Next Article in Journal
The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
Previous Article in Journal
The Influence of Priming on Reference States
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2010, 1(1), 53-65;

(Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One?

Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Straße 10, 07745 Jena, Germany
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Sonnemannstraße 9-11, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 18 February 2010 / Revised: 15 March 2010 / Accepted: 19 March 2010 / Published: 23 March 2010
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [188 KB, uploaded 23 March 2010]


Game and decision theory start from rather strong premises. Preferences, represented by utilities, beliefs represented by probabilities, common knowledge and symmetric rationality as background assumptions are treated as “given.” A richer language enabling us to capture the process leading to what is “given” seems superior to the stenography of decision making in terms of utility cum probability. However, similar to traditional rational choice modeling, boundedly rational choice modeling, as outlined here, is far from being a “global” theory with empirical content; rather it serves as a tool to formulate “local” theories with empirical content. View Full-Text
Keywords: bounded rationality; methodology of decision; game theory bounded rationality; methodology of decision; game theory
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Güth, W.; Kliemt, H. (Un)Bounded Rationality in Decision Making and Game Theory – Back to Square One? Games 2010, 1, 53-65.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics



[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top