Next Article in Journal
Of Coordinators and Dictators: A Public Goods Experiment
Previous Article in Journal
Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building
Previous Article in Special Issue
An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide
Games 2013, 4(4), 561-583; doi:10.3390/g4040561

Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity

 and *
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 777 Atlantic Drive NW, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 4 April 2013 / Revised: 3 September 2013 / Accepted: 26 September 2013 / Published: 7 October 2013
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [162 KB, 8 October 2013; original version 7 October 2013]   |  


The class of “stable games”, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009, has the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many evolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of the feedback-system-theoretic notion of a “passive” dynamical system. Motivated by this observation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements the definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics qualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition of passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary dynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.
Keywords: population games; evolutionary games; passivity theory population games; evolutionary games; passivity theory
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

Share & Cite This Article

Further Mendeley | CiteULike
Export to BibTeX |
EndNote |
MDPI and ACS Style

Fox, M.J.; Shamma, J.S. Population Games, Stable Games, and Passivity. Games 2013, 4, 561-583.

View more citation formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

For more information on the journal, click here


[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert