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The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan
Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 23 January 2010; in revised form: 2 April 2010 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published: 15 April 2010
Abstract: We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström . In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.
Keywords: coalition formation; non-cooperative implementation; partition function; recursive core
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MDPI and ACS Style
Huang, C.-Y.; Sjöström, T. The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games. Games 2010, 1, 66-88.
Huang C-Y, Sjöström T. The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games. Games. 2010; 1(2):66-88.
Huang, Chen-Ying; Sjöström, Tomas. 2010. "The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games." Games 1, no. 2: 66-88.