Games 2010, 1(4), 415-421; doi:10.3390/g1040415

Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

1 Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 214 Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 14627, USA 2 Insper Institute of Education and Research, Rua Quatá, 300 - Vila Olímpia 04546-042, São Paulo, Brazil
Received: 1 July 2010; in revised form: 26 September 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
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Abstract: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
Keywords: hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium

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MDPI and ACS Style

Barelli, P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games 2010, 1, 415-421.

AMA Style

Barelli P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games. 2010; 1(4):415-421.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Barelli, Paulo. 2010. "Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games." Games 1, no. 4: 415-421.

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