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Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices
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Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444). This special issue belongs to the section "Religions and Theologies".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 September 2023) | Viewed by 20610

Special Issue Editors

Prof. Dr. John Lippitt

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Guest Editor
Institute for Ethics & Society, The University of Notre Dame Australia, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia
Interests: moral, theological and epistemic virtues and vices; forgiveness; vices of the digital age; Kierkegaard; the ethics of policing
Prof. Dr. C. Stephen Evans

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
University Professor of Philosophy and Humanities, Baylor University, Waco, TX 76798, USA
Interests: Kierkegaard; philosophy of religion; philosophy of the human sciences; virtue ethics; metaethics
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Scholars have been divided on what to make of Kierkegaard’s relation to the virtues tradition. Some, such as Sylvia Walsh (2018), have been highly sceptical of thinking of Kierkegaard as a kind of “virtue ethicist.” Others, such as Robert C. Roberts (2022), have seen Kierkegaard as firmly rooted in the virtues tradition, while Pieter Vos (2020) sees Kierkegaard as part of a broader tradition of Protestant theological ethics that both reveals basic virtue ethical characteristics and makes a distinct contribution to contemporary virtue ethics. On specific virtues, C. Stephen Evans (2019) has recently argued that the virtue of accountability is central to Kierkegaardian spirituality, while John Lippitt (2020) has drawn on Kierkegaard to explore the relationships between forgiveness, love, justice, humility, and hope.

Certainly, there are profound reflections to be found in Kierkegaard’s writings on virtues or “spiritual qualities” (Walsh’s preferred term) such as courage, forgivingness, gratitude, hope, humility, honesty and patience, as well as more unusual qualities such as “joy” [glæde], contrition, earnestness and sobriety. Furthermore, while Kierkegaard does not explicitly explore faith, hope and love as the three “theological virtues,” all three notions play important roles in his thought and his view of religious life. No reader can miss the centrality of faith, and scholarship over the last two decades or so has increasingly recognized the importance and profundity of his thought on love. The question of what it means to love well is one that runs through much of the authorship, pseudonymous and signed. Love arguably has its own epistemic standards connected to other putative virtues such as generosity of spirit, trust and hope. Hope – which Kierkegaard most commonly discusses under the name of “expectancy” [Forventning] - may be seen as the antithesis of that central Kierkegaardian theme of despair, which may arguably be understood as at root the unwillingness to hope (Bernier 2015).

For Kierkegaard, the philosophical task of unpacking such qualities is almost always in service of the role they play in the religious or specifically Christian life. Kierkegaard’s approach to these qualities is typically not explicitly to talk of them as virtues (perhaps because of the influence of Luther, whose dislike of Aristotle and virtue-talk was intense). Yet, many have judged that it makes sense to do so given that each may be thought of as contributing to the formation of character. Broadly in line with the classical tradition, he typically sees each such quality as involving certain ways of thinking, feeling and seeing correctly. However, Kierkegaard holds, along with many other Christian thinkers, that some human excellence cannot be achieved without divine grace and assistance. There is a growing recognition of Kierkegaard as being a significant source of insight into understanding the role of numerous virtues in the task of allowing oneself to be “built up.” Likewise, his writings can be tapped for profound insights into such vices as pride, envy and self-righteousness.

This Special Issue seeks to explore various aspects of Kierkegaard’s relation to the philosophical and theological traditions of thinking about virtues and vices, from a range of perspectives. Articles are invited on either Kierkegaard’s relation to philosophical and theological work on virtues and vices in general, or his contribution to our understanding of specific virtues, vices and their inter-relationship—whether those commonly regarded as such or those more quirkily “Kierkegaardian.”

We request that, prior to submitting a manuscript, interested authors initially submit a proposed title and an abstract of 400–600 words summarizing their intended contribution. Please send it to the guest editors ([email protected]; [email protected]) or to the Religions editorial office ([email protected]). Abstracts will be reviewed by the guest editors for the purposes of ensuring proper fit within the scope of the Special Issue. Full manuscripts will undergo double-blind peer review.

Tentative completion schedule:

  • Abstract submission deadline: 28 October 2022
  • Notification of abstract acceptance: 28 November 2022
  • Full manuscript deadline: 30 September 2023

References:

Bernier, Mark (2015) The Task of Hope in Kierkegaard (Oxford University Press).

