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Games 2010, 1(4), 422-437; doi:10.3390/g1040422

The Insider-Outsider Model Reexamined

1, 1 and 2,*
1 Gate Lyon-Saint-Etienne, University Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, 42023 Cedex 02, France 2 DIW Berlin and Department of Economics, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 31 August 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
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In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that centrality and small diameter are robust features of strict Nash networks. Then, we study the Nash and efficient networks when the decay vanishes.
Keywords: Two-way flow models; Nash networks; heterogeneity; decay Two-way flow models; Nash networks; heterogeneity; decay
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Billand, P.; Bravard, C.; Sarangi, S. The Insider-Outsider Model Reexamined. Games 2010, 1, 422-437.

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