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Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization
CRESE, Université de Franche-Comté, 30, Avenue de l’Observatoire, 25009 Besançon, France
School of Management and Economics, Queen’s University Belfast, 25, University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, Northern Ireland, UK
Keleti Faculty of Economics, Obuda University, Tavaszmezo 15-17, H-1084 Budapest, Hungary
GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Université de Saint-Etienne, 6, rue basse des rives, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 18 May 2010; in revised form: 6 August 2010 / Accepted: 14 September 2010 / Published: 21 September 2010
Abstract: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Keywords: partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation
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MDPI and ACS Style
Béal, S.; Chakrabarti, S.; Ghintran, A.; Solal, P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games 2010, 1, 338-356.
Béal S, Chakrabarti S, Ghintran A, Solal P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games. 2010; 1(3):338-356.
Béal, Sylvain; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Ghintran, Amandine; Solal, Philippe. 2010. "Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization." Games 1, no. 3: 338-356.