Recent Progress on Quantum Cryptography

A special issue of Photonics (ISSN 2304-6732). This special issue belongs to the section "Quantum Photonics and Technologies".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 January 2024) | Viewed by 5961

Special Issue Editor

School of Electronic Information, Centre South University, Changsha, 410083, China
Interests: photonic chips, artificial intelligence, quantum optical communication, quantum key distribution
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Since its inception in the 1960s, quantum information system security has been one of the key fields for quantum technologies, bringing forward many important developments. In principle, quantum cryptography can provide information-theory security based on the basic principle of quantum physics. There is no doubt that QKD has taken the spotlight in terms of the use of quantum information in cryptography, and new quantum information-based cryptography applications are coming up all the time as well.

Despite the fact that QKD provides the ultimate answer to the security problem, its optimal implementation is difficult to achieve in reality, and there are a number of unsolved issues. In the design and implementation of such cryptographic systems, a balance between security, speed, and distance should be considered. Simultaneously, it is vital to minimize costs and improve efficiency in the system's manufacturing and deployment. In addition, the gap between theory and practice continues to expose flaws. To overcome these concerns, additional research into quantum repeaters or quantum networks is needed to improve communication distance, as well as practical security analysis to investigate the disparities between real-world QKD implementations and theoretical models, and the development of more robust systems.

We hope that this Special Issue will attract research that contributes to a better understanding of quantum cryptography, with the goal of developing innovative applications and technologies that have the potential to have a significant influence on both the practical and theoretical levels. Specifically, articles on designing more robust QKD protocols, establishing more secure quantum networks, and analyzing real-world security risks posed by attacks are being invited. The areas covered may include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Quantum key distribution;
  • Quantum networks;
  • Quantum repeaters;
  • Satellite quantum communications;
  • Quantum security analysis;
  • Quantum hacking and countermeasures;
  • Quantum data locking;
  • Quantum random number generation;
  • Quantum digital signatures;
  • Quantum fingerprinting;
  • Quantum secret sharing;
  • Quantum Byzantine agreement;
  • Quantum e-voting.

Dr. Duan Huang
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Photonics is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • quantum key distribution
  • quantum networks
  • quantum hacking
  • quantum random number generation
  • quantum digital signatures
  • quantum secret sharing

Published Papers (3 papers)

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Research

17 pages, 1003 KiB  
Article
One-Pixel Attack for Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Systems
by Yushen Guo, Pengzhi Yin and Duan Huang
Photonics 2023, 10(2), 129; https://doi.org/10.3390/photonics10020129 - 27 Jan 2023
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 1560
Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been employed in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems as attacking detection portions of defense countermeasures. However, the vulnerability of DNNs leaves security loopholes for hacking attacks, for example, adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose to implement [...] Read more.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been employed in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) systems as attacking detection portions of defense countermeasures. However, the vulnerability of DNNs leaves security loopholes for hacking attacks, for example, adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose to implement the one-pixel attack in CV-QKD attack detection networks and accomplish the misclassification on a minimum perturbation. This approach is based on the differential evolution, which makes our attack algorithm fool multiple DNNs with the minimal inner information of target networks. The simulation and experimental results show that, in four different CV-QKD detection networks, 52.8%, 26.4%, 21.2%, and 23.8% of the input data can be perturbed to another class by modifying just one feature, the same as one pixel for an image. We carry out this success rate in the context of the original accuracy reaching up to nearly 99% on average. Further, by enlarging the number of perturbed features, the success rate can be raised to a satisfactory higher level of about 80%. According to our experimental results, most of the CV-QKD detection networks can be deceived by launching one-pixel attacks. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Progress on Quantum Cryptography)
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14 pages, 595 KiB  
Article
Low-Rate Denial-of-Service Attack Detection: Defense Strategy Based on Spectral Estimation for CV-QKD
by Enze Dai, Duan Huang and Ling Zhang
Photonics 2022, 9(6), 365; https://doi.org/10.3390/photonics9060365 - 24 May 2022
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 1789
Abstract
Although continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems have unconditional security in theory, there are still many cyber attacking strategies proposed that exploit the loopholes of hardware devices and algorithms. At present, few studies have focused on attacks using algorithm vulnerabilities. The low-rate denial-of-service [...] Read more.
Although continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems have unconditional security in theory, there are still many cyber attacking strategies proposed that exploit the loopholes of hardware devices and algorithms. At present, few studies have focused on attacks using algorithm vulnerabilities. The low-rate denial-of-service (LDoS) attack is precisely an algorithm-loophole based hacking strategy, which attacks by manipulating a channel’s transmittance T. In this paper, we take advantage of the feature that the power spectral density (PSD) of LDoS attacks in low frequency band is higher than normal traffic’s to detect whether there are LDoS attacks. We put forward a detection method based on the Bartlett spectral estimation approach and discuss its feasibility from two aspects, the estimation consistency and the detection accuracy. Our experiment results demonstrate that the method can effectively detect LDoS attacks and maintain the consistency of estimation. In addition, compared with the traditional method based on the wavelet transform and Hurst index estimations, our method has higher detection accuracy and stronger pertinence. We anticipate our method may provide an insight into how to detect an LDoS attack in a CVQKD system. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Progress on Quantum Cryptography)
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14 pages, 835 KiB  
Article
Weak Randomness Analysis of Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Finite Resources
by Xiao-Lei Jiang, Xiao-Qin Deng, Yang Wang, Yi-Fei Lu, Jia-Ji Li, Chun Zhou and Wan-Su Bao
Photonics 2022, 9(5), 356; https://doi.org/10.3390/photonics9050356 - 18 May 2022
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 1748
Abstract
The ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol requires perfect random numbers for bit encoding and basis selecting. Perfect randomness is of great significance to the practical QKD system. However, due to the imperfection of practical quantum devices, an eavesdropper (Eve) may acquire some [...] Read more.
The ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol requires perfect random numbers for bit encoding and basis selecting. Perfect randomness is of great significance to the practical QKD system. However, due to the imperfection of practical quantum devices, an eavesdropper (Eve) may acquire some random numbers, thus affecting the security of practical systems. In this paper, we analyze the effects of the weak randomness in the measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) with finite resources. We analytically derive concise formulas for estimating the lower bound of the single-photon yield and the upper bound of the phase error rate in the case of the weak randomness. The simulation demonstrates that the final secret key rate of MDI-QKD with finite resources is sensitive to state preparation, even with a small proportion of weak randomness, the secure key rate has a noticeable fluctuation. Therefore, the weak randomness of the state preparation may bring additional security risks. In order to ensure the practical security of the QKD system, we are supposed to strengthen the protection of state preparation devices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Progress on Quantum Cryptography)
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