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Games 2010, 1(2), 159-167; doi:10.3390/g1020159
Article

Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

1 and 2,*
Received: 5 May 2010 / Revised: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 15 June 2010 / Published: 25 June 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
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Abstract

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
Keywords: core; hedonic games; three-sided matching core; hedonic games; three-sided matching
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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Lazarova, E.; Dimitrov, D. Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation. Games 2010, 1, 159-167.

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