Special Issue "Fairness in Games"

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A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 January 2012)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Dr. Dorothea K. Herreiner

Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, University Hall 4217, 1 LMU Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90045-2659, USA
Website | E-Mail
Fax: +1 310 338 1950
Interests: game theory; experimental economics; behavioral economics; justice and fairness; industrial economics; market organization; social networks; learning; art markets

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Modelling and understanding of preferences has undergone major changes during the last two decades - the concept of social preferences has challenged the neoclassical economics paradigm of self-centered preferences. Rabin's seminal work "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics" (AER, 1993) initiated the quest for game theoretic solution concepts that consider fairness notions explicitly. This Special Issue follows in those footsteps seeking theoretical and applied contributions that consider equilibrium concepts that incorporate or address fairness, that discuss the relationship between standard game theoretic solution concepts and fairness or justice notions, or that analyze existing or introduce new games or experiments exploring the relevance of fairness in the context of strategic behavior.

Dr. Dorothea K. Herreiner
Guest Editor

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence
Games 2013, 4(2), 208-242; doi:10.3390/g4020208
Received: 4 February 2013 / Accepted: 13 May 2013 / Published: 30 May 2013
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (1580 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems—the Dictator and
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The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante. Using two simple allocation problems—the Dictator and Ultimatum game—we explore whether, and how exactly, unknown pie sizes with varying degrees of risk (“endowment risk”) influence individual behavior. We derive theoretical predictions for these games using utility functions that capture additively separable constant relative risk aversion and inequity aversion. We experimentally test the theoretical predictions using two subject pools: students of Czech Technical University and employees of Prague City Hall. We find that: (1) Those who are more risk-averse are also more inequality-averse in the Dictator game (and also in the Ultimatum game but there not statistically significantly so) in that they give more; (2) Using the within-subject feature of our design, and in line with our theoretical prediction, varying risk does not influence behavior in the Dictator game, but does so in the Ultimatum game (contradicting our theoretical prediction for that game); (3) Using the within-subject feature of our design, subjects tend to make inconsistent decisions across games; this is true on the level of individuals as well as in the aggregate. This latter finding contradicts the evidence in Blanco et al. (2011); (4) There are no subject-pool differences once we control for the elicited risk attitude and demographic variables that we collect. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games
Games 2012, 3(2), 78-96; doi:10.3390/g3020078
Received: 28 February 2012 / Accepted: 30 March 2012 / Published: 23 April 2012
PDF Full-text (247 KB) | Supplementary Files
Abstract
The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with
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The literature on social norms has often stressed that social disapproval is crucial to foster compliance with norms and promote fair and cooperative behavior. With this in mind, we explore the disapproval of allocation decisions using experimental data from five dictator games with a feedback stage. Our data suggests that subjects are heterogeneous in their disapproval patterns, distinguishing two main groups: (1) Subjects who only disapprove choices that harm them, and (2) subjects who disapprove socially inefficient choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games
Games 2012, 3(1), 56-77; doi:10.3390/g3010056
Received: 9 January 2012 / Accepted: 16 March 2012 / Published: 21 March 2012
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (459 KB)
Abstract
This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely repeated
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This paper investigates how the introduction of social preferences affects players’ equilibrium behavior in both the one-shot and the infinitely repeated version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We show that fairness concerns operate as a ”substitute” for time discounting in the infinitely repeated game, as fairness helps sustain cooperation for lower discount factors. In addition, such cooperation can be supported under larger parameter values if players are informed about each others’ social preferences than if they are uninformed. Finally, our results help to identify conditions under which cooperative behavior observed in recent experimental repeated games can be rationalized using time preferences alone (patience) or a combination of time and social preferences (fairness). Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Games with Synergistic Preferences
Games 2012, 3(1), 41-55; doi:10.3390/g3010041
Received: 26 February 2012 / Accepted: 12 March 2012 / Published: 15 March 2012
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (93 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown
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Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper presents a simple structure in the context of game theory, building on a model due to Bergstrom, that incorporates these ‘synergisms’ between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Building Trust—One Gift at a Time
Games 2011, 2(4), 412-433; doi:10.3390/g2040412
Received: 13 May 2011 / Revised: 26 August 2011 / Accepted: 13 September 2011 / Published: 27 September 2011
PDF Full-text (391 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a
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This paper reports an experiment evaluating the effect of gift giving on building trust. We have nested our explorations in the standard version of the investment game. Our gift treatment includes a dictator stage in which the trustee decides whether to give a gift to the trustor before both of them proceed to play the investment game. We observe that in such case the majority of trustees offer their endowment to trustors. Consequently, receiving a gift significantly increases the amounts sent by trustors when controlling for the differences in payoffs created by it. Trustees are, however, not better off by giving a gift as the increase in the amount sent by trustors is not large enough to offset the trustees’ loss associated with the cost of giving a gift. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)
Open AccessArticle Spite and Reciprocity in Auctions
Games 2011, 2(3), 365-411; doi:10.3390/g2030365
Received: 1 June 2011 / Revised: 18 July 2011 / Accepted: 30 August 2011 / Published: 16 September 2011
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (825 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences
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The paper presents a complete information model of bidding in second price sealed-bid and ascending-bid (English) auctions, in which potential buyers know the unit valuation of other bidders and may spitefully prefer that their rivals earn a lower surplus. Bidders with spiteful preferences should overbid in equilibrium when they know their rival has a higher value than their own, and bidders with a higher value underbid to reciprocate the spiteful overbidding of the lower value bidders. The model also predicts different bidding behavior in second price as compared to ascending-bid auctions. The paper also presents experimental evidence broadly consistent with the model. In the complete information environment, lower value bidders overbid more than higher value bidders, and they overbid more frequently in the second price auction than in the ascending price auction. Overall, the lower value bidder submits bids that exceed value about half the time. These patterns are not found in the incomplete information environment, consistent with the model. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fairness in Games)

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