Reprint

Behavioral Game Theory

Edited by
January 2021
128 pages
  • ISBN978-3-03943-773-3 (Hardback)
  • ISBN978-3-03943-774-0 (PDF)

This book is a reprint of the Special Issue Behavioral Game Theory that was published in

Computer Science & Mathematics
Summary

How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they’re rational and can somehow predict each other’s behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They often do not conform to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium, or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social preferences, bounded rationality (for example, limited iterated reasoning), and learning from experience. This book brings together new advances in the field of behavioral game theory that help us understand how people actually make strategic decisions in game-theoretic situations.

Format
  • Hardback
License
© 2022 by the authors; CC BY license
Keywords
social preferences; third-party punishment; cognitive reflection ability; intuition; reflection; dictator game; ultimatum game; potential games; social welfare; risk dominance; payoff dominance; innovation diffusion; externalities; decomposition; strategic communication; two-stage games; pareto efficient equilibria; belief formation; learning; behavioral game theory; case-based decision theory; level-k reasoning; guessing game; cognitive load; endogenous depth of reasoning; strategic thinking; n/a