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Games
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Coalition Formation
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Coalition Formation

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 May 2010) | Viewed by 43079

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
Interests: cooperative and non-cooperative game theory; evolutionary game theory; public goods; intertemporal choice; experimental economics; financial economics

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Since the earliest days of mankind we have realized that there are gains from cooperating with others. As a consequence our socio-economic environment abounds with group structures like families, clubs, firms, political interest groups, military alliances and all kinds of international organizations and agreements. While the early literature in cooperative game theory has taken the coalition structure as exogenously given and has focused on the question of how the gains from cooperation are distributed among the members of a coalition, the theory of coalition formation deals with the emergence and stability of coalitions among individual decision makers. The problem of coalition formation becomes very complex if coalitions impose externalities on each other and if multiple memberships are allowed. For the Special Issue in Games I invite original contributions on coalition formation (including matching problems) from cooperative and non-cooperative game theory as well as from experimental economics. General and applied contributions, e.g. dealing with international environmental agreements, are equally welcome.

Prof. Dr. Anke Gerber
Guest Editor

Keywords

  • coalition formation
  • matching
  • farsightedness
  • international agreements

Published Papers (6 papers)

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Research

262 KiB  
Article
Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization
by Sylvain Béal, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Amandine Ghintran and Philippe Solal
Games 2010, 1(3), 338-356; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030338 - 21 Sep 2010
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 6864
Abstract
We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for [...] Read more.
We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
223 KiB  
Article
Universally Balanced Combinatorial Optimization Games
by Gabrielle Demange and Xiaotie Deng
Games 2010, 1(3), 299-316; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030299 - 13 Sep 2010
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6386
Abstract
This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer [...] Read more.
This article surveys studies on universally balanced properties of cooperative games defined in a succinct form. In particular, we focus on combinatorial optimization games in which the values to coalitions are defined through linear optimization programs, possibly combinatorial, that is subject to integer constraints. In economic settings, the integer requirement reflects some forms of indivisibility. We are interested in the classes of games that guarantee a non-empty core no matter what are the admissible values assigned to the parameters defining these programs. We call such classes universally balanced. We present characterization and complexity results on the universally balancedness property for some classes of interesting combinatorial optimization games. In particular, we focus on the algorithmic properties for identifying universally balancedness for the games under discussion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
183 KiB  
Article
Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
by P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Games 2010, 1(3), 286-298; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1030286 - 02 Sep 2010
Cited by 18 | Viewed by 7710
Abstract
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if [...] Read more.
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
215 KiB  
Article
Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation
by Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov
Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020159 - 25 Jun 2010
Viewed by 5984
Abstract
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average [...] Read more.
We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
486 KiB  
Article
Can Justice and Fairness Enlarge International Environmental Agreements?
by Christine Grüning and Wolfgang Peters
Games 2010, 1(2), 137-158; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020137 - 24 Jun 2010
Cited by 12 | Viewed by 8670
Abstract
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a [...] Read more.
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
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311 KiB  
Article
The Recursive Core for Non-Superadditive Games
by Chen-Ying Huang and Tomas Sjöström
Games 2010, 1(2), 66-88; https://doi.org/10.3390/g1020066 - 15 Apr 2010
Cited by 4 | Viewed by 6845
Abstract
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically [...] Read more.
We study the recursive core introduced in Huang and Sjöström [8]. In general partition function form games, the recursive core coalition structure may be either coarser or finer than the one that maximizes the social surplus. Moreover, the recursive core structure is typically different from the one predicted by the α-core. We fully implement the recursive core for general games, including non-superadditive games where the grand coalition does not form in equilibrium. We do not put any restrictions, such as stationarity, on strategies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
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