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Games 2010, 1(2), 137-158; doi:10.3390/g1020137
Article

Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?

 and *
Received: 11 May 2010; in revised form: 1 June 2010 / Accepted: 14 June 2010 / Published: 24 June 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Download PDF [486 KB, uploaded 24 June 2010]
Abstract: The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases.
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; coalition formation; justice and fairness International Environmental Agreements; coalition formation; justice and fairness
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Grüning, C.; Peters, W. Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements? Games 2010, 1, 137-158.

AMA Style

Grüning C, Peters W. Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements? Games. 2010; 1(2):137-158.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Grüning, Christine; Peters, Wolfgang. 2010. "Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?" Games 1, no. 2: 137-158.

Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert