An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
AbstractI argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ or the ‘subject combination problem’, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature’s sole ontological primitive. We, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. As such, the challenge to artificially create individualized consciousness becomes synonymous with the challenge to artificially induce abiogenesis. View Full-Text
Share & Cite This Article
Kastrup, B. An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophies 2017, 2, 10.
Kastrup B. An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophies. 2017; 2(2):10.Chicago/Turabian Style
Kastrup, Bernardo. 2017. "An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem." Philosophies 2, no. 2: 10.
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.