Special Issue "Bargaining Games"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 June 2015)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Bahar Leventoglu

Department of Economics and Political Science, Duke University, 294B Gross Hall, 140 Science Drive, Durham, NC 27708-0097, USA
Website | E-Mail
Phone: +1 919 660 4314
Interests: applied game theory; models of war; international bargaining; regime transitions; social mobility; ethnic conflict

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue invites original research on game theoretical approaches to bargaining failure. Bargaining failure is one of the main causes of socially inefficient strategic interactions in various settings, including but not limited to the marketplace, business, law, legislatures, and international relations. In the existing literature, informational problems and lack of commitment power remain the major rationalist explanations of bargaining failure. Despite the wealth of accumulated knowledge over the last few decades, we still need to investigate these areas more deeply, as well as environments where standard assumptions of game theory fail, e.g., lack of common knowledge, presence of agents with nonstandard preferences, i.e., preferences that are not represented by expected utility, or presence of behaviorally motivated agents. We welcome novel contributions to the existing rationalist explanations of inefficient bargaining as well as contributions that explore the frontiers of decision theory and behavioral economics in a bargaining framework.

Dr. Bahar Leventoglu
Guest Editor

Submission

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed Open Access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 500 CHF (Swiss Francs). English correction and/or formatting fees of 250 CHF (Swiss Francs) will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections.

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining
Games 2016, 7(2), 12; doi:10.3390/g7020012
Received: 16 September 2015 / Revised: 14 March 2016 / Accepted: 14 March 2016 / Published: 12 May 2016
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Abstract
We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate
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We consider a multilateral bargaining game in which the agents can be classified into two groups according to their instantaneous preferences. In one of these groups there is one agent with a different discount factor. We analyze how this time-preference heterogeneity may generate multiplicity of equilibria. When such an agent is sufficiently more patient than the rest, there is an equilibrium in which her group-mates make the same proposal as the members of the other group. Thus, in heterogeneous groups the presence of more patient members may reduce the utility of its members. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Open AccessArticle Bargaining Mechanisms for One-Way Games
Games 2015, 6(3), 347-367; doi:10.3390/g6030347
Received: 1 June 2015 / Revised: 20 August 2015 / Accepted: 27 August 2015 / Published: 8 September 2015
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Abstract
We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the
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We introduce one-way games, a two-player framework whose distinguishable feature is that the private payoff of one (independent) player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on the actions taken by the other (dependent) player. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without side payments and the social cost of any ex post efficient mechanism can be far from the optimum. We also show that it is impossible to design a Bayes–Nash incentive-compatible mechanism for one-way games that is budget-balanced, individually rational and efficient. To address this negative result, we propose a privacy-preserving mechanism based on a single-offer bargaining made by the dependent player that leverages the intrinsic advantage of the independent player. In this setting the outside option of the dependent player is not known a priori; however, we show that the mechanism satisfies individual rationality conditions, is incentive-compatible, budget-balanced and produces an outcome that is more efficient than the equilibrium without payments. Finally, we show that a randomized multi-offer extension brings no additional benefit in terms of efficiency. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Open AccessArticle Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games
Games 2015, 6(3), 273-298; doi:10.3390/g6030273
Received: 22 June 2015 / Revised: 10 August 2015 / Accepted: 17 August 2015 / Published: 31 August 2015
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Abstract
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the
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We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Open AccessArticle A Tale of Two Bargaining Solutions
Games 2015, 6(2), 161-174; doi:10.3390/g6020161
Received: 20 April 2015 / Revised: 3 June 2015 / Accepted: 15 June 2015 / Published: 19 June 2015
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Abstract
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions
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We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the tempered aspirations solution, in terms of Pareto efficiency in a strategic framework. Our main result shows that the weights solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a reference point. In particular, the introduction of a reference point brings one more degree of freedom to the model which requires also the difference in the weights placed on the reference point to be considered in reaching an efficiency ranking. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Open AccessArticle From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach
Games 2015, 6(1), 32-38; doi:10.3390/g6010032
Received: 19 November 2014 / Revised: 30 January 2015 / Accepted: 18 February 2015 / Published: 5 March 2015
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Abstract
Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then,
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Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
Open AccessArticle The Seawall Bargaining Game
Games 2014, 5(2), 127-139; doi:10.3390/g5020127
Received: 24 April 2014 / Revised: 9 June 2014 / Accepted: 19 June 2014 / Published: 24 June 2014
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Abstract
Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for
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Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)

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