Table of Contents

Abstract: Theorists of language have argued that co-speech hand gestures are an intentional part of social communication. The present study provides evidence for these claims by showing that speakers adjust their gesture use according to their perceived relevance to the audience. Participants were asked to read about items that were and were not useful in a wilderness survival scenario, under the pretense that they would then explain (on camera) what they learned to one of two different audiences. For one audience (a group of college students in a dormitory orientation activity), the stakes of successful communication were low; for the other audience (a group of students preparing for a rugged camping trip in the mountains), the stakes were high. In their explanations to the camera, participants in the high stakes condition produced three times as many representational gestures, and spent three times as much time gesturing, than participants in the low stakes condition. This study extends previous research by showing that the anticipated consequences of one’s communication—namely, the degree to which information may be useful to an intended recipient—influences speakers’ use of gesture.

Abstract: Constructing a personal identity is an activity much more complex than elaborating a series of online profiles, which are only digital hints of the Self. The construction of our personal identity is a context-mediated activity. Our hypothesis is that young people are enabled, as digital natives and social network users, to co-construct the “context of communication” in which their narrative identities will be interpreted and understood. In particular, the aim of this paper is to show that such “context of communication”, which can be seen as the hermeneutical counterpart of the “networked publics” elaborated by Danah Boyd, emerges out of the tension between trust and privacy. In other terms, it is, on the one hand, the outcome of a web of trustful relations and, on the other, the framework in which the informational norms regulating teens’ expectations of privacy protection are set and evaluated. However, these expectations can be frustrated, since the information produced in such contexts can be disembedded and re-contextualized across time. The general and widespread use of information technology is, in fact, challenging our traditional way of thinking about the world and our identities in terms of stable and durable structures; they are reconstituted, instead, into novel forms.

Abstract: Remarking on the relationship between the concepts of trust and privacy, Charles Fried (1990, p. 56) [1] writes: Trust is the attitude of expectation that another will behave according to the constraints of morality… There can be no trust where there is no possibility of error. More specifically, man cannot know that he is trusted unless he has the right to act without constant surveillance so that he knows he can betray the trust. Privacy confers that essential right… Without privacy and the possibility of error which it protects that aspect of his humanity is denied to him. The important relationship between trust and privacy that Fried describes is often overlooked in the contemporary literature on privacy, as well in the recent publications that focus on trust and trust-related topics. The six essays included in this special issue of Information, however, give us some additional insights into certain conceptual and practical connections involving the notions of trust and privacy. In this respect, the contributing authors expand upon the insight in Fried’s classic work on the interconnection between the two concepts.[...]

Abstract: In 1872 Ludwig von Boltzmann derived a statistical formula to represent the entropy (an apophasis) of a highly simplistic system. In 1948 Claude Shannon independently formulated the same expression to capture the positivist essence of information. Such contradictory thrusts engendered decades of ambiguity concerning exactly what is conveyed by the expression. Resolution of widespread confusion is possible by invoking the third law of thermodynamics, which requires that entropy be treated in a relativistic fashion. Doing so parses the Boltzmann expression into separate terms that segregate apophatic entropy from positivist information. Possibly more importantly, the decomposition itself portrays a dialectic-like agonism between constraint and disorder that may provide a more appropriate description of the behavior of living systems than is possible using conventional dynamics. By quantifying the apophatic side of evolution, the Shannon approach to information achieves what no other treatment of the subject affords: It opens the window on a more encompassing perception of reality.

Abstract: This article explores some open questions related to the problem of verification of theories in the context of empirical sciences by contrasting three epistemological frameworks. Each of these epistemological frameworks is based on a corresponding central metaphor, namely: (a) Neo-empiricism and the gambling metaphor; (b) Popperian falsificationism and the scientific tribunal metaphor; (c) Cognitive constructivism and the object as eigen-solution metaphor. Each of one of these epistemological frameworks has also historically co-evolved with a certain statistical theory and method for testing scientific hypotheses, respectively: (a) Decision theoretic Bayesian statistics and Bayes factors; (b) Frequentist statistics and p-values; (c) Constructive Bayesian statistics and e-values. This article examines with special care the Zero Probability Paradox (ZPP), related to the verification of sharp or precise hypotheses. Finally, this article makes some remarks on Lakatos’ view of mathematics as a quasi-empirical science.

Abstract: Contemporary biological research (particularly in systems biology and the “omic” disciplines) is factually answering some of the poignant questions associated with the information concept and the limitations of information theory. Here, rather than emphasizing and persisting on a focalized discussion about the i-concept, an ampler conception of “informational entities” will be advocated. The way living cells self-produce, interact with their environment, and collectively organize multi-cell systems becomes a paradigmatic case of what such informational entities consist of. Starting with the fundamentals of molecular recognition, and continuing with the basic cellular processes and subsystems, a new interpretation of the global organization of the living cell must be assayed, so that the equivalents of meaning, value, and intelligence will be approached along an emerging “bioinformational” perspective. Further insights on the informational processes of brains, companies, institutions and human societies at large, and even the sciences themselves, could benefit from—and cross-fertilize with—the advancements derived from the informational approach to living systems. The great advantage fuelling the expansion of the bioinformation paradigm is that, today, cellular information processes may be defined almost to completion at the molecular scale (at least in the case of prokaryotic cells). This is not the case, evidently, with nervous systems and the variety of human organizational, cultural, and social developments. Concretely, the crucial evolutionary phenomenon of protein-domain recombination—knowledge recombination—will be analyzed here as a showcase of, and even as a model for, the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary mixing of the sciences so prevalent in contemporary societies. Scientomics will be proposed as a new research endeavor to assist advancement. Informationally, the “society of enzymes” appears as a forerunner of the “society of neurons”, and even of the “society of individuals”.

Abstract: It has been argued that the mental representation resulting from sentence comprehension is not (just) an abstract symbolic structure but a “mental simulation” of the state-of-affairs described by the sentence. We present a particular formalization of this theory and show how it gives rise to quantifications of the amount of syntactic and semantic information conveyed by each word in a sentence. These information measures predict simulated word-processing times in a dynamic connectionist model of sentence comprehension as mental simulation. A quantitatively similar relation between information content and reading time is known to be present in human reading-time data.

Abstract: Information is usually related to knowledge. However, the recent development of information theory demonstrated that information is a much broader concept, being actually present in and virtually related to everything. As a result, many unknown types and kinds of information have been discovered. Nevertheless, information that acts on knowledge, bringing new and updating existing knowledge, is of primary importance to people. It is called epistemic information, which is studied in this paper based on the general theory of information and further developing its mathematical stratum. As a synthetic approach, which reveals the essence of information, organizing and encompassing all main directions in information theory, the general theory of information provides efficient means for such a study. Different types of information dynamics representation use tools of mathematical disciplines such as the theory of categories, functional analysis, mathematical logic and algebra. Here we employ algebraic structures for exploration of information and knowledge dynamics. In Introduction (Section 1), we discuss previous studies of epistemic information. Section 2 gives a compressed description of the parametric phenomenological definition of information in the general theory of information. In Section 3, anthropic information, which is received, exchanged, processed and used by people is singled out and studied based on the Componential Triune Brain model. One of the basic forms of anthropic information called epistemic information, which is related to knowledge, is analyzed in Section 4. Mathematical models of epistemic information are studied in Section 5. In Conclusion, some open problems related to epistemic information are given.