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Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation
Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK
Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Campus C3 1, 66123 Saarbruecken, Germany
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 5 May 2010; in revised form: 10 June 2010 / Accepted: 15 June 2010 / Published: 25 June 2010
Abstract: We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.
Keywords: core; hedonic games; three-sided matching
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Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Lazarova, E.; Dimitrov, D. Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation. Games 2010, 1, 159-167.
Lazarova E, Dimitrov D. Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation. Games. 2010; 1(2):159-167.
Lazarova, Emiliya; Dimitrov, Dinko. 2010. "Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation." Games 1, no. 2: 159-167.