Evans, C. Stephen (2019) Kierkegaard and Spirituality: Accountability as the Meaning of Human Existence (Eerdmans).

Lippitt, John (2020) Love’s Forgiveness: Kierkegaard, Resentment, Humility, and Hope (Oxford University Press).

Roberts, Robert C. (2022) Recovering Christian Character: The Psychological Wisdom of Søren Kierkegaard (Eerdmans).

Vos, Pieter (2020) Longing for the Good Life: Virtue Ethics after Protestantism (Bloomsbury).

Walsh, Sylvia (2018) Kierkegaard and Religion: Personality, Character, and Virtue (Cambridge University Press). 

Prof. Dr. John Lippitt
Prof. Dr. C. Stephen Evans
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Religions is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1800 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Kierkegaard
  • virtues
  • vices
  • virtue ethics
  • character formation
  • moral virtues
  • theological virtues
  • intellectual virtues
  • faith
  • hope
  • love

Published Papers (14 papers)

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17 pages, 261 KiB  
Article
To Gain One’s Soul: Kierkegaard and the Hermeneutical Virtue of Patience
by Amber Bowen
Religions 2024, 15(3), 317; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15030317 - 4 Mar 2024
Viewed by 1048
Abstract
In his 1843–1844 Upbuilding Discourses on patience, Søren Kierkegaard makes the claim that one gains one’s soul in patience. Philosophically speaking, this claim seems to be a meshing together of two unrelated topics: the virtue of patience, which usually falls under moral philosophy, [...] Read more.
In his 1843–1844 Upbuilding Discourses on patience, Søren Kierkegaard makes the claim that one gains one’s soul in patience. Philosophically speaking, this claim seems to be a meshing together of two unrelated topics: the virtue of patience, which usually falls under moral philosophy, and the topic of the soul, which belongs to metaphysics or religious discourse. Rather than interpreting Kierkegaard’s talk about the soul as merely poetic or religious rather than properly philosophical, in this essay I attempt to take his connection between the virtue of patience and the constitution of the person seriously. I do so by arguing that the constitutive elements of the Kierkegaardian self can be understood hermeneutically as a proto-fundamental ontology. I then identify how Kierkegaard describes the virtue of patience in distinctly hermeneutical terms not as qualities or traits that adhere to the person but as a particular way of inhabiting space and time in relation to God. In patience, the self remains rooted in the present, bearing the weight of the loss and lack therein, while maintaining an anticipatory openness toward the future—a future that ultimately only God can provide. Patience, I conclude, is a way of being in time that is necessary at the constitutive level of the hermeneutical self. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
18 pages, 325 KiB  
Article
Kierkegaard on “Sobriety”: Christian Virtues, the Ethical, and Triadic Dyads
by John J. Davenport
Religions 2023, 14(12), 1492; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14121492 - 30 Nov 2023
Viewed by 808
Abstract
In her recent book, Kierkegaard and Religion: Personality, Character, and Virtue, Sylvia Walsh argues that Kierkegaard is not a virtue ethicist in the most common senses associated with eudaimonism, which he understands as enlightened self-interest. However, recent disputes about whether the aspects [...] Read more.
In her recent book, Kierkegaard and Religion: Personality, Character, and Virtue, Sylvia Walsh argues that Kierkegaard is not a virtue ethicist in the most common senses associated with eudaimonism, which he understands as enlightened self-interest. However, recent disputes about whether the aspects of “character” that Kierkegaard praises are virtues rely partly on whether the “ethical stage” in Kierkegaard’s moral psychology remains important within Christian faith, even when most strictly conceived in his late works. This in turn depends on how we understand the difficult works–grace relation in Kierkegaard’s conception of Christian faith. In this essay, I argue that the ethical existence sphere remains important even though, in works like Practice in Christianity and Judge for Yourself!, Kierkegaard argues that Christian faith is not a mere outgrowth or natural “development” of ethical earnestness or care—hardening the break with immanence that he introduced in earlier works. While he emphasizes a total transformation, a break from natural moral consciousness, and describes Christian qualities as a reversal of ordinary human expectations, there remains an underlying continuity with the attitudes and stances constitutive of the ethical and religiousness A (as existence spheres). This becomes visible when we identify three aspects found across the aesthetic, ethical, and Christian religious versions of major concepts in Kierkegaard’s work, including positive character terms. I use “sobriety” as discussed in Judge for Yourself! as my main example. This analysis confirms several important points advanced by Lee Barrett on the works–grace relation. The paradoxical standoff between ethical effort and grace is bridged to some extent by the continuing significance of the ethical “sphere” as a part of the “religious”, even in Kierkegaard’s late works and journal entries. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
17 pages, 301 KiB  
Article
Kierkegaard on Hope and Faith
by Anthony Rudd
Religions 2023, 14(12), 1458; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14121458 - 24 Nov 2023
Viewed by 894
Abstract
Faith, hope and love have often been classed together in the Christian tradition as the three “theological virtues”. Kierkegaard does not use that label for them, but he does have a good deal to say about all three. This paper starts by examining [...] Read more.
