Games 2010, 1(4), 551-585; doi:10.3390/g1040551
Article

Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature

Received: 27 August 2010; in revised form: 27 October 2010 / Accepted: 11 November 2010 / Published: 15 November 2010
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: We survey the recent literature on coordination games, where there is a conflictbetween risk dominance and payoff dominance. Our main focus is on models of local interactions, where players only interact with small subsets of the overall population rather than with society as a whole. We use Ellison’s [1] Radius-Coradius Theorem to present prominent results on local interactions. Amongst others, we discuss best reply learning in a global- and in a local- interaction framework and best reply learning in multiple location models and in a network formation context. Further, we discuss imitation learning in a localandin a global- interactions setting.
Keywords: coordination games; learning; local interactions
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MDPI and ACS Style

Weidenholzer, S. Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature. Games 2010, 1, 551-585.

AMA Style

Weidenholzer S. Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature. Games. 2010; 1(4):551-585.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Weidenholzer, Simon. 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature." Games 1, no. 4: 551-585.

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