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Games, Volume 9, Issue 2 (June 2018)

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Open AccessArticle Conditional Cooperation and Framing Effects
Games 2018, 9(2), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020037
Received: 23 April 2018 / Revised: 6 June 2018 / Accepted: 7 June 2018 / Published: 11 June 2018
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Abstract
This paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such
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This paper presents evidence from a lab experiment investigating whether the preeminence of conditional cooperators in studies using the method of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001, Economics Letters) is sensitive to changes in the experimental frame. The treatments vary the framing such that the salience of conditionality to subjects is reduced. The results show that these manipulations affect the distribution of elicited types. However, there is no evidence that the framing of Fischbacher et al. overestimates the fraction of conditional cooperators compared to the other frames considered in the experiment. Furthermore, this research finds that conditional contributions elicited using the Fischbacher et al. (2001) frame are the most consistent with contributions in a one-shot public good game. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
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Open AccessArticle Explaining Public Goods Game Contributions with Rational Ability
Games 2018, 9(2), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020036
Received: 19 March 2018 / Revised: 5 June 2018 / Accepted: 6 June 2018 / Published: 10 June 2018
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Abstract
As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a one-shot public goods
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As the link between psychology and economics has grown, so too has research on the link between personality traits and economic behavior. We build on this previous work, bringing to light the relationship between personality traits and contributions in a one-shot public goods game. We find that contributions to the public good are smaller for rational participants as measured by the Rational-Experiential Inventory—revised 40 (REI-40) item scale. We find no effect on contributions for the measures of the Big Five personality traits or the remaining measures from the REI-40. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
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Open AccessArticle The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good
Games 2018, 9(2), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020035
Received: 15 May 2018 / Revised: 31 May 2018 / Accepted: 6 June 2018 / Published: 9 June 2018
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Abstract
The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are
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The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are high, though significantly lower than in a classic Public Good Game. Results show that demand effects and the warm glow of giving account almost entirely for the contributions, with the former playing the most prominent role. The social nature of the individual provision of a public good is confirmed by the fact that, even when the efficiency multiplier is removed, contributions are higher than in comparable Dictator Games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle Risk Assessment Uncertainties in Cybersecurity Investments
Games 2018, 9(2), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020034
Received: 11 May 2018 / Revised: 3 June 2018 / Accepted: 6 June 2018 / Published: 9 June 2018
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Abstract
When undertaking cybersecurity risk assessments, it is important to be able to assign numeric values to metrics to compute the final expected loss that represents the risk that an organization is exposed to due to cyber threats. Even if risk assessment is motivated
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When undertaking cybersecurity risk assessments, it is important to be able to assign numeric values to metrics to compute the final expected loss that represents the risk that an organization is exposed to due to cyber threats. Even if risk assessment is motivated by real-world observations and data, there is always a high chance of assigning inaccurate values due to different uncertainties involved (e.g., evolving threat landscape, human errors) and the natural difficulty of quantifying risk. Existing models empower organizations to compute optimal cybersecurity strategies given their financial constraints, i.e., available cybersecurity budget. Further, a general game-theoretic model with uncertain payoffs (probability-distribution-valued payoffs) shows that such uncertainty can be incorporated in the game-theoretic model by allowing payoffs to be random. This paper extends previous work in the field to tackle uncertainties in risk assessment that affect cybersecurity investments. The findings from simulated examples indicate that although uncertainties in cybersecurity risk assessment lead, on average, to different cybersecurity strategies, they do not play a significant role in the final expected loss of the organization when utilising a game-theoretic model and methodology to derive these strategies. The model determines robust defending strategies even when knowledge regarding risk assessment values is not accurate. As a result, it is possible to show that the cybersecurity investments’ tool is capable of providing effective decision support. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Models for Cyber-Physical Infrastructures)
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Open AccessArticle Successful Nash Equilibrium Agent for a Three-Player Imperfect-Information Game
Games 2018, 9(2), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020033
Received: 13 May 2018 / Revised: 5 June 2018 / Accepted: 6 June 2018 / Published: 8 June 2018
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Abstract
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in
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Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in two-player zero-sum games, but no guarantees in non-zero-sum games or in games with more than two players. We describe an agent that is able to defeat a variety of realistic opponents using an exact Nash equilibrium strategy in a three-player imperfect-information game. This shows that, despite a lack of theoretical guarantees, agents based on Nash equilibrium strategies can be successful in multiplayer games after all. Full article
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle Game Theory of Tumor–Stroma Interactions in Multiple Myeloma: Effect of Nonlinear Benefits
Games 2018, 9(2), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020032
Received: 4 April 2018 / Revised: 18 May 2018 / Accepted: 22 May 2018 / Published: 28 May 2018
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Abstract
Cancer cells and stromal cells often exchange growth factors with paracrine effects that promote cell growth: a form of cooperation that can be studied by evolutionary game theory. Previous models have assumed that interactions between cells are pairwise or that the benefit of
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Cancer cells and stromal cells often exchange growth factors with paracrine effects that promote cell growth: a form of cooperation that can be studied by evolutionary game theory. Previous models have assumed that interactions between cells are pairwise or that the benefit of a growth factor is a linear function of its concentration. Diffusible factors, however, affect multiple cells and generally have nonlinear effects, and these differences are known to have important consequences for evolutionary dynamics. Here, we study tumor–stroma paracrine signaling using a model with multiplayer collective interactions in which growth factors have nonlinear effects. We use multiple myeloma as an example, modelling interactions between malignant plasma cells, osteoblasts, and osteoclasts. Nonlinear benefits can lead to results not observed in linear models, including internal mixed stable equilibria and cyclical dynamics. Models with linear effects, therefore, do not lead to a meaningful characterization of the dynamics of tumor–stroma interactions. To understand the dynamics and the effect of therapies it is necessary to estimate the shape of the benefit functions experimentally and parametrize models based on these functions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Cancer)
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Open AccessReview Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance
Games 2018, 9(2), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020031
Received: 23 April 2018 / Revised: 15 May 2018 / Accepted: 15 May 2018 / Published: 24 May 2018
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Abstract
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces.
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Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, such behavioral rules are themselves subject to evolutionary forces. Paying particular attention to the work of young researchers, this essay surveys the progress made over the last decade towards understanding these phenomena, and discusses open research topics of importance to economics and the broader social sciences. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolutionary Network Games)
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Open AccessArticle From Windfall Sharing to Property Ownership: Prosocial Personality Traits in Giving and Taking Dictator Games
Games 2018, 9(2), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020030
Received: 14 April 2018 / Revised: 17 May 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 / Published: 23 May 2018
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Abstract
The dictator game is a well-known task measuring prosocial preferences, in which one person divides a fixed amount of windfall money with a recipient. A key factor in real-world transfers of wealth is the concept of property ownership and consequently the related acts
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The dictator game is a well-known task measuring prosocial preferences, in which one person divides a fixed amount of windfall money with a recipient. A key factor in real-world transfers of wealth is the concept of property ownership and consequently the related acts of giving and taking. Using a variation of the traditional dictator game (N = 256), we examined whether individual differences under different game frames corresponded with prosocial personality traits from the Big Five (politeness, compassion) and HEXACO (Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience) (honesty-humility, agreeableness) models. In the Big Five model, the effects of prosocial personality traits were generally stronger and more consistent for taking than for giving, in line with a “do-no-harm” explanation, whereby prosocial individuals felt less entitled to and less willing to infringe on the endowments of others. In contrast, HEXACO honesty-humility predicted allocations across both frames, consistent with its broad association with fair-mindedness, and providing further evidence of its role in allocations of wealth more generally. These findings highlight the utility of integrating personality psychology with behavioral economics, in which the discriminant validity across prosocial traits can shed light on the distinct motivations underpinning social decisions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Open AccessArticle Luxembourg in the Early Days of the EEC: Null Player or Not?