Faith, hope and love have often been classed together in the Christian tradition as the three “theological virtues”. Kierkegaard does not use that label for them, but he does have a good deal to say about all three. This paper starts by examining hope, arguing that there is an Aristotelian-style virtue relating to hope (a mean between wishful and depressive thinking) and that Kierkegaard could consistently recognize it as a secular virtue. However, his main discussions of hope as a positive state are in a religious context and relate it closely to faith and love; proper hope is a work of love and grounded in faith in God. I then argue that Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith, hope and love is, in many respects, close to Aquinas’ understanding of them as theological virtues (which differs in important ways from Aristotle’s account of a virtue) and that, therefore, it is appropriate to see Kierkegaard’s religious thought as lying within the tradition of virtue theory. The main difference between Aquinas and Kierkegaard here is that the former has an intellectualist and propositional account of faith which contrasts with the latter’s affective and existential view of it. This means that hope and love are both closer to faith for Kierkegaard than they are for Aquinas, meaning that he has a tight account of the unity of the theological virtues. I conclude by discussing how both faith and hope operate as antidotes to despair in The Sickness Unto Death. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
16 pages, 289 KiB  
Article
On the Virtues and Vices of the Singular Will: Seeking “One Thing” with Kierkegaard
by J. Aaron Simmons
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1435; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111435 - 19 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1386
Abstract
In this essay, I follow the example of recent Kierkegaard scholarship in the attempt to consider Kierkegaard’s work from a personal point of view. Accordingly, I begin with a biographical account of my first encounter with Kierkegaard’s notion that “purity of heart is [...] Read more.
In this essay, I follow the example of recent Kierkegaard scholarship in the attempt to consider Kierkegaard’s work from a personal point of view. Accordingly, I begin with a biographical account of my first encounter with Kierkegaard’s notion that “purity of heart is to will one thing”. I explain that were it not for the intervention of one of my early professors, David Kangas, the idea might have prevented me from getting married. I then offer a reading of “An Occasional Discourse”, where that idea is worked out, and suggest that Kierkegaard faces a serious challenge of what I call “empty formalism”. The worry is that his account offers general suggestions without any practical direction on how to live. By showing how the notion of singularly willing the eternal can be productively understood as a kind of virtue, I contend that Kierkegaard both avoids empty formalism and also manages to resist an overly determinate model of ethical life that eliminates the ambiguity of morality and the riskiness of faith. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
15 pages, 265 KiB  
Article
The Grammar and Socio-Political Implications of Kierkegaard’s Christian Virtue of Meekness
by Pieter Vos
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1431; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111431 - 16 Nov 2023
Viewed by 859
Abstract
This paper argues that in Kierkegaard’s works, in his upbuilding discourses and late journal entries in particular, meekness or gentleness (Danish: Sagtmodighed) is presented as a distinctive moral and spiritual quality that exhibits a number of characteristics that are usually regarded as [...] Read more.
This paper argues that in Kierkegaard’s works, in his upbuilding discourses and late journal entries in particular, meekness or gentleness (Danish: Sagtmodighed) is presented as a distinctive moral and spiritual quality that exhibits a number of characteristics that are usually regarded as attributes of a virtue. Following a “grammatical approach” to what counts as a virtue, rather than a specifically Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation, it is argued that Kierkegaard presents meekness as an encompassing attitude, a character trait, which can be acquired through imitation of exemplary persons, Christ, in particular, which aims for the good life, is conducive of the good, and is for the benefit of others and the self. It is demonstrated that according to Kierkegaard, meekness differs from other virtues such as courage and patience by its forgiving attitude towards the wrongdoer and nonviolent resistance to injustice and evil. As a virtue that disposes a person to nonviolent resistance, meekness has socio-political implications: injustice is uncovered and criticized for the benefit of “the poor”. A meek person does not confirm the world in its evil, but criticizes it, albeit in a way that is appropriate to meekness, i.e., in a forgiving and nonviolent way. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
14 pages, 315 KiB  
Article
Thoughtlessness as an Intellectual Vice in Kierkegaard and Aristotle
by Eleanor Helms
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1401; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111401 - 9 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1155
Abstract
I examine the Kierkegaardian intellectual vice of thoughtlessness (Tankeløshed) and its opposite, the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of phronēsis, or practical wisdom. I argue that thoughtlessness is primarily an intellectual problem rather than a moral one. My emphasis on intellectual virtue [...] Read more.
