Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population
AbstractWe develop a game theoretic model to analyze the Nash equilibrium of vaccine decisions in a hospital population with heterogeneous contacts. We use the model in conjunction with person-to-person contact data within a large university hospital. We simulate, using agent-based models, the probability of infection for various worker types in the data and use these probabilities to identify the Nash equilibrium vaccine choices of hospital workers. The analysis suggests that there may be large differences in vaccination rates among hospital worker groups. We extend the model to include peer effects within the game. The peer effects may create additional equilibria or may further cement existing equilibria depending on parameter values. Further, depending on the magnitude of the peer effects and the costs of infection and vaccination, peer effects may increase or decrease differences in worker group vaccination rates within the hospital. View Full-Text
Scifeed alert for new publicationsNever miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
- Get alerts for new papers matching your research
- Find out the new papers from selected authors
- Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
- Define your Scifeed now
Tassier, T.; Polgreen, P.; Segre, A. Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population. Adm. Sci. 2015, 5, 2-26.
Tassier T, Polgreen P, Segre A. Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population. Administrative Sciences. 2015; 5(1):2-26.Chicago/Turabian Style
Tassier, Troy; Polgreen, Philip; Segre, Alberto. 2015. "Vaccination Games with Peer Effects in a Heterogeneous Hospital Worker Population." Adm. Sci. 5, no. 1: 2-26.