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Economies, Volume 1, Issue 2 (September 2013), Pages 14-18

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Editorial

Open AccessEditorial Forthcoming Issue on Game Theory and Political Economy
Economies 2013, 1(2), 14; doi:10.3390/economies1020014
Received: 15 September 2013 / Accepted: 15 September 2013 / Published: 17 September 2013
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Abstract
Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and
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Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations) to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms) and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations); available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated); agents’ motivations (material and/or social); and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition) or bounded (limited cognition). Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems) that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy. [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
Open AccessEditorial Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Great Recession
Economies 2013, 1(2), 15-18; doi:10.3390/economies1020015
Received: 24 September 2013 / Accepted: 24 September 2013 / Published: 24 September 2013
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Abstract
World economy is living a time of change, and the complexity of change has implied a new research agenda on the role of economic policy in society. The role, types and effects of economic policy have been major issues in economic science since
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World economy is living a time of change, and the complexity of change has implied a new research agenda on the role of economic policy in society. The role, types and effects of economic policy have been major issues in economic science since its origins. Jean Tinbergen (1956) [1] established the basis for the traditional theory of economic policy in economics and he tried to show how economic knowledge could be organized to regulate and guide economic systems. Nevertheless, this traditional approach has been improved through several contributions, for example when Eggertsson (1997) [2] incorporated the existence of incomplete knowledge, endogenous politics and institutional change in the theory of economic policy. [...] Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Great Recession)

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