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Sustainability 2015, 7(4), 4280-4309; doi:10.3390/su7044280

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

1,†,* , 1
and
2,†
1
College of Management and Economics, Institute for Manufacturing and Logistics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2
School of Business, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China
These authors contributed equally to this work.
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Tsan-Ming Choi
Received: 30 October 2014 / Revised: 3 March 2015 / Accepted: 4 March 2015 / Published: 14 April 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sustainability in Fashion Business Operations)
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Abstract

We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emission-reduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings. View Full-Text
Keywords: fashion business operations; carbon tax; emission reduction incentive; third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS); transfer payment; supply chain structure fashion business operations; carbon tax; emission reduction incentive; third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS); transfer payment; supply chain structure
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

He, L.; Zhao, D.; Xia, L. Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures. Sustainability 2015, 7, 4280-4309.

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