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Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
FNRS and CEREC, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 43 Boulevard du Jardin Botanique, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
FNRS and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, 134 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 29 June 2010; Accepted: 27 August 2010 / Published: 2 September 2010
Abstract: A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
Keywords: coalition formation; farsighted players; stability
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MDPI and ACS Style
Herings, P.-J.; Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents. Games 2010, 1, 286-298.
Herings P-J, Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents. Games. 2010; 1(3):286-298.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2010. "Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents." Games 1, no. 3: 286-298.