Games 2018, 9(2), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020029
Received: 3 February 2018 / Revised: 26 April 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 / Published: 22 May 2018
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Abstract
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a
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Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the textbook claim that Luxembourg was a null player with a more comprehensive picture of Luxembourg’s role in EEC’s voting system. The assessment of Luxembourg’s voting power is sensitive to the role played by the European Commission in the decision-making procedure and the measurement concepts underlying power evaluations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle Gender Differences in the Response to Decision Power and Responsibility—Framing Effects in a Dictator Game
Games 2018, 9(2), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020028
Received: 12 April 2018 / Revised: 10 May 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 / Published: 20 May 2018
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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses
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This paper studies the effects of two different frames on decisions in a dictator game. Before making their allocation decision, dictators read a short text. Depending on the treatment, the text either emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice or it stresses their responsibility for the receiver’s payoff. Including a control treatment without such a text, three treatments are conducted with a total of 207 dictators. Our results show a different reaction to these texts depending on the dictator’s gender. We find that only men react positively to a text that stresses their responsibility for the receiver, while only women seem to react positively to a text that emphasizes their decision power and freedom of choice. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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Open AccessArticle Achieving Perfect Coordination amongst Agents in the Co-Action Minority Game
Games 2018, 9(2), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020027
Received: 10 April 2018 / Revised: 11 May 2018 / Accepted: 15 May 2018 / Published: 17 May 2018
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Abstract
We discuss the strategy that rational agents can use to maximize their expected long-term payoff in the co-action minority game. We argue that the agents will try to get into a cyclic state, where each of the (2N+1)
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We discuss the strategy that rational agents can use to maximize their expected long-term payoff in the co-action minority game. We argue that the agents will try to get into a cyclic state, where each of the ( 2 N + 1 ) agents wins exactly N times in any continuous stretch of ( 2 N + 1 ) days. We propose and analyse a strategy for reaching such a cyclic state quickly, when any direct communication between agents is not allowed, and only the publicly available common information is the record of total number of people choosing the first restaurant in the past. We determine exactly the average time required to reach the periodic state for this strategy. We show that it varies as ( N / ln 2 ) [ 1 + α cos ( 2 π log 2 N ) ] , for large N, where the amplitude α of the leading term in the log-periodic oscillations is found be 8 π 2 ( ln 2 ) 2 exp ( 2 π 2 / ln 2 ) 7 × 10 11 . Full article
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Open AccessArticle Incentive Systems for Risky Investment Decisions Under Unknown Preferences: Ortner et al. Revisited
Games 2018, 9(2), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020026
Received: 15 March 2018 / Revised: 19 April 2018 / Accepted: 7 May 2018 / Published: 14 May 2018
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Abstract
Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based on
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Ortner et al. (Manage. Account. Res. 36(1):43–50, 2017) propose the State-Contingent Relative Benefit Cost Allocation Scheme as an incentive system for risky investment decisions. The note at hand reveals the information distribution implicitly assumed within the framework of this study. Based on this information distribution, both simpler and more powerful ways to induce consistency exist. Full article
Open AccessArticle Sharing Loading Costs for Multi Compartment Vehicles
Games 2018, 9(2), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020025
Received: 13 February 2018 / Revised: 3 April 2018 / Accepted: 7 May 2018 / Published: 14 May 2018
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Abstract
Supply chains for goods that must be kept cool—cold chains—are of increasing importance in world trade. The goods must be kept within well-defined temperature limits to preserve their quality. One technique for reducing logistics costs is to load cold items into multiple compartment
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Supply chains for goods that must be kept cool—cold chains—are of increasing importance in world trade. The goods must be kept within well-defined temperature limits to preserve their quality. One technique for reducing logistics costs is to load cold items into multiple compartment vehicles (MCVs), which have several spaces within that can be set for different temperature ranges. These vehicles allow better consolidation of loads. However, constructing the optimal load is a difficult problem, requiring heuristics for solution. In addition, the cost determined must be allocated to the different items being shipped, most often with different owners who need to pay, and this should be done in a stable manner so that firms will continue to combine loads. We outline the basic structure of the MCV loading problem, and offer the view that the optimization and cost allocation problems must be solved together. Doing so presents the opportunity to solve the problem inductively, reducing the size of the feasible set using constraints generated inductively from the inductive construction of minimal balanced collections of subsets. These limits may help the heuristics find a good result faster than optimizing first and allocating later. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Logistic Games)
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Open AccessArticle Personal-Data Disclosure in a Field Experiment: Evidence on Explicit Prices, Political Attitudes, and Privacy Preferences
Games 2018, 9(2), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020024
Received: 28 March 2018 / Revised: 30 April 2018 / Accepted: 7 May 2018 / Published: 10 May 2018
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Abstract
