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Article
Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
1
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
2
Department of Cognitive, Perceptual and Brain Sciences, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AP, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 30 September 2010; in revised form: 14 December 2010 / Accepted: 4 January 2011 / Published: 14 January 2011
Abstract: This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. We define contribution cycles as the number of contributors a player waits for before committing to a further contribution, and use a permutation test on contribution cycles to assign a measure of conditional cooperation to each group play. The validity of the measures is tested in an experiment. We find that roughly 20% of the plays exhibit dynamics of conditional cooperation. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.
Keywords: public goods game; real-time protocol; information feedback; conditional cooperation
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Cite This Article
MDPI and ACS Style
Levati, M.V.; Zultan, R. Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games 2011, 2, 1-15.
AMA Style
Levati MV, Zultan R. Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games. 2011; 2(1):1-15.
Chicago/Turabian Style
Levati, M. Vittoria; Zultan, Ro’i. 2011. "Cycles of Conditional Cooperation in a Real-Time Voluntary Contribution Mechanism." Games 2, no. 1: 1-15.