Games 2010, 1(3), 338-356; doi:10.3390/g1030338
Article

Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization

1,* email, 2, 3 and 4
Received: 18 May 2010; in revised form: 6 August 2010 / Accepted: 14 September 2010 / Published: 21 September 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Coalition Formation)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: We study the solution concepts of partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria. The partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium is axiomatically characterized by using notions of rationality, consistency and converse consistency with regard to reduced games. We also establish sufficient conditions for which partial cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibria and partial cooperative Stackelberg equilibria exist in supermodular games. Finally, we provide an application to strategic network formation where such solution concepts may be useful.
Keywords: partial cooperative equilibrium; supermodular games; network formation
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MDPI and ACS Style

Béal, S.; Chakrabarti, S.; Ghintran, A.; Solal, P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games 2010, 1, 338-356.

AMA Style

Béal S, Chakrabarti S, Ghintran A, Solal P. Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization. Games. 2010; 1(3):338-356.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Béal, Sylvain; Chakrabarti, Subhadip; Ghintran, Amandine; Solal, Philippe. 2010. "Partial Cooperative Equilibria: Existence and Characterization." Games 1, no. 3: 338-356.

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