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Games 2010, 1(3), 168-188; doi:10.3390/g1030168
Article
Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning
Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands
Received: 9 June 2010 / Accepted: 30 June 2010 / Published: 2 July 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
Download PDF Full-Text [219 KB, uploaded 2 July 2010 14:54 CEST]
Abstract: In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.
Keywords: epistemic game theory; backward induction; forward induction; algorithms
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MDPI and ACS Style
Perea, A. Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning. Games 2010, 1, 168-188.
AMA StylePerea A. Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning. Games. 2010; 1(3):168-188.
Chicago/Turabian StylePerea, Andres. 2010. "Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning." Games 1, no. 3: 168-188.