Games 2014, 5(2), 127-139; doi:10.3390/g5020127
Article

The Seawall Bargaining Game

email and * email
Received: 24 April 2014; in revised form: 9 June 2014 / Accepted: 19 June 2014 / Published: 24 June 2014
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.
Keywords: alternating-offer model; chicken game; public good; sea-flood; seawall
PDF Full-text Download PDF Full-Text [230 KB, uploaded 24 June 2014 13:46 CEST]

Export to BibTeX |
EndNote


MDPI and ACS Style

Delille, R.; Pereau, J.-C. The Seawall Bargaining Game. Games 2014, 5, 127-139.

AMA Style

Delille R, Pereau J-C. The Seawall Bargaining Game. Games. 2014; 5(2):127-139.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Delille, Rémy; Pereau, Jean-Christophe. 2014. "The Seawall Bargaining Game." Games 5, no. 2: 127-139.

Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert