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Games, Volume 4, Issue 2 (June 2013), Pages 144-282

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Research

Open AccessArticle Reciprocity in Locating Contributions: Experiments on the Neighborhood Public Good Game
Games 2013, 4(2), 144-162; doi:10.3390/g4020144
Received: 7 December 2012 / Revised: 1 March 2013 / Accepted: 4 April 2013 / Published: 26 April 2013
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Abstract
In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. [...] Read more.
In repeated public good experiments, reciprocity helps to sustain high levels of cooperation. Can this be achieved by location choices in addition to making contributions? It is more realistic to rely on an intuitive neighborhood model for community members who interact repeatedly. In our experiments, participants can locate their contribution, yielding a small benefit for the participant, who receives the contribution and a small disadvantage for the participant, at the opposite location. This mechanism of individually targeted sanctions helps to foster initial cooperation. It decreases over time, however. Location choices are used to reciprocate, but may not suffice to stabilize voluntary cooperation as an effect observed in the field. Full article
Open AccessArticle The Dynamics of Costly Signaling
Games 2013, 4(2), 163-181; doi:10.3390/g4020163
Received: 11 February 2013 / Revised: 1 April 2013 / Accepted: 11 April 2013 / Published: 26 April 2013
Cited by 6 | PDF Full-text (649 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that [...] Read more.
Costly signaling is a mechanism through which the honesty of signals can be secured in equilibrium, even in interactions where communicators have conflicting interests. This paper explores the dynamics of one such signaling game: Spence’s model of education. It is found that separating equilibria are unlikely to emerge under either the replicator or best response dynamics, but that partially communicative mixed equilibria are quite important dynamically. These mixtures are Lyapunov stable in the replicator dynamic and asymptotically stable in the best response dynamic. Moreover, they have large basins of attraction, in fact larger than those of either pooling or separating equilibria. This suggests that these mixtures may play significant, and underappreciated, roles in the explanation of the emergence and stability of information transfer. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
Open AccessArticle Dynamic Properties of Evolutionary Multi-player Games in Finite Populations
Games 2013, 4(2), 182-199; doi:10.3390/g4020182
Received: 11 February 2013 / Revised: 11 April 2013 / Accepted: 22 April 2013 / Published: 6 May 2013
Cited by 15 | PDF Full-text (522 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite [...] Read more.
William D. Hamilton famously stated that “human life is a many person game and not just a disjoined collection of two person games”. However, most of the theoretical results in evolutionary game theory have been developed for two player games. In spite of a multitude of examples ranging from humans to bacteria, multi-player games have received less attention than pairwise games due to their inherent complexity. Such complexities arise from the fact that group interactions cannot always be considered as a sum of multiple pairwise interactions. Mathematically, multi-player games provide a natural way to introduce non-linear, polynomial fitness functions into evolutionary game theory, whereas pairwise games lead to linear fitness functions. Similarly, studying finite populations is a natural way of introducing intrinsic stochasticity into population dynamics. While these topics have been dealt with individually, few have addressed the combination of finite populations and multi-player games so far. We are investigating the dynamical properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations. Properties of the fixation probability and fixation time, which are relevant for rare mutations, are addressed in well mixed populations. For more frequent mutations, the average abundance is investigated in well mixed as well as in structured populations. While the fixation properties are generalizations of the results from two player scenarios, addressing the average abundance in multi-player games gives rise to novel outcomes not possible in pairwise games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
Open AccessArticle A Note on Cooperative Strategies in Gladiators’ Games
Games 2013, 4(2), 200-207; doi:10.3390/g4020200
Received: 4 March 2013 / Revised: 28 March 2013 / Accepted: 16 May 2013 / Published: 22 May 2013
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Abstract
Gladiatorial combat was in reality a lot less lethal than it is depicted in the cinema. This short paper highlights how cooperative strategies could have prevailed in the arenas, which is generally what happened during the Games. Cooperation in the arena corresponded [...] Read more.
Gladiatorial combat was in reality a lot less lethal than it is depicted in the cinema. This short paper highlights how cooperative strategies could have prevailed in the arenas, which is generally what happened during the Games. Cooperation in the arena corresponded to a situation of the professionalization of gladiators, who been trained in gladiatorial schools. This case provides an analogy of the conditions under which cooperation occurs in a context of competition between rival companies. Full article
Open AccessArticle Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence
Games 2013, 4(2), 208-242; doi:10.3390/g4020208
Received: 4 February 2013 / Accepted: 13 May 2013 / Published: 30 May 2013
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (1580 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems—the Dictator [...] Read more.
The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems—the Dictator and Ultimatum game—we explore whether, and how exactly, unknown pie sizes with varying degrees of risk (“endowment risk”) influence individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for these games using utility functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequity aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical predictions using two subject pools: students of Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in the Dictator game (and also in the Ultimatum game but there not statistically significantly so) in that they give more; (2) Using the within-subject feature of our design, and in line with our theoretical prediction, varying risk does not influence behavior in the Dictator game, but does so in the Ultimatum game (contradicting our theoretical prediction for that game); (3) Using the within-subject feature of our design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions across games; this is true on the level of individuals as well as in the aggregate. This latter finding contradicts the evidence in Blanco et al. (2011); (4) There are no subject-pool differences once we control for the elicited risk attitude and demographic variables that we collect. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation
Games 2013, 4(2), 243-282; doi:10.3390/g4020243
Received: 30 March 2013 / Revised: 4 May 2013 / Accepted: 6 May 2013 / Published: 19 June 2013
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (2545 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to [...] Read more.
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributed to competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand for workers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willing to make early offers and workers are willing to accept them. We present a model and experiment in which workers’ quality becomes known only in the late part of the market. However, in equilibrium, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a shortage of high quality applicants. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Matching Markets)

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