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Games, Volume 1, Issue 4 (December 2010), Pages 357-585

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Open AccessArticle Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Network Good Production
Games 2010, 1(4), 357-380; doi:10.3390/g1040357
Received: 7 June 2010 / Revised: 7 August 2010 / Accepted: 6 September 2010 / Published: 28 September 2010
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (170 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an
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If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding partners for collaboration, while cooperation problems arise at the investment levels of partners who have already agreed to collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination problem. Still, if subjects are able to solve the coordination problem, they invest in a suboptimal way in the network good. It is mostly found that if cooperation is successful in terms of investment, it is due to subjects being able to monitor how much their partners invest. Moreover, subjects deal better with the coordination and cooperation problems as they gain experience. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Open AccessArticle The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games
Games 2010, 1(4), 381-394; doi:10.3390/g1040381
Received: 23 July 2010 / Revised: 18 September 2010 / Accepted: 19 September 2010 / Published: 8 October 2010
Cited by 5 | PDF Full-text (224 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality
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It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
Open AccessArticle Modelling Social Dynamics (of Obesity) and Thresholds
Games 2010, 1(4), 395-414; doi:10.3390/g1040395
Received: 23 July 2010 / Revised: 10 September 2010 / Accepted: 25 September 2010 / Published: 13 October 2010
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (2001 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of individual behavior affected by its social embedding, either at large (society-wide norms or averages) or at a local neighborhood. The emphasis is on how initial conditions can affect the long run outcome and to derive,
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This paper focuses on the dynamic aspects of individual behavior affected by its social embedding, either at large (society-wide norms or averages) or at a local neighborhood. The emphasis is on how initial conditions can affect the long run outcome and to derive, discuss and apply the conditions for such thresholds. For this purpose, intertemporal social pressure (from peers, from norms, or from fashions) is modelled in two different ways: (i) individual benefit is influenced by the possession of a stock (in the application: weight) and the society wide average, and (ii) individual benefits depend on a norm that follows its own motion, of course driven by agents’ behavior. The topical issue of obesity serves as motivation and corresponding models and examples are presented and analyzed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Open AccessArticle Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games
Games 2010, 1(4), 415-421; doi:10.3390/g1040415
Received: 1 July 2010 / Revised: 26 September 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
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Abstract We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
Open AccessArticle The Insider-Outsider Model Reexamined
Games 2010, 1(4), 422-437; doi:10.3390/g1040422
Received: 31 August 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
Cited by 3 | PDF Full-text (157 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and
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In this note we introduce different levels of decay in the Goyal, Galeotti and Kamphorst (GGK) insider-outsider model of network formation. First, we deal with situations where the amount of decay is sufficiently low to avoid superfluous connections in strict Nash networks and we examine the architectures of strict Nash networks. We show that centrality and small diameter are robust features of strict Nash networks. Then, we study the Nash and efficient networks when the decay vanishes. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Open AccessArticle Bayesian Social Learning with Local Interactions
Games 2010, 1(4), 438-458; doi:10.3390/g1040438
Received: 8 September 2010 / Accepted: 2 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
Cited by 2 | PDF Full-text (331 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent
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We study social learning in a large population of agents who only observe the actions taken by their neighbours. Agents have to choose one, out of two, reversible actions, each optimal in one, out of two, unknown states of the world. Each agent chooses rationally, on the basis of private information and of the observation of his neighbours’ actions. Agents can repeatedly update their choices at revision opportunities that they receive in a random sequential order. We show that if agents receive equally informative signals and observe both neighbours, then actions converge exponentially fast to a configuration where some agents are permanently wrong. In contrast, if agents are unequally informed (in that some agents receive a perfectly informative signal and others are uninformed) and observe one neighbour only, then everyone will eventually choose the correct action. Convergence, however, obtains very slowly, at rate √t. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
Open AccessArticle Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
Games 2010, 1(4), 459-477; doi:10.3390/g1040459
Received: 16 September 2010 / Accepted: 14 October 2010 / Published: 21 October 2010
Cited by 1 | PDF Full-text (202 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal
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We study behavior in a moonlighting game with unequal initial endowments. In this game, predictions for second-mover behavior based on inequality aversion are in contrast to reciprocity. We find that inequality aversion explains only few observations. The comparison to a treatment with equal endowments supports the conclusion that behavior is better captured by intuitive notions of reciprocity than by inequality aversion. Extending the model by allowing for alternative reference points promises better performance, but leads to other problems. We conclude that the fact that inequality aversion often works as a good short-hand for reciprocity is driven by biased design choices. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
Open AccessArticle A Modal Logic of Epistemic Games
Games 2010, 1(4), 478-526; doi:10.3390/g1040478
Received: 11 June 2010 / Revised: 7 September 2010 / Accepted: 22 October 2010 / Published: 2 November 2010
Cited by 9 | PDF Full-text (574 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
We propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic games in strategic form. The first part of the paper deals with games with complete information. We first provide syntactic proofs of some well-known theorems
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We propose some variants of a multi-modal of joint action, preference and knowledge that support reasoning about epistemic games in strategic form. The first part of the paper deals with games with complete information. We first provide syntactic proofs of some well-known theorems in the area of interactive epistemology that specify some sufficient epistemic conditions of equilibrium notions such as Nash equilibrium and Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS). Then, we present a variant of the logic extended with dynamic operators of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL). We show that it allows to express the notion IDSDS in a more compact way. The second part of the paper deals with games with weaker forms of complete information. We first discuss several assumptions on different aspects of perfect information about the game structure (e.g., the assumption that a player has perfect knowledge about the players’ strategy sets or about the preference orderings over strategy profiles), and show that every assumption is expressed by a corresponding logical axiom of our logic. Then we provide a proof of Harsanyi’s claim that all uncertainty about the structure of a game can be reduced to uncertainty about payoffs. Sound and complete axiomatizations of the logics are given, as well as some complexity results for the satisfiability problem. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
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Open AccessArticle Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements
Games 2010, 1(4), 527-550; doi:10.3390/g1040527
Received: 15 September 2010 / Revised: 15 October 2010 / Accepted: 8 November 2010 / Published: 10 November 2010
Cited by 5 | PDF Full-text (496 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text | Supplementary Files
Abstract
Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games.
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Is mutually beneficial cooperation in trust games more prevalent with private property or common property? Does the strength of property right entitlement affect the answer? Cox, Ostrom, Walker, et al. [1] report little difference between cooperation in private and common property trust games. We assign stronger property right entitlements by requiring subjects to meet a performance quota in a real effort task to earn their endowments. We report experiment treatments with sequential choice and strategy responses. We find that cooperation is lower in common property trust games than in private property trust games, which is an idiosyncratic prediction of revealed altruism theory [2]. Demonstrable differences and similarities between our strategy response and sequential choice data provide insight into the how these protocols can yield different results from hypothesis tests even when they are eliciting the same behavioral patterns across treatments. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
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Open AccessArticle Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature
Games 2010, 1(4), 551-585; doi:10.3390/g1040551
Received: 27 August 2010 / Revised: 27 October 2010 / Accepted: 11 November 2010 / Published: 15 November 2010
Cited by 22 | PDF Full-text (330 KB) | HTML Full-text | XML Full-text
Abstract
We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as
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We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison’s [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a localandin a global- interactions setting. Full article
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