The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition
AbstractThis article studies a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer produces two substitutable products and offers respective service levels to customers who buy one of the two products. Each retailer can only order one kind of product from the manufacturer, and then sell them to the market at a certain sale price. The demands for two products are influenced not only by the service levels the manufacturer provides, but also the sales prices of the two products. Furthermore, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of members in the supply chain with the aid of the Stackelberg game, and discover a number of insights concerning some important parameters. Finally, Numerical analysis is presented to validate our theoretical results and compare channel performances. View Full-Text
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Han, X.; Sun, X.; Zhou, Y. The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition. Sustainability 2014, 6, 4339-4354.
Han X, Sun X, Zhou Y. The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition. Sustainability. 2014; 6(7):4339-4354.Chicago/Turabian Style
Han, Xiaonan; Sun, Xiaochen; Zhou, Yancong. 2014. "The Equilibrium Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Price and Service Competition." Sustainability 6, no. 7: 4339-4354.