Special Issue "Public Key Cryptography"

A special issue of Cryptography (ISSN 2410-387X).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 September 2018)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Guomin Yang

The School of Computing and Information Technology, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
Website | E-Mail
Phone: +61 2 4221 3872
Interests: public key cryptography; authentication; key agreement; privacy enhancing technologies

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Public key cryptography is a major branch of modern cryptography and forms the foundation of computer and network security, as well as electronic commerce. It is a fantastic and fast evolving research area. New public key cryptographic technologies and systems, such as identity-based, attributed-based and functional cryptosystems, have been introduced in recently years to address the security issues imposed by emerging computing paradigms, such as cloud computing. Nevertheless, there are still a lot of challenging problems to be solved in this area, such as the development of secure public key cryptosystems that are quantum-safe and practical. 

This Special Issue aims to provide a platform for researchers to publish high-quality and original research papers presenting the recent development and state-of-the-art solutions on all the aspects of public key cryptography.

The topics of interest to this Special Issue cover the scope of the 23rd Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (https://ssl.informatics.uow.edu.au/acisp2018/index.html).

Extended versions of papers presented at ACISP 2018 are sought, but this call for papers is also fully open to all those who wish to contribute by submitting a relevant research manuscript.

Dr. Guomin Yang
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Cryptography is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) is waived for well-prepared manuscripts submitted to this issue. Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Public key encryption
  • Digital signature
  • Post-quantum cryptography
  • Foundations of public key cryptography
  • Provable security

Published Papers (2 papers)

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Open AccessArticle A Secure Algorithm for Inversion Modulo 2k
Cryptography 2018, 2(3), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030023
Received: 21 August 2018 / Revised: 10 September 2018 / Accepted: 12 September 2018 / Published: 13 September 2018
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Abstract
Modular inversions are widely employed in public key crypto-systems, and it is known that they imply a bottleneck due to the expensive computation. Recently, a new algorithm for inversions modulo pk was proposed, which may speed up the calculation of a modulus
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Modular inversions are widely employed in public key crypto-systems, and it is known that they imply a bottleneck due to the expensive computation. Recently, a new algorithm for inversions modulo p k was proposed, which may speed up the calculation of a modulus dependent quantity used in the Montgomery multiplication. The original algorithm lacks security countermeasures; thus, a straightforward implementation may expose the input. This is an issue if that input is a secret. In the RSA-CRT signature using Montgomery multiplication, the moduli are secrets (primes p and q). Therefore, the moduli dependent quantities related to p and q must be securely computed. This paper presents a security analysis of the novel method considering that it might be used to compute secrets. We demonstrate that a Side Channel Analysis leads to disclose the data being manipulated. In consequence, a secure variant for inversions modulo 2 k is proposed, through the application of two known countermeasures. In terms of performance, the secure variant is still comparable with the original one. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Key Cryptography)

Other

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Open AccessBrief Report Cryptanalysis of a Proposal Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem Inside Sn
Cryptography 2018, 2(3), 16; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography2030016
Received: 21 May 2018 / Revised: 13 July 2018 / Accepted: 16 July 2018 / Published: 19 July 2018
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Abstract
In 2008, Doliskani et al. proposed an ElGamal-style encryption scheme using the symmetric group Sn as mathematical platform. In 2012, an improvement of the cryptosystem’s memory requirements was suggested by Othman. The proposal by Doliskani et al. in particular requires the discrete
[...] Read more.
In 2008, Doliskani et al. proposed an ElGamal-style encryption scheme using the symmetric group Sn as mathematical platform. In 2012, an improvement of the cryptosystem’s memory requirements was suggested by Othman. The proposal by Doliskani et al. in particular requires the discrete logarithm problem in Sn, using its natural representation, to be hard. Making use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, we describe an efficient method to solve this discrete logarithm problem, yielding a polynomial time secret key recovery attack against Doliskani et al.’s proposal. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Key Cryptography)
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