Special Issue "Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 1 November 2018

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Maria Gallego

Department of Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, 75 University Avenue West, Waterloo, Canada N2L 3C5
E-Mail
Interests: public economics; intergovernmental federalism; game theory; political economy and bargaining theory

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Understanding the choices made in any society or country within a political economy context requires understanding of the strategic interactions of different economic and political agents. Under these circumstances, game theory tools are used within the social choice and political economy traditions to examine the relationship between these agents to examine how these agents influence policy making within given political institutions under different political regimes. Understanding distributional conflicts in society requires modelling bargaining between players with opposing preferences and how they best respond to the actions taken by their opponents. The institutional and informational structure under which policy making takes place shapes the policy agreements reached between these agents with the influence of citizens varying across political regimes. Political economists and social choice theorists have studied elections involving voters, political parties and special interest groups in static or dynamic settings, in repeated games under different political institutions.

The aim of this Special Issue is to bring together political economy models that examine policy making under different political regimes. We invite submissions of political economy and social choice models at the theoretical and/or empirical levels, studying issues in the following areas:

  • Modelling the interaction between different agents (citizens, parties, governments, levels of government) under different political regimes
  • Party positioning in elections under different political regimes
  • The influence of special interest groups in party’s policy positions
  • Elections under different political regimes
  • Bargaining between different agents or coalitions under different political regimes

Dr. Maria Gallego
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 550 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Political economy
  • Social choice
  • Political regimes
  • Institutional structures
  • elections
  • bargaining and conflict
  • voters
  • special interest groups
  • parties/candidates
  • information aggregation
  • repeated elections

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Luxembourg in the Early Days of the EEC: Null Player or Not?
Games 2018, 9(2), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020029
Received: 3 February 2018 / Revised: 26 April 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 / Published: 22 May 2018
PDF Full-text (284 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a
[...] Read more.
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the textbook claim that Luxembourg was a null player with a more comprehensive picture of Luxembourg’s role in EEC’s voting system. The assessment of Luxembourg’s voting power is sensitive to the role played by the European Commission in the decision-making procedure and the measurement concepts underlying power evaluations. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory)
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