I examine the Kierkegaardian intellectual vice of thoughtlessness (Tankeløshed) and its opposite, the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of phronēsis, or practical wisdom. I argue that thoughtlessness is primarily an intellectual problem rather than a moral one. My emphasis on intellectual virtue in Kierkegaard contrasts with more typical characterizations of passion, will, and action as Kierkegaard’s main concerns and reliance on intellect as an obstacle to be overcome. Drawing on Aristotle’s account of phronēsis as the intellectual virtue related to action, I show that Kierkegaard offers a rich account of practical wisdom and a critique of its opposite, thoughtlessness. I conclude that, since there are different kinds of wisdom, Kierkegaard can say that faith is not a form of knowledge in the sense of epistēmē, or scientific knowledge, while preserving a central role for intellect in the task and life of faith. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
15 pages, 291 KiB  
Article
Valuable Vice: Kierkegaard on Collective Envy in A Literary Review
by Rob Compaijen
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1397; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111397 - 8 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1243
Abstract
In this paper, I explore Kierkegaard’s views on envy as developed in A Literary Review, by confronting them with the capital vices tradition. I begin by developing a basic account of envy that serves as a point of reference throughout the paper. [...] Read more.
In this paper, I explore Kierkegaard’s views on envy as developed in A Literary Review, by confronting them with the capital vices tradition. I begin by developing a basic account of envy that serves as a point of reference throughout the paper. I then turn to the capital vices tradition, elaborating the concept of a capital vice, and discussing the views of Basil of Caesarea, Evagrius of Pontus, John Cassian, Gregory the Great, and Thomas Aquinas on envy’s viciousness. Subsequently, I discuss Kierkegaard’s treatment of envy in A Literary Review, exploring two of its key notions—‘the public’ and ‘leveling’—through a reading of L.P. Hartley’s novel Facial Justice (1960). In the final part of the paper, I show that the originality of Kierkegaard’s account of envy consists both in its character as a collective vice and its evaluative status as vicious yet valuable. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
13 pages, 249 KiB  
Article
The Vice of Social Comparison in Kierkegaard: Nature, Religious Moral Psychology, and Normativity
by Wojciech Kaftanski
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1394; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111394 - 8 Nov 2023
Viewed by 1219
Abstract
This paper argues for the thesis that social comparison is, for Kierkegaard, a vice. The first part of this article reconstructs Kierkegaard’s understanding of the nature of social comparison. Here, I bring attention to his anthropological but also political and sociological observations that [...] Read more.
This paper argues for the thesis that social comparison is, for Kierkegaard, a vice. The first part of this article reconstructs Kierkegaard’s understanding of the nature of social comparison. Here, I bring attention to his anthropological but also political and sociological observations that pertain to social comparison and its links to modernity. The second part reconstructs the moral psychological account of social comparison in Kierkegaard, drawing on some of the available secondary literature. I complement Kierkegaard’s consideration of social comparison in relation to worry and humility with his account of the non-cognitive aspects of its operationality. The third part demonstrates that social comparison is a vice. Therein, drawing on the previous sections of this article, I identify Kierkegaard’s naturalistic argument engaged to present social comparison as a non-moral and non-religious vice (functionalism), pointing toward its intermeshing with the moral religious. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
23 pages, 372 KiB  
Article
Kierkegaard, “the Public”, and the Vices of Virtue-Signaling: The Dangers of Social Comparison
by John Lippitt
Religions 2023, 14(11), 1370; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14111370 - 30 Oct 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2227
Abstract
Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area [...] Read more.
Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area where concerns about the risks of social comparison are paramount: the contemporary debate about moral grandstanding or “virtue-signaling”. Neil Levy and Evan Westra have recently attempted to defend virtue-signaling against Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke’s critique. I argue that these defences fail and that a consideration of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is critical to seeing why. The over-confidence to which they give rise exacerbates certain vices with the potential to do moral, social and epistemic harm: I focus in particular on self-righteousness (complementing Kierkegaard’s discussion of envy). I then argue that Kierkegaard’s contrast between the religious category of the “single individual”—the genuine person of “character”—and the person who effectively appeals to the authority of some version of “the public” deepens our understanding of why we should reject defences of virtue-signaling. It helps us to distinguish between two kinds of virtue-signaler (“superficial enthusiasts” and “clear-eyed cynics”), both of whom contribute, in different ways, to the negative impacts of the vice of self-righteousness. Contrary to Levy’s claim that virtue-signaling is virtuous, I conclude that typically it is closer to vice than to virtue. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
