Search for Articles:
Title / Keyword
Author / Affiliation / Email
Journal
Article Type
 
 
Advanced Search
 
Section
Special Issue
Volume
Issue
Number
Page
 
1.4
0.9
Journals
Games
Special Issues
Political Game Theory: Coalition Formation and Dynamic Aspects of Collective...
share announcement

Political Game Theory: Coalition Formation and Dynamic Aspects of Collective Decision Making

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (25 November 2022) | Viewed by 3607

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Vincent Anesi

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics and Management, University of Luxembourg, 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi L-1359, Luxembourg
Interests: collective decision making; political economic theory; electoral accountability; legislative bargaining

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Understanding the connection between individuals’ preferences within groups of agents (such as legislatures, electorates, households, international organizations, etc.) and the collective decisions of those groups has become a fundamental research topic in economics and political science. There is a rapidly growing, but yet far from comprehensive, game-theoretical literature on the dynamic aspects of this relationship. Articles are invited that further explore the interaction between individual preferences, strategic incentives, and collective decisions induced by political institutions in dynamic collective decision-making problems. Contributing authors are invited to approach the topic from either a noncooperative strategic vantage point or a more cooperative game-theoretic perspective. Topics welcomed include but are not restricted to committees and cabinets, legislative bargaining, collective learning, dynamic stability, repeated elections, bureaucratic policy making, and coalition formation.

Prof. Dr. Vincent Anesi
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • voting
  • stability
  • coalitions
  • elections
  • collective decision making
  • legislative bargaining

Published Papers (1 paper)

Order results
Result details
Show export options expand_more Show export options expand_less
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

17 pages, 842 KiB  
Article
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation
by Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Mandar Oak
Games 2022, 13(4), 48; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13040048 - 21 Jun 2022
Viewed by 2254
Abstract
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of [...] Read more.
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be ‘disconnected’. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. In particular, we show that when the rents from office are low, the median citizen stands unopposed, and when rents are high, there is more political entry. For intermediate rents, we show that strategic dropouts can happen to influence the final policy. We show that the incentives for strategic dropout can be higher under proportional representation than plurality voting, contrary to Duverger’s law. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Game Theory: Coalition Formation and Dynamic Aspects of Collective Decision Making)
►▼ Show Figures

Figure 1

Show export options expand_more Show export options expand_less
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
 
Displaying articles 1-1
Back to TopTop