Special Issue "Games and Matching Markets"
A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 November 2012)
Dr. Flip Klijn
Institute for Economic Analysis, CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain
Interests: matching theory; market design; game theory; operations research; social choice theory
The publication of the text books by Gusfield and Irving (1989) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) triggered a literature on a wide variety of matching problems. The abundance of real-life matching markets explains the exponential growth of this literature. Some important examples of matching markets include the assignment of students to universities and dormitories, children to schools, junior doctors to hospital internships, and kidney transplant patients to donors. Using a multi-disciplinary approach, researchers have studied market failures and have proposed practical solutions. Theoretical studies have provided insights in the different properties of matching mechanisms and procedures. Experimental work has been crucial in testing new matching schemes before implementing them in real-life markets. It has become clear that very often real-life settings require an extension of basic models and that apparently innocuous details can have significant impact on the performance of matching mechanisms. For the Special Issue in Games I invite theoretical as well as experimental contributions that deal with features present in real-life matching markets. Possible topics include, but are not to limited to:
- large markets
- preference externalities
- affirmative action
Prof. Dr. Flip Klijn