Special Issue "Political Economy and Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 July 2015)

Special Issue Editors

Guest Editor
Dr. Jon X. Eguia

Department of Economics, School of Economics, Finance and Management University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Rd., Bristol, BS8 1TN, United Kingdom
Website | E-Mail
Interests: political economy; non-cooperative game theory; collective choice; voting and elections
Guest Editor
Dr. Gergely Ujhelyi

Economics Department, University of Houston, 204 McElhinney Hall, Houston, TX 77204, USA
Website | E-Mail
Interests: political economy; public economics; applied game theory; development economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Game theory unites theoretical thinking in economics and political science. Research using the language of games has achieved considerable progress in our understanding of political phenomena, the implication of politics for economic outcomes, and the inner workings of government. These insights are in turn critical to understand the impact of institutional reform.

For this special issue, we are soliciting contributions on the full spectrum of game theory applications to political economy and political science. We are particularly interested in papers that open up “black boxes” by thinking carefully about generally ignored aspects of political actors and their actions. For example: How do political parties work? What happens inside the bureaucracy? What happens during a political campaign?

Dr. Jon X. Eguia
Dr. Gergely Ujhelyi
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 550 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.


  • institutions
  • legislative bargaining
  • political agency
  • policy-making
  • collective choice
  • constitutional design
  • taxation and redistribution
  • public good provision
  • government debt
  • bureaucracies
  • voting and elections
  • lobbying
  • corruption
  • political parties
  • political campaigns
  • international agreements
  • development
  • power and conflict

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Open AccessArticle A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability
Games 2015, 6(2), 39-56; doi:10.3390/g6020039
Received: 1 January 2015 / Revised: 16 March 2015 / Accepted: 23 March 2015 / Published: 22 April 2015
PDF Full-text (354 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may
[...] Read more.
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy and Game Theory)

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