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Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; doi:10.3390/g1020159

Article

Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

Emiliya Lazarova ¹  and Dinko Dimitrov ^2,*

¹ Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK ² Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Campus C3 1, 66123 Saarbruecken, Germany

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.

Received: 5 May 2010; in revised form: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 15 June 2010 / Published: 25 June 2010

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)

Download PDF Full-Text [215 KB, uploaded 25 June 2010 14:16 CEST]

Abstract: We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

Keywords: core; hedonic games; three-sided matching

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