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Games 2010, 1(3), 286-298; doi:10.3390/g1030286
Article

Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents

1
, 2,3
 and 3,*
Received: 29 June 2010; Accepted: 27 August 2010 / Published: 2 September 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Download PDF [183 KB, uploaded 2 September 2010]
Abstract: A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalition structure outside the set leading to some coalition structure in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of P satisfying the first two conditions. A non-empty farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a characterization of unique farsightedly stable sets of coalition structures and we study the relationship between farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set and the von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set. Finally, we illustrate our results by means of coalition formation games with positive spillovers.
Keywords: coalition formation; farsighted players; stability coalition formation; farsighted players; stability
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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MDPI and ACS Style

Herings, P.-J.; Mauleon, A.; Vannetelbosch, V. Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents. Games 2010, 1, 286-298.

AMA Style

Herings P-J, Mauleon A, Vannetelbosch V. Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents. Games. 2010; 1(3):286-298.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. 2010. "Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents." Games 1, no. 3: 286-298.

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