Many people implicitly sell or give away their data when using online services and participating in loyalty programmes—despite growing concerns about company’s use of private data. Our paper studies potential reasons and co-variates that contribute to resolving this apparent paradox, which has not
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Many people implicitly sell or give away their data when using online services and participating in loyalty programmes—despite growing concerns about company’s use of private data. Our paper studies potential reasons and co-variates that contribute to resolving this apparent paradox, which has not been studied previously. We ask customers of a bakery delivery service for their consent to disclose their personal data to a third party in exchange for a monetary rebate on their past orders. We study the role of implicitly and explicitly stated prices and add new determinants such as political orientation, income proxies and membership in loyalty programmes to the analysis of privacy decision. We document large heterogeneity in privacy valuations, and that the offered monetary benefits have less predictive power for data-disclosure decisions than expected. However, we find significant predictors of such decisions, such as political orientation towards liberal democrats (FDP) and membership in loyalty programmes. We also find suggestive evidence that loyalty programmes are successful in disguising their “money for data” exchange mechanism. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Voluntary Disclosure of Private Information and Unraveling in the Market for Lemons: An Experiment
Games 2018, 9(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020023
Received: 27 March 2018 / Revised: 5 May 2018 / Accepted: 7 May 2018 / Published: 10 May 2018
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Abstract
We experimentally analyze a lemons market with a labor-market framing. Sellers are referred to as “workers” and have the possibility to provide “employers” with costly but credible information about their “productivity”. Economic theory suggests that in this setup, unraveling takes place and a
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We experimentally analyze a lemons market with a labor-market framing. Sellers are referred to as “workers” and have the possibility to provide “employers” with costly but credible information about their “productivity”. Economic theory suggests that in this setup, unraveling takes place and a number of different types are correctly identified in equilibrium. While we do observe a substantial degree of information disclosure, we also find that unraveling is typically not as complete as predicted by economic theory. The behavior of both workers and employers impedes unraveling in that there is too little disclosure. Workers are generally reluctant to disclose their private information, and employers enforce this behavior by bidding less competitively if workers reveal compared to the case where they conceal information. Full article
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Open AccessArticle Intention-Based Sharing
Games 2018, 9(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020022
Received: 21 March 2018 / Revised: 23 April 2018 / Accepted: 24 April 2018 / Published: 30 April 2018
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Abstract
How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on
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How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle Bifurcation Mechanism Design—From Optimal Flat Taxes to Better Cancer Treatments
Games 2018, 9(2), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020021
Received: 25 February 2018 / Revised: 6 April 2018 / Accepted: 18 April 2018 / Published: 26 April 2018
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Abstract
Small changes to the parameters of a system can lead to abrupt qualitative changes of its behavior, a phenomenon known as bifurcation. Such instabilities are typically considered problematic, however, we show that their power can be leveraged to design novel types of mechanisms.
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Small changes to the parameters of a system can lead to abrupt qualitative changes of its behavior, a phenomenon known as bifurcation. Such instabilities are typically considered problematic, however, we show that their power can be leveraged to design novel types of mechanisms. Hysteresis mechanisms use transient changes of system parameters to induce a permanent improvement to its performance via optimal equilibrium selection. Optimal control mechanisms induce convergence to states whose performance is better than even the best equilibrium. We apply these mechanisms in two different settings that illustrate the versatility of bifurcation mechanism design. In the first one we explore how introducing flat taxation could improve social welfare, despite decreasing agent “rationality,” by destabilizing inefficient equilibria. From there we move on to consider a well known game of tumor metabolism and use our approach to derive potential new cancer treatment strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Cancer)
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Open AccessFeature PaperEditorial Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory
Games 2018, 9(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020020
Received: 24 April 2018 / Revised: 25 April 2018 / Accepted: 25 April 2018 / Published: 26 April 2018
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Abstract
Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several
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Ethics is a field in which the gap between words and actions looms large. Game theory and the empirical methods it inspires look at behavior instead of the lip service people sometimes pay to norms. We believe that this special issue comprises several illustrations of the fruitful application of this approach to ethics. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ethics, Morality, and Game Theory)
Open AccessArticle Fractionated Follow-Up Chemotherapy Delays the Onset of Resistance in Bone Metastatic Prostate Cancer
Games 2018, 9(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020019
Received: 28 February 2018 / Revised: 11 April 2018 / Accepted: 18 April 2018 / Published: 23 April 2018
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Abstract
Prostate cancer to bone metastases are almost always lethal. This results from the ability of metastatic prostate cancer cells to co-opt bone remodeling, leading to what is known as the vicious cycle. Understanding how tumor cells can disrupt bone homeostasis through their
