not be covered in binary models.
Keywords: power; single peaked preferences; convex policy space; group decision making; Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index; nucleolus; simple games; multiple levels of approval
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

Export to BibTeX |

MDPI and ACS Style

Kurz, S. Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces. Economies 2014, 2, 45-77.

AMA Style

Kurz S. Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces. Economies. 2014; 2(1):45-77.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Kurz, Sascha. 2014. "Measuring Voting Power in Convex Policy Spaces." Economies 2, no. 1: 45-77.

Economies EISSN 2227-7099 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert