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Games 2015, 6(3), 273-298; doi:10.3390/g6030273

Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games

1
BETA, University of Strasbourg, 61 Av. de la Foret Noire, 67000 Strasbourg, France
2
LEE & Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Avda. Sos Baynat s/n, Campus Riu Sec, 12071 Castellón, Spain
3
School of Agriculture Policy and Development, University of Reading, P.O. Box 237, Reading RG6 6AR, UK
4
Department of Economics, Bocconi University, 1 via Roentgen, 20136 Milan, Italy
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Bahar Leventoglu
Received: 22 June 2015 / Revised: 10 August 2015 / Accepted: 17 August 2015 / Published: 31 August 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [2003 KB, uploaded 31 August 2015]   |  

Abstract

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games. View Full-Text
Keywords: bargaining; supergame; confirmed proposals; confirmed agreements bargaining; supergame; confirmed proposals; confirmed agreements
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Attanasi, G.; García-Gallego, A.; Georgantzís, N.; Montesano, A. Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games. Games 2015, 6, 273-298.

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