Games 2010, 1(2), 89-102; doi:10.3390/g1020089
Article

Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

1,* email, 2, 3 and 2
Received: 16 March 2010; in revised form: 16 April 2010 / Accepted: 16 April 2010 / Published: 22 April 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Other-Regarding Preferences)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.
Keywords: generosity game; equity; efficiency; experiment
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MDPI and ACS Style

Güth, W.; Pull, K.; Stadler, M.; Stribeck, A. Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments. Games 2010, 1, 89-102.

AMA Style

Güth W, Pull K, Stadler M, Stribeck A. Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments. Games. 2010; 1(2):89-102.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; Stribeck, Agnes. 2010. "Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments." Games 1, no. 2: 89-102.

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