Games 2010, 1(2), 66-88; doi:10.3390/g1020066

The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games

1 Department of Economics, National Taiwan University, 21 Hsu-Chow Road, Taipei, Taiwan 2 Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08901, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 23 January 2010; in revised form: 2 April 2010 / Accepted: 8 April 2010 / Published: 15 April 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
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Abstract: We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies.
Keywords: coalition formation; non-cooperative implementation; partition function; recursive core

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MDPI and ACS Style

Huang, C.-Y.; Sjöström, T. The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games. Games 2010, 1, 66-88.

AMA Style

Huang C-Y, Sjöström T. The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games. Games. 2010; 1(2):66-88.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Huang, Chen-Ying; Sjöström, Tomas. 2010. "The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games." Games 1, no. 2: 66-88.

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