Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

doi:10.3390/g1020089

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Games 2010, 1(2), 89-102; doi:10.3390/g1020089

Article

Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

Werner Güth^1,* , Kerstin Pull², Manfred Stadler³ and Agnes Stribeck²

¹ Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Straße 10, 07745 Jena, Germany ² Human Resource Management and Organization, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Nauklerstraße 47, 72074 Tübingen, Germany ³ Economic Theory, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Mohlstraße 36, 72074 Tübingen, Germany

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Received: 16 March 2010; in revised form: 16 April 2010 / Accepted: 16 April 2010 / Published: 22 April 2010

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)

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Abstract: In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

Keywords: generosity game; equity; efficiency; experiment

Supplementary Files

Supplementary File 1:
Experimental Questionnaire 1 (PDF, 74 KB)
Supplementary File 2:
Experimental Questionnaire 2 (PDF, 72 KB)
Supplementary File 3:
Experimental Data (XLS, 67 KB)

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Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Güth, W.; Pull, K.; Stadler, M.; Stribeck, A. Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments. Games 2010, 1, 89-102.

AMA Style

Güth W, Pull K, Stadler M, Stribeck A. Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments. Games. 2010; 1(2):89-102.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Stribeck, Agnes. 2010. "Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments." Games 1, no. 2: 89-102.

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