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Games 2010, 1(4), 415-421; doi:10.3390/g1040415
Article

Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games

1,2
Received: 1 July 2010; in revised form: 26 September 2010 / Accepted: 15 October 2010 / Published: 20 October 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic)
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Abstract: We introduce consistency of beliefs in the space of hierarchies of conditional beliefs (Battigalli and Siniscalchi) and use it to provide epistemic conditions for equilibria in finite multi-stage games with observed actions.
Keywords: hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium hierarchies of conditional beliefs; epistemic conditions; common belief; correlated subgame perfect equilibrium
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Barelli, P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games 2010, 1, 415-421.

AMA Style

Barelli P. Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games. Games. 2010; 1(4):415-421.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Barelli, Paulo. 2010. "Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games." Games 1, no. 4: 415-421.


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