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Games 2014, 5(2), 127-139; doi:10.3390/g5020127

The Seawall Bargaining Game

GREThA, Université de Bordeaux, Avenue Léon Duguit, 33608 Pessac Cedex, France
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 24 April 2014 / Revised: 9 June 2014 / Accepted: 19 June 2014 / Published: 24 June 2014
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)
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Agents located from downstream to upstream along an estuary and exposed to a flooding risk have to invest in facilities like a seawall (or dike). As the benefits of that local public good increase along the estuary, upstream agents have to bargain for monetary compensation with the most downstream agent in exchange for more protection effort. The paper analyses different bargaining protocols and determines the conditions under which agents are better off. The results show that upstream agents are involved in a chicken game when they have to bargain with the most downstream agent.
Keywords: alternating-offer model; chicken game; public good; sea-flood; seawall alternating-offer model; chicken game; public good; sea-flood; seawall
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Delille, R.; Pereau, J.-C. The Seawall Bargaining Game. Games 2014, 5, 127-139.

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