17 pages, 957 KiB  
Article
Taking on the Habit: Kierkegaardian Faith as an Aristotelian Virtue
by Fernanda Rojas and Nassim Bravo
Religions 2023, 14(10), 1283; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14101283 - 11 Oct 2023
Viewed by 1387
Abstract
In this article, we would like to argue that the notion of faith, as seen in the anthropology that Kierkegaard presents in works such as The Sickness unto Death or Postscript, among others, shows striking similarities with the Aristotelian ethics of virtue. [...] Read more.
In this article, we would like to argue that the notion of faith, as seen in the anthropology that Kierkegaard presents in works such as The Sickness unto Death or Postscript, among others, shows striking similarities with the Aristotelian ethics of virtue. In a more specific manner, we wish to propose that faith can be interpreted as a virtue in the Aristotelian sense since one can find the following three aspects in it: (1) faith is a state based on habit; (2) faith makes human beings good; and (3) faith makes the human being perform her characteristic activity well. In our view, these features correspond to Aristotle’s definition of virtue: “If this is so in all cases, the virtue of a human being too will be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his characteristic activity well”. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
14 pages, 257 KiB  
Article
Kierkegaardian Virtues and the Problem of Self-Effacement
by Patrick Stokes
Religions 2023, 14(10), 1240; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14101240 - 27 Sep 2023
Viewed by 982
Abstract
One of the more well-known objections to Kierkegaard’s moral philosophy is that he presents a view of moral life that is self-absorbed almost to the point of solipsism, focused on the subject’s own moral status rather than acting from responsiveness to others. Kierkegaard [...] Read more.
One of the more well-known objections to Kierkegaard’s moral philosophy is that he presents a view of moral life that is self-absorbed almost to the point of solipsism, focused on the subject’s own moral status rather than acting from responsiveness to others. Kierkegaard commentators have gone to great lengths to debunk such readings, to demonstrate that Kierkegaard is indeed a far more other-oriented ethicist than such critiques would suggest. At the same time, many—though not all—commentators have come to read Kierkegaard as a Christian virtue ethicist. Yet virtue ethics itself has been objected to on the grounds that it is (1) self-effacing (it requires us to act for reasons or from motives other than those virtue ethics itself endorses), (2) egoistic (it serves the benefit of the agent themselves), and (3) self-absorbed (it causes the agent to focus on themselves rather than others). This paper considers whether and how these objections might apply to Kierkegaard, and argues that his moral psychology has specific resources for answering these objections in distinctive ways. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
8 pages, 203 KiB  
Article
Patriotism and Love of the Neighbor: A Kierkegaardian View of a Contested Virtue
by C. Stephen Evans
Religions 2023, 14(9), 1203; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091203 - 20 Sep 2023
Viewed by 665
Abstract
Though patriotism has traditionally been considered a virtue, in many countries of the world today, the status of patriotism as a virtue has been challenged. Philosopher John Hare has recently defended patriotism as a virtue. Kierkegaard, with his suspicion of “the crowd” and [...] Read more.
Though patriotism has traditionally been considered a virtue, in many countries of the world today, the status of patriotism as a virtue has been challenged. Philosopher John Hare has recently defended patriotism as a virtue. Kierkegaard, with his suspicion of “the crowd” and attack on “Christendom” has sometimes been thought to be one of the critics of patriotism. This paper argues that Kierkegaard’s view is actually close to Hare’s. Kierkegaard does believe that patriotism can be a virtue, though it is perhaps especially susceptible to distortion and corruption. Patriotism, like other natural forms of “preferential love”, must be infused with the love of the neighbor to be a genuine virtue. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
14 pages, 311 KiB  
Article
Thankfully and Joyfully Receiving the Father and Becoming a Christian
by Matt Aroney
Religions 2023, 14(9), 1151; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14091151 - 8 Sep 2023
Viewed by 1291
Abstract
Kierkegaard’s status as a virtue ethicist is a current discussion topic. Of vital importance to the question is not whether Kierkegaard’s work contains some use of virtues but where they fit in relation to his stated aims of showing someone how to become [...] Read more.
Kierkegaard’s status as a virtue ethicist is a current discussion topic. Of vital importance to the question is not whether Kierkegaard’s work contains some use of virtues but where they fit in relation to his stated aims of showing someone how to become a Christian. This article seeks to demonstrate that the virtues of Thankfulness and Joy are deployed in Kierkegaard’s discourses to lead people into a relationship with God the Father. The virtues are ultimately gifts from the Triune God that lead back to a life with the Triune God. Thus, though Kierkegaard at times fits the mould of a virtue ethicist, his teleology differs in its focus on both the self and relationship with God. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)