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Prostate cancer to bone metastases are almost always lethal. This results from the ability of metastatic prostate cancer cells to co-opt bone remodeling, leading to what is known as the vicious cycle. Understanding how tumor cells can disrupt bone homeostasis through their interactions with the stroma and how metastatic tumors respond to treatment is key to the development of new treatments for what remains an incurable disease. Here we describe an evolutionary game theoretical model of both the homeostatic bone remodeling and its co-option by prostate cancer metastases. This model extends past the evolutionary aspects typically considered in game theoretical models by also including ecological factors such as the physical microenvironment of the bone. Our model recapitulates the current paradigm of the “vicious cycle” driving tumor growth and sheds light on the interactions of heterogeneous tumor cells with the bone microenvironment and treatment response. Our results show that resistant populations naturally become dominant in the metastases under conventional cytotoxic treatment and that novel schedules could be used to better control the tumor and the associated bone disease compared to the current standard of care. Specifically, we introduce fractionated follow up therapy—chemotherapy where dosage is administered initially in one solid block followed by alternating smaller doses and holidays—and argue that it is better than either a continuous application or a periodic one. Furthermore, we also show that different regimens of chemotherapy can lead to different amounts of pathological bone that are known to correlate with poor quality of life for bone metastatic prostate cancer patients. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Cancer)
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Open AccessArticle Generalized Trust, Need for Cognitive Closure, and the Perceived Acceptability of Personal Data Collection
Games 2018, 9(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020018
Received: 12 March 2018 / Revised: 31 March 2018 / Accepted: 9 April 2018 / Published: 13 April 2018
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Abstract
This vignette-based study examines how generalized trust and the need for cognitive closure relate to the perceived acceptability of contemporary business methods of personal data collection. Subjects are exposed to four scenarios that describe a method of personal data collection, involving either brand-name
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This vignette-based study examines how generalized trust and the need for cognitive closure relate to the perceived acceptability of contemporary business methods of personal data collection. Subjects are exposed to four scenarios that describe a method of personal data collection, involving either brand-name companies or generic descriptors of companies. After each scenario, subjects rate how acceptable they find the practice of data collection, along with the frequency and quality of experiences that they have had with the company (for brand names) or type of company (for generic descriptors). Judgments of perceived acceptability are analyzed, both across the portfolio of judgments and within each separate scenario. While analyses of each separate scenario point to the context-dependency of the perceived acceptability of data collection, several results stand out when analyzing the subjects’ portfolios of responses in the aggregate. Higher generalized trust is linked to a higher average acceptability rating, and the effect is stronger when companies are described with brand names rather than generic descriptors. Uniformly, however, no relationship is found between need for cognitive closure and perceived acceptability. Additionally, positive experiences are found to be a stronger predictor of perceived acceptability of data collection than frequency of use. Full article
Open AccessReview How to Analyze Models of Nonlinear Public Goods
Games 2018, 9(2), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020017
Received: 28 February 2018 / Revised: 27 March 2018 / Accepted: 3 April 2018 / Published: 4 April 2018
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Abstract
Public goods games often assume that the effect of the public good is a linear function of the number of contributions. In many cases, however, especially in biology, public goods have nonlinear effects, and nonlinear games are known to have dynamics and equilibria
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Public goods games often assume that the effect of the public good is a linear function of the number of contributions. In many cases, however, especially in biology, public goods have nonlinear effects, and nonlinear games are known to have dynamics and equilibria that can differ dramatically from linear games. Here I explain how to analyze nonlinear public goods games using the properties of Bernstein polynomials, and how to approximate the equilibria. I use mainly examples from the evolutionary game theory of cancer, but the approach can be used for a wide range of nonlinear public goods games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Cancer)
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Open AccessArticle Theory of Mind and General Intelligence in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
Games 2018, 9(2), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020016
Received: 5 March 2018 / Revised: 27 March 2018 / Accepted: 28 March 2018 / Published: 30 March 2018
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Abstract
Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity
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Decreasing social sensitivity (i.e., the ability of a person to perceive, understand, and respect the feelings and viewpoints of others), has been shown to facilitate selfish behavior. This is not only true for exogenous changes in social sensitivity, but also for social sensitivity influenced by someone’s social cognition. In this analysis, we examined one measure of social cognition, namely a person’s Theory of Mind (ToM), to examine differences in decision-making in standard non-strategic and strategic environments (dictator and ultimatum games). We found that participants with higher ToM gave a greater share in the non-strategic environment. In the ultimatum game, however, ToM showed no correlation with the offers of the ultimators. Instead, we found that general intelligence scores—measured by the Wonderlic test—shared a negative, albeit weak, correlation with the amount offered in the ultimatum game. Thus, we find that lower social cognition is an important explanatory variable for selfish behavior in a non-strategic environment, while general intelligence shares some correlation in a strategic environment. Similar to the change in social sensitivity created by a specific game design, social sensitivity influenced by individual personality traits can influence behavior in non-strategic environments. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Dictator Games)
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