Games 2010, 1(4), 381-394; doi:10.3390/g1040381
Article

The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games

1,* email and 2
Received: 23 July 2010; in revised form: 18 September 2010 / Accepted: 19 September 2010 / Published: 8 October 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality notions and arbitrary strategic games and allows to strengthen the above result to arbitrary games, other rationality notions, and transfinite iterations of the elimination process. We also clarify what conclusions one can draw for the customary dominance notions that are not monotonic. The main tool is Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem.
Keywords: true common beliefs; arbitrary games; monotonicity; Tarski’s Fixpoint Theorem
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MDPI and ACS Style

Apt, K.R.; Zvesper, J.A. The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games. Games 2010, 1, 381-394.

AMA Style

Apt KR, Zvesper JA. The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games. Games. 2010; 1(4):381-394.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Apt, Krzysztof R.; Zvesper, Jonathan A. 2010. "The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games." Games 1, no. 4: 381-394.

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