Games 2010, 1(4), 459-477; doi:10.3390/g1040459

Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games

1,2,3 and 4,* email
Received: 16 September 2010; Accepted: 14 October 2010 / Published: 21 October 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices.
Keywords: reciprocity; inequality aversion; altruism; moonlighting game
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MDPI and ACS Style

Engelmann, D.; Strobel, M. Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games. Games 2010, 1, 459-477.

AMA Style

Engelmann D, Strobel M. Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games. Games. 2010; 1(4):459-477.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin. 2010. "Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games." Games 1, no. 4: 459-477.

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