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Algorithms 2009, 2(4), 1303-1326; doi:10.3390/a2041303

Incentive Compatible and Globally Efficient Position Based Routing for Selfish Reverse Multicast in Wireless Sensor Networks

1
Discrete Simulation Sciences, Los Alamos National Laboratories, Los Alamos, NM 87545, USA
2
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045,USA
3
Computer Science,University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
4
Mathematical Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA 91711, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 31 August 2009 / Revised: 16 September 2009 / Accepted: 29 September 2009 / Published: 14 October 2009
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sensor Algorithms)
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Abstract

We consider the problem of all-to-one selfish routing in the absence of a payment scheme in wireless sensor networks, where a natural model for cost is the power required to forward, referring to the resulting game as a Locally Minimum Cost Forwarding (LMCF). Our objective is to characterize equilibria and their global costs in terms of stretch and diameter, in particular finding incentive compatible algorithms that are also close to globally optimal. We find that although social costs for equilibria of LMCF exhibit arbitrarily bad worst-case bounds and computational infeasibility of reaching optimal equilibria, there exist greedy and local incentive compatible heuristics achieving near-optimal global costs.
Keywords: sensor networks; incentive compatible topology control; game theory; price of stability; price of anarchy; heuristics for NP-hard problems; location based routing; local algorithms; random Euclidean power graphs sensor networks; incentive compatible topology control; game theory; price of stability; price of anarchy; heuristics for NP-hard problems; location based routing; local algorithms; random Euclidean power graphs
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Eidenbenz, S.; Ercal-Ozkaya, G.; Meyerson, A.; Percus, A.; Varatharajan, S. Incentive Compatible and Globally Efficient Position Based Routing for Selfish Reverse Multicast in Wireless Sensor Networks. Algorithms 2009, 2, 1303-1326.

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