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11 pages, 243 KiB  
Essay
The Oneness of Love in Works of Love
by Jeffrey Hanson
Religions 2023, 14(12), 1517; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14121517 - 8 Dec 2023
Viewed by 957
Abstract
Kierkegaard’s claim that God just is love implies that love is ultimately one reality. Indeed, on more than one occasion, Kierkegaard will make this point explicitly as well as implicitly by frequently asserting the oneness of love. For example, early on in Works [...] Read more.
Kierkegaard’s claim that God just is love implies that love is ultimately one reality. Indeed, on more than one occasion, Kierkegaard will make this point explicitly as well as implicitly by frequently asserting the oneness of love. For example, early on in Works of Love, he states plainly that “this love for the neighbor is not related as a type to other types of love. Erotic love is defined by the object; friendship is defined by the object; only love for the neighbor is defined by love”. What Kierkegaard means by this is that preferential loves are defined by a factor in addition to love itself: the object of that love. Neighbor-love is defined by love itself, which takes as its object the neighbor, or in other words, “unconditionally every human being”. Preferential loves are specified as it were by the person loved in this manner. Neighbor-love is not related as a type to other types of love in that neighbor-love is paradigmatic love; preferential loves are specified, but as recent commentators have shown, are not thereby precluded from also being or filtered by or infused by or coincident with neighbor-love as well. The point of this passage is that there are not distinct, enumerated types of love that, taken together, can be amalgamated into something called “love”, which would be inclusive of distinct kinds. The current paper argues that neighbor-love is meant to be thought of as paradigmatic. Therefore, as a paradigmatic unity, it will also exhibit qualities ordinarily associated with preferential love. Put differently, my claim is that we have reason to conclude that, in the end, features of preferential love will be manifest in neighbor-love just as surely as neighbor-love has an effect on preferential love. I wish to take seriously the claim of Works of Love that, ultimately, love is one. Love, being one, is not comprised of distinct types or subsets. I demonstrate the importance of this point by explaining how all love has its ultimate origin in God (and God just is love). While seemingly a truism, I argue from a variety of passages that the oneness of love has multiple implications throughout the text, implications that further support the theory that neighbor-love is not an alternative to, but rather encompasses features of, preferential loves. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Kierkegaard, Virtues and Vices)
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