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Games 2010, 1(3), 168-188; doi:10.3390/g1030168
Article

Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning

Received: 9 June 2010; Accepted: 30 June 2010 / Published: 2 July 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
Download PDF [219 KB, uploaded 2 July 2010]
Abstract: In this paper we want to shed some light on what we mean by backward induction and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games. To that purpose, we take the concepts of common belief in future rationality (Perea [1]) and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce [2], Battigalli [3], Battigalli and Siniscalchi [4]) as possible representatives for backward induction and forward induction reasoning. We compare both concepts on a conceptual, epistemic and an algorithm level, thereby highlighting some of the crucial differences between backward and forward induction reasoning in dynamic games.
Keywords: epistemic game theory; backward induction; forward induction; algorithms epistemic game theory; backward induction; forward induction; algorithms
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Perea, A. Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning. Games 2010, 1, 168-188.

AMA Style

Perea A. Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning. Games. 2010; 1(3):168-188.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Perea, Andres. 2010. "Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning." Games 1, no. 3: 168-188.


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