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Games 2010, 1(4), 357-380; doi:10.3390/g1040357

Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Network Good Production

1 Department of Sociology/ICS, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS, Utrecht, The Netherlands 2 Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 7 June 2010 / Revised: 7 August 2010 / Accepted: 6 September 2010 / Published: 28 September 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Networks and Network Formation)
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If actors want to reach a particular goal, they are often better off forming collaborative relations and investing together rather than investing separately. We study the coordination and cooperation problems that might hinder successful collaboration in a dynamic network setting. We develop an experiment in which coordination problems are mainly due to finding partners for collaboration, while cooperation problems arise at the investment levels of partners who have already agreed to collaborate. The results show that as costs of forming links increase, groups succeed less often in solving the coordination problem. Still, if subjects are able to solve the coordination problem, they invest in a suboptimal way in the network good. It is mostly found that if cooperation is successful in terms of investment, it is due to subjects being able to monitor how much their partners invest. Moreover, subjects deal better with the coordination and cooperation problems as they gain experience.
Keywords: network formation; coordination; cooperation; experiments; collective goods network formation; coordination; cooperation; experiments; collective goods
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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Knigge, A.; Buskens, V. Coordination and Cooperation Problems in Network Good Production. Games 2010, 1, 357-380.

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