Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games
AbstractWe introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions. View Full-Text
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Barelli, P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games 2010, 1, 415-421.
Barelli P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games. 2010; 1(4):415-421.Chicago/Turabian Style
Barelli, Paulo. 2010. "Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games." Games 1, no. 4: 415-421.