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Games 2010, 1(3), 338-356; doi:10.3390/g1030338
Article
Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization
1
CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté, 30, Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France
2
School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25, University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland, UK
3
Keleti Faculty of Economics, Obuda University, Tavaszmezo 15-17, H-1084 Budapest, Hungary
4
GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, 6, rue basse des rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 18 May 2010; in revised form: 6 August 2010 / Accepted: 14 September 2010 / Published: 21 September 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
Abstract: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Keywords: partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation
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MDPI and ACS Style
Béal, S.; Chakrabarti, S.; Ghintran, A.; Solal, P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games 2010, 1, 338-356.
AMA StyleBéal S, Chakrabarti S, Ghintran A, Solal P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games. 2010; 1(3):338-356.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBéal, Sylvain; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Ghintran, Amandine; Solal, Philippe. 2010. "Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization." Games 1, no. 3: